The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the "Cold War", which provoked the crisis of the communist system, and after him, the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet soldiers, the emergence of several tens of thousands of young military people with disabilities, aggravated the already heavy socio-economic crisis, in which the Soviet Union turned out to be in the second half of the 1970s., Made the burden of military expenses exorbitant for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The true causes of the war were in the inability of the Soviet leadership in a timely and correctly evaluate major dynamic changes in the Grand Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that made a bet on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth due to the younger generation, dissatisfied with its material situation.

In the region from the second half of the 1960s, new influence centers, alliances and stress lines began to be formed, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and arms trafficking, which in excess everywhere began to spread. The political spill in the region was not over the axis "socialism-capitalism", how it was mistaken to represented Moscow, but according to religious lines.

Entering troops and war could not be a response to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow continued to consider the Middle East region through the prism of his opposition from the United States, as a certain "big" game superpower with a zero amount.

The Afghan crisis is a sample of misunderstanding of its national interests, improper assessment of the situation in the world, region and in its own country, ideological, political myopia.

In Afghanistan, the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy was manifested by the real state of affairs in the world.

The middle and the second half of the 1970s were marked in the Middle East an increase in instability, which was the result of the anticolonial revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, awakening Islam. Especially violent issued 1979: The leader of the Arab world Egypt concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes a storm of indignation in the region; The revolution in Iran leads to power Ayatolla; Heracking Iraq Saddam Hussein is looking for an occasion for armed conflict and finds him in war with Iran; Syria led by Assad (senior) provokes civil war in Lebanon, in which Iran is drawn; Libya under the guidance of Gaddafi sponsors various terrorist groups; Resigned left-center government in Turkey.

The situation in the peripheral Afghanistan is radically. In April 1978, the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" comes to power, which declares the desire to build socialism. In political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a "client" of the USSR in the settlement of financial and economic and military assistance.

With Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is good, even excellent relations since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly relations with Soviet Russia. For all those who have passed since then, decades are not found in the Soviet history of the mention of Afghanistan in a negative context. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that is in the informal sphere of the influence of the USSR. The West this fact was in secretly recognized and never interested in Afghanistan. Even the change of monarchy to the republic in 1973 as a result of the palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April "Revolution" of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, they knew the leaders (Taraki, Amina, Karmalya) and many coup participants - they were often in the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the external exploration service) were worked with them.

It seemed that Moscow did not lose from changing the regime. However, the Socialists repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, repressive measures caused resistance to the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of "socialists" was steadily narrowed. The situation was used by the neighboring Iran and Pakistan, who began to refer to Afghanistan a group of their servicemen in civilian clothes, as well as maintain the opposition to weapons. Activity showed China. In parallel, historically existing and earlier contradictions between the leaders of the Socialists were intensified.

As a result, after a year, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new power - she was on the verge of falling. Under its control, there were only the capital and 2 more of the 34 provinces.

On March 18, 1979, Taraki in a long telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A.Kosygin explains the situation and persistently asks to introduce troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. Providest power. In each word, Taraki is swaying despair, the consciousness of hopelessness. Every question of the Soviet leader, he returns to the same urgent request - enter the troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership is not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin is perplexed why, they say, you can not protect yourself. Taraki recognizes that the regime does not have support among the population. In response to naive, ideologically caused Kosyagin proposals to rely on "workers", Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand people. The Soviet prime minister proposes how it seems to be a reasonable decision: the troops will not give, but we will put equipment and weapons in the necessary quantity. Taraki clarifies him that there is no one to manage tanks and airplanes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls several hundreds of Afghan officers who have trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them moved to the opposition side, and mostly on religious reasons.

Shortly before the Taraki in Moscow, Amin called and almost all the same, told the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Austinov.

On the same day, Kosygin informs about the conversation of his colleagues on the Politburo on a specially convened meeting for this meeting. Politburo members expressed, it would seem sensible considerations: the religious factor underestimated, the regime has a narrow social base, there is an intervention from Iran and Pakistan (and not the USA), the input of the troops will mean a war with the population. It seems that there is a reason to revise or at least correct the policy in Afghanistan: to start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common foundation for reconciliation, to form a coalition government, etc. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the strange line, which Kosygin offered Taraki, are ready to put weapons and techniques (which is no one to manage), but we will not enter the troops. Then he should have answered the question: what to do in case of an imminent drop in the regime, what is the mode and warns about? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is translated into the waiting plane and situational solutions. There is no strategy.

3 groups are gradually allocated to the Politburo: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, which, in the end, insist on the introduction of troops, 2) Kosygin, which is opposed to this solution to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who are silent or inactively support input troops. The patient L. Brezhnev is rarely rarely participating in politburo meetings and with difficulty focuses on the problems that need to be solved. These people enter the Politburo Commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, taking appropriate decisions.

Throughout the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin strengthen the pressure on the Soviet leadership requests to help the troops. The situation becomes so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - ambassador, representatives on the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves - Taraki and Amina. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful attempted at Amin occurs in Kabul, as a result of which he captures power, removes the Taraki, which is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

From this time, Moscow is asked to achieve the elimination of Amina, to which it does not trust, lead to the power of "his" person - Karmaly and stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Amine gives reasons: understanding that his survival now depends only from himself, he goes to a dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these are intelligent actions themselves, but committed without coordination and secret from the Soviet side, are considered as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to withdraw Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

In approximately October-November, the issues of special operation of the Soviet forces against Amina are being worked out, the cover of which should be the second, parallel and subordinate operation of the "limited" contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be the provision of the order in case of regular miscalculations with the support of amine among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul were replaced with new all major Soviet representatives, whose activity caused the growing displeasure in the Kremlin.

By December 1, the development of questions ends, and Andropov passes the Brezhnev note on this matter. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the input of troops is made.

Before making a final decision, he was actively resisted by the head of the General Staff Marshal N. Markov. It happened to its open clashes and stocking on elevated colors with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogrkov indicated that the army would have to enter into a war with a population without knowledge of traditions, without the knowledge of the terrain that all this will lead to the partisan war and great losses that these actions will weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogrovka warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. Only in one day at the airport of Kabul landing 215 transport airplanes (An-12, An-22, Il-76), which caused the strength of about one division and a large number of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of land forces focused on the Soviet-Afghan border, there was no border crossing on December 25, none in the following days. On December 27, Amin was eliminated and the Babrak of Karmal was shown. The troops gradually began to enter - more and more.

The war in Afghanistan left many non-healing wounds in our memory. The stories of the "Afghans" reveal us the mass of the shocking details of the terrible decade, which are not all want to remember.

Without control

The personnel of the 40th Army, which carried out his international duty in Afghanistan, constantly lacked alcohol. The small amount of alcohol, which was sent to the part, rarely reached the addressee. However, for the holidays, the soldiers were always in impitution.
This is an explanation. With a total deficit of the alcohol, our military adapted to chant moonshine. It is legally to do this forbidden to do the authorities, so in some parts there were specially protected moonshine points. Headache for homegrown moonshoes was the extraction of sugar-containing raw materials.
Most often used trophy sugar withdrawn from the Mujahideen.

The absence of sugar was compensated by local honey, according to our military, which represented "slices of dirty yellow color." This product was distinguished from the usual honey, possessing a "disgusting taste." Self-more unpleasant based on its basis. However, it happened without consequences.
Veterans recognized that in the Afghan war there were problems with the control of personnel, cases of systematic drunkenness were often recorded.

It is said that in the early years of war, many officers abused alcohol, some of them turned into chronic alcoholics.
Some soldiers who had access to medical preparations were addicted to the admission of painkillers - so they managed to suppress the uncontrolled fear of fear. Others who managed to establish contacts with Pashtuns, hooked on drugs. According to the former officer, Special Forces Alexei Chikishev, in some parts up to 90% of ordinary smoked charas (analogue of Gasisha).

Doomed to death

The Soviet soldiers of the Mujahideen were rarely killed immediately. It usually followed the proposal to accept Islam, in the event of a refusal, the soldier was actually sentenced to death. True, as a "gesture of goodwill" militants could give a prisoner human rights organization or exchange to their own, but it is rather an exception to the rules.

Almost all Soviet prisoners of war were held in Pakistani camps, to rescue them from where it was impossible. After all, for all USSR in Afghanistan did not fought. The conditions for the content of our soldiers were unbearable, many said that it was better to die from the guard, than to endure these torments. It was even more terrible torture, from one description of which it becomes not in itself.
The American journalist George Crav wrote that shortly after entering the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan, five jute bags appeared next to the runway. Pushing one of them, the soldier saw the sheltered blood. After opening the bags in front of our military, a terrible picture appeared: in each of them there was a young internationalist wrapped in his own skin. Doctors found that at first the skin was cut on his stomach, and then tied a knot over his head.
The Poland nicknamed "Red Tulip". Before the execution of the prisoner, they pumped up drugs, bringing to unconsciousness, but heroin stopped acting long before his death. At first, the doomed experienced the strongest pain shock, then started to go crazy and eventually died in inhuman torment.

Worked what they wanted

Local residents were often extremely cruel to Soviet commercialists. Veterans with shudders remembered how the peasants finished the Soviet wounded shovels and hoes. Sometimes it gave rise to a ruthless answer from the colleagues of the dead, there were cases and absolutely unjustified cruelty.
The Efreitor of the Airborne Forces Sergey Boyarkin in the book "Soldiers of the Afghan War" described the episode of patrolling his battalion in the vicinity of Kandahar. The paratroopers were entertained by shot from cattle machine guns, while Afghan was caught on their way, he suffered a donkey. Thille thinking, in a man I was allowed, and one of the military decided to cut off the victim's ears into memory.

Boyarkin also described the favorite habit of some military to throw compromising Afghans. During the search, patrol imperceptibly pulled out a cartridge from his pocket, pretending to be discovered in Afghan's things. After presenting such evidence of guilt, the local resident could shoot right on the spot.
Victor Mochkin, who served as a mechanic driver in the 70th Brigade, stationed under the Kandahar, recalled the incident in the Tarinnot village. Previously, the settlement was fed from Grad and artillery, in a panic ran out of the village of local residents, including women and children, the Soviet soldiers finished off from the "chill." In total, about 3000 Pashtuns died here.

"Afghan syndrome"

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, but the extension of that merciless war remained - they were called "Afghan syndrome". Many Afghan soldiers, returning to a peaceful life, could not find a place in it. Statistics that appeared a year after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, showed scary figures:
About 3,700 war veterans were in prisons, 75% of Afghan family families faced either with divorces, or with the exacerbation of conflicts, almost 70% of international players were not satisfied with the work, 60% were abused by alcohol or drugs, among the "Afghans" turned out to be a high level of suicide. .
In the early 90s, a study was conducted, which would have shown that at least 35% of war veterans need psychological treatment. Unfortunately, with time, old mental injuries without qualified assistance tend to exacerbate. Similar problem existed in the United States.
But if in the USA in the 1980s, a state program of assistance to veterans of the Vietnamese War was developed, the budget of which amounted to 4 billion dollars, then in Russia and the CIS countries of the system rehabilitation of "Afghans" is not conducted. And it is unlikely that something will change in the near future.

We continue a series of publications about war in Afghanistan.

efreitor Airborne Sergey Boyarknefreitor Airborne Sergey Boyarkin
(317 PDP, Kabul, 1979-81gg.)

For all time in Afghanistan (almost a year and a half) since December 1979. I have heard so many stories as our paratroopers have just killed the civilian population that they simply do not consider, and never heard our soldiers save someone from Afghans - in a soldier's environment such an act would be regarded as aiding enemy.

Even during the December coup in Kabul, who lasted all night on December 27, 1979, some paratroopers shot unarmed people who saw on the streets - then without the shade of regret, they had fun about it as funny cases.

Two months after entering the troops - February 29, 1980. - In the province of Kunar, the first combat operation began. The main shock force was the paratroopers of our regiment - 300 soldiers who landed from helicopters on a high-altitude plateau and went down to restore order. As I was told by the participants of that operation, the order was imposed as follows: in the villages they destroyed food reserves, killed all the lives; Usually, before entering the house, they threw a grenade there, then fired a fan in all directions - only after that they watched who was there; All men and even teenagers immediately shot in place. The operation lasted almost two weeks, but then people were killed - no one thought.

What our paratroopers came in the first two years in remote areas of Afghanistan - it was a complete arbitrariness. Since the summer of 1980. The 3rd battalion of our regiment was sent to the province of Kandahar to patrol the territory. Without afraid of anyone, they quietly traveled along the roads and the Kandahar desert and could have been able to kill anyone who met any clarity to kill anyone who met on their way.

He was killed just like that, automatic queue, without going with the armor of BMD.
Kandahar, summer 1981

Photograph of the killed Afghan, who was taken from his things.

Here is the most common story that an eyewitness told me. Summer 1981. Province of Kandahar. Photo - On Earth is the dead Afghan and his downtown. Afghan walked his way and led ass. The Afghan's weapons had only a stick, which he drove the donkey. Just on this road, the column of our paratroopers was driving. He was killed just like that, automatic queue, without going with the armor of BMD.

The column stopped. One paratrooper approached and cut off the ears from the murdered Afghan - in memory of his combat exploits. Then a mine was installed under the corpse of Afghan to kill someone who detects this body. Only this time the idea did not work - when the column was moved, someone could not resist and finally, from the machine gun gave turn on the corpse - Mina exploded and ruined the body of Afghans into pieces.

The participated caravans were searched, and if we found weapons (and the old rifles and guns in the Afghans were almost always), they killed all people who were in the caravan, and even animals. And when there were no weapons from the travelers, then, sometimes, a faithful spent trick was used - during a search, the cartridge was pulled out of his pocket, and, pretending to be this cartridge, found in his pocket or in the thoughts of Afghans, presented his Afghan as proof His guilt.

These photos are taken from the killed Afghans. They were killed, because their caravan met with the column of our paratroopers.
Kandahar Summer 1981.

Now it was possible to motive: after listening, as a man is justified by a man, convincing that the cartridge is not him, they began to beat him, then they watched him on his knees to spill, but he was beaten again and then shot. Next killed the rest of the people who were in the caravan.
In addition to patrolling the territory, paratroopers often arranged on the roads and positions of ambushes on enemies. These "caravan hunters" never figured out anything - even the presence of weapons from the travelers - just suddenly shot from shelters in all who were held in the place, without sparing no one, even women and children.

I remember one paratrooper, a participant in the fighting, enthusiastically:

I would never have thought what is possible! We kill everyone in a row - and we are only praising and the awards hang!

Here is a documentary evidence. Wall newspaper with information on the combat actions of the 3rd battalion held in the summer of 1981. In the province of Kandahar.

Here it is seen that the number of taken into account killed Afghans is three times higher than the number of trophy weapons: 2 cars, 2 grenade launchers and 43 rifles were seized, and 137 people were killed.

Mystery of Kabul Mountains

Two months after entering the troops to Afghanistan, February 22-23, 1980, Kabul shook a major anti-government rebellion. Everyone who was then in Kabul, remembered these days well: the streets were filled with crowds of protesters of people, they shouted, arranged the riots, there was shooting around the city. This insurgency was not prepared with some opposition forces or foreign special services, it began completely unexpectedly for everyone: both for the Soviet military, located in Kabul and for the Afghan leadership. Here is how the Colonel-General Viktor Merimsky recalls the events in their memoirs:

"... All the central streets of the city filled excited people. The number of demonstrators reached 400 thousand people ... In the Afghan government, confusion was felt. Marshal S.L.Sokolov, Army General S.F. Akhromeyev and I left my residence to the Afghan Ministry of Defense, where they met With the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan M.Rafi. On our question, what happens in the capital, he could not answer ... "

The reason served to the impetus for such a turbulent protest of the citizens was not clarified. Only after 28 years I managed to find out the entire session of those events. As it turned out, the rebellion was triggered by the reckless entrance of our paratroopers officers.

st.Tentenant Alexander Vovk
Alexander Vovk

First Commander Kabul Major Yuri Nostriryakov (right).
Afghanistan, Kabul, 1980.

It all started with the fact that February 22, 1980, in Kabul, in Babule, Article Alexander Vovk was killed in Kabul - Senior Instructor on Komsomol Polytotel 103rd Airborne Division.

The first commandant of Kabul - Major Yuri Nostryakov told me the history of death. It happened near the "Green Market", where VOK arrived on UAZ, together with the head of the 123rd Wadd of the Colonel of Yuri dugröshev. They did not fulfill any task, but, most likely, they just wanted to buy something on the market. They were in the car, when it was unexpectedly produced one shot -pal fell in Vovka. Dvugroshev and the soldier did not even understand where they shot, and quickly left this place. However, the wound was fatal, and he almost immediately died.

Deputy. Commander of the 357th regiment Major Vitaly Azaburin (in the middle).
Afghanistan, Kabul, 1980.

And then it happened that the whole city stuck. Having learned about the death of his combat comrade, a group of officers and ensigns of the 357th parachute regiment headed by Deputy Comandor, Major Major, Vitaly Zababurin sat down in a BTRR and went to the scene for disassembly with the locals. But, having arrived at the scene, they did not bother themselves from finding the culprit, and they decided to just punish everyone on a hot head, who was there. Moving along the street, they began to loud and crush everything on their way: threw out houses with grenades, shot from automatons and from machine guns on the BTRAH. Dozens of innocent people got under the hot hand of officers.
The spread ended, but the whole city quickly flew around the bloody pogrom. Kabul Streets began to move thousands of indignantly citizens, riots began. At this time I was located on the territory of the government residence, behind the high stone wall of the Palace of Peoples. I will never forget that wild crowd, who instivables, from which the blood was stalled in the veins. The sensations were the most terrible ...

The rebellion was suppressed within two days. Hundreds of residents of Kabul died. However, the real instigators of those riots, which arranged a violence over innocent people, remained in the shadows.

Three thousand civilians for one punitive operation

At the end of December 1980 To our guard room (it was in the Palace of Peoples, in Kabul) have entered two sergeants from the 3rd battalion of our regiment. By that time, the 3rd battalion was already under the chamber for half a year and constantly participated in combat operations. Everyone who was then in the cauldron, and I, including, carefully listened to their stories about how they fight. From them I first and I learned about this major military operation, and heard this figure - about 3,000 killed Afghans in one day.

In addition, this information was confirmed by Viktor Mochkin, who served as a mechanic driver in the 70th Brigade deployed under the Kandahar (who was there and the 3rd battalion of our 317th parachute regiment). He said that the entire 70th Brigade took part in that combat operation. The operation passed as follows.

In the second half of December 1980, a large settlement was surrounded by a semiring (presumably taruncot). So stood about three days. By this time, they were brought out artillery and the installation of salvo fire "Grad".
December 20, the operation began: in the settlement, a blow from Grad and artillery was deposited. After the first salts, the village plunged into a solid cloud of dust. The shelling of the settlement lasted almost continuously. Residents to escape from shell breaks ran out of a village in the field. But there they began to shoot them from the machine guns, the guns of the BMD, the Four "Shilk" fire (self-propelled plants with four united large-caliber machine guns), almost all soldiers were shot from their automata, killing everyone: including women, and children.

After the art crest, the brigade went into a kislak, and there were killed the rest of the inhabitants. When the combat operation is over, the whole earth around was covered with people's corpses. We counted about 3000 (three thousand) corpses.

Combat operation in the village, carried out with the participation of the 3rd battalion of our regiment.
Kandahar, summer 1981

The international warriors are not the heroes, and the USSR led the conciliatory company, supporting the illegitimate government and wanting to impose their bloody communist regime to the freedom-loving Afghans. Mujahideen - not the bandits at all, but fighters for freedom. The United States of the Breasts of his best sons rose on the path of Soviet aggression and saved the country, forcing the communists to bring their troops after terrible losses.

Familiar song? How many times I was surprised at how you can reinstate the story, while not even waiting for those who know the truth will leave. Creators of new myths are not afraid of expulsion in lies. They always have for everything a universal excuse - the truth is defended by the wolken wool, which herself does not know freedom and the whole world wants to turn into her gloomy mordor.

That, in theory, there must be an ominous laughter behind the scenes ... But there will be facts and only facts. From who in Afghan was, and whom you can blame for how much of his testimony is the foregoing of history and time will not change.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General, the last commander of the 40th Army, (the backbone of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan) Boris Gromov, not so long ago, clearly and reasonably once again divided the mythotorhood of propagandon under zero.

I will summarize, but I suspect a short statement to many of them will not like it.

1. No "Soviet-Afghan" conflict did not exist. "The so-called Soviet-Afghan war implies that the conflict was bilateral, that is, it was a confrontation between the USSR and Afghanistan, and this is actually incorrect. In fact, the Afghan conflict was an internal confrontation between the legal government headed by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (NDPA) and the Mujaheds - or Dreshans, the Bands of Islamists and other rebels "- the exact phrase of the general.
The Soviet army was present in Afghanistan legally and at the invitation of the government, but the myth of the conflict between the countries was popularized by the West during the so-called Cold War. It was necessary to somehow give the appearance of the Mujahidee, supported by the United States and their allies, at least the visibility of the fighters "for the truth"

2. The USSR lost the war in Afghanistan and was with a disgrace from there I was expelled. Again, in the root, the wrong statement is starting from the fact that the war of the Soviet Union with Afghanistan was not, and ending with the goals of the USSR army there.
"First, it is important to emphasize that, being the commander of the Soviet Army to the Dra, I have never received orders to" win "in Afghanistan. At his peak, the 40th Army consisted of only 108 thousand 800 people, and this clearly indicates that no one has sought the classic military victory in Afghanistan, "said Gromov and added that Soviet soldiers. Providing the normal functioning of legitimate power, coped with their tasks.

Yes, Najibullah regime was overthrown. But when? When his ally himself became a victim. The USSR was destroyed, and receivers did not have to protect the interests of their country. They had other priorities.

3. Soviet soldiers with incredible cruelty treated with the local population, because they were ready to help the Mujahedam even at the cost of their own lives. Ha. Three times ha.
"In fact, the Soviet Union has implemented numerous civil, economic and political programs aimed at improving living conditions for the local population," said Gromov. Only in 1982, the 40th Army held 127 civil operations, which included repair of houses, the construction of roads, distribution of food and medicine to local residents and holding cultural events.

4. The United States won, brought peace and happiness on the land bleeding by the Soviet troops, now Afghans can live there as they themselves want themselves and as opposed to the ancestors ..
This is generally very interesting approval. If the conclusion of the Moscow Army's conclusion was quiet there, now - despite the fact that the declared in 2014, the withdrawal of Americans from Afghan did not take place - the Taliban controls seventy percent of the Afghan territories.

Whether residents can be judged by the huge number of Afghan refugees, and in what conditions they have to live with the Taliban, it is better to be silent at all - they will be bad, they will become bad not only to defenders of the rights and freedoms of women.

Quite interesting facts - moreover, only the facts, without any lyrics. Under the pretext of the causation of happiness and democracy, and in fact - the seizure of the sphere of influence, for which the USA struggled from the USSR, a whole country was destroyed.

Under this was a powerful acquittal foundation: this was wanted by civilians who rebel once against Najibulla regime.

I have no idea what degree of naivety should have to believe in a fairy tale about the freedom that has come there ... Nevertheless, the scheme is rehearsed and works. And where - you can see ...

A few days ago I returned from Afghanistan, brought from there more than a thousand photoraraphy and now I am preparing a big cycle of posts about Afghan - it will be interesting, so add me in friendswho still have not done so now. I will tell you about the Afghan capital - the city of Kabul, about life in the Afghan province, about how to live in modern Afghanistan women, and several large longrides will be devoted to such a topic as the Afghan war of 1979-89 - which touched upon his black shadow of many families in Former.

Trainings on Panjester and Salangu, having communicated with the Afghans and having studied the remnants of the broken military equipment from the Ovolin of Dusty Mountain Roads, I realized that the USSR did not imagine too much, what he is involved in the winter of 1979 - in centuries Afghanistan was a separate mountainous country living in his Customs, and to conquer His force did not succeed anyone for all past century - these mountains swallowed any number of people and techniques that foreign states sent here, and appearing and disappearing, like ghosts, partisan detachments violated all the supply of locations and fortresses - what made the presence here Alien army is expensive and meaningless.

To start a little story. It has long been looking at Afghan lands as very promising in terms of "accession" - at the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a poor agricultural country with a lack of industry, most of the population was poor and illiterate, and according to the Marxist theory, the revolution was about to break back in Afghanistan. According to the results of which Afghanistan was clearly supposed to become another Soviet republic and "join the family of fraternal peoples."

Now, few people know about it, but its first Afghan war of the USSR began at all in 1979, but exactly half a century earlier - in 1929, when to support the overthrown king of Amanulla-Khan. A detachment from the Soviet 2000 soldiers was rejected into an Afghan form, and the soldiers called each other oriental names. In the documents of military units, this operation was as "liquidation of banditry in South Turkestan", and its mention in historical documents was prohibited.

In the photo - the Red Army teams pass the bridge across the Amudarya River, followed by the lands of Afghanistan, 1929:

In 1978, a communist coup in Afghanistan (in some sources - organized and supported by the USSR), as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power in Afghanistan. Immediately, the USSR began to send his military specialists and KGB employees to Afghanistan to "organization of work in the field" - read, the preparation of Afghanistan to transform into the Soviet republic like the USSR.

It immediately caused resistance to the huge part of the population of Afghanistan - people knew that with the complete establishment of the Soviet authorities, their traditions and customs will come to the end, and all the unwanted to be taken to the camps to Kolyma and in Mordovia - as it was already with the population of "attached" the Baltic republics . It is here, then there was anti-communist rebellion there - the Martov rebellion became one of the most famous meat in the city of Herat, and "at the request of the Afghan comrades" of the USSR decided to introduce troops to Afghanistan.

02. And in the meantime we are going on the dusty streets of Kabul. A smooth road with a green dividing strip leads to the foothill, on which the Ruins of Palands are located Darul Aman and Taj Beck - the last one is still known as the "Palace of Amina", and it was from his assault on December 27, 1979 a Soviet-Afghan war started, which lasted almost 10 years .

03. Operation on the assault Palace of Amina wore the code name "Storm-333" - during her USSR planned to take the storm two palaces and, in fact, to kill the head of the state of Afghanistan - despite the fact that Amin was the Soviet ruler. In the USSR, it was believed that the amine "too unknown" and "may not have an Afghanistan not clear where."

04. This intention may tell a lot about the future plans of the USSR on Afghanistan - at the head of the country, the ruler should be held entirely (perhaps even sent from the USSR or graduated from any Soviet "diplomatic" university), after which a quiet sapoy, in For several years, Afghanistan was supposed to become the sixteenth Soviet Republic.

05. Hyfizuolela Amin, head of Afghanistan, was poisoned shortly before the storm of the palace - his closest entourage was flooded by the Soviet agent, which was poisoning. There are no suspects of suspects (also Soviet who did not dedicated to the details of the operation) did not even refuse the Amina, but the Soviet special forces who burst into the palace were killed in the palace - throwing several grenades in the room and his surroundings.

06. Operation on the storming of the bobs unfolded here on this field - in the left side of the picture you can see the palace Darul Aman, and in the right - Taj Beck Palace (Amin Palace). In 1979, the "Muslim battalion" of Soviet special forces was landed in this place - the battalion was called because all its participants were disguised into traditional Afghan clothes, and many moreover possessed Eastern appearance - everything was done in order to confuse as much as possible Afghans. Approximately the same thing happened - there, Soviet paratroopers first applied blue berets, which was confused by the Chekhov, first who took them for the UN's blue troops.

07. Almost until the most recent seconds of his life, Hafizule Amin did not believe that his palace storm the very "Soviet comrades", with whom he hugged yesterday. Already when grenades rushed in the halls of the palace, Amina ordered his adutentant to report on the "attack of unknown Mujahideen" Soviet Commandes - they say, shylya will help us now! When Adutante housed that the Soviet was attacked, the amine in rage threw the ashtray and shouted "to lie, it can't be!"

08. Quarters around the palaces are now, in fact, a fenced fortress - foreign specialists who need to be protected inside. Maybe in a few years the palaces will open to visit.

09. And after the fence you can see the remnants of the embassies of foreign countries - the building died during numerous hostilities, which was happening in Kabul since 1979.

10. Almost simultaneously with the assault of the Palace of Amin, a severe military equipment has begun on the road and tunnels on Salang Pass - this is a very important strategic pass in Afghanistan, in the Hindukush Mountains it connects the northern and central part of the country.

11. In the sixties, the USSR built here a road tunnel Salang - works led, mainly Moscow Metrostro-building. Slang helped build allegedly for "help in the development of Afghanistan", but the true purpose of the construction became clear only in 1979 - Salang tunnel, in fact, ran the straight road from the USSR directly to the capital of Afghanistan, in Kabul.

12. In fact, simultaneously with the Amin's Palace Salanging Operation through the Salang Tunnels from the USSR, military equipment - BMP, BTR, tanks and heavy artillery (including anti-aircraft) reached out.

13. If there were no Salang tunnel - then no matter what a large-scale military operation and speech could not be - without heavy equipment you will not have a long time. And so Afghans, in fact, themselves in the hands of the USSR keys from their capital, allowing to build a "strategic road" from the USSR right to Kabul.

14. Also on Salanga, you can see the remnants of "combat effort" of the road - along winding mountain tracks, and the Soviet military units were stood in the tunnel and gallery, which protected the columns of technology, which went from the USSR to the capital of Afghanistan.

15. Already at the end of December 1979, almost simultaneously with the assault of the Amin Palace on Salang began the first fighting - the Afghans tried to prevent the transfer of the Soviet troops and fired the columns from the mountains, and the USSR troops were fought from attacks.

16. Periodically, the subliments of the technique inside the tunnel of Slang - Mujahideen themselves were somehow swayed inside the tunnel and installed mines, which were then undermined when the columns of the technique were passing. At least one flammable inside the "fuel tunnel" meant death for the entire column - carbon monoxide and combustion products instantly filled the closed space of the tunnel, burning all oxygen.

17. Now, inside the Salang tunnel, large fans are installed, driving air, but in the tunnel still constantly it was possible from passing heavy cars.

18. However, now the salanga can be ride without fears - mines and shells here practically did not remain, and the tunnel itself began to fulfill the role of the usual trading road.

19. Cars on Salang:

20. Mountain roads:

21. Roadside buildings:

22. One of the galleries:

23. However, let us return in 1979. After the capture of the Palace of Amin and the transfer of heavy equipment through Slang, the Soviet army began to be densely justified in Kabul - the Central (Kabulsky) node appeared, which connected the Central Command of the Ca in Kabul with Kunduz Provinces, Nangar, Firebad, Baglan, Bullei-Humry, Gazni and others .

24. And the bases with the Soviet military equipment were here in these foothills - hence the Soviet command was calmly planned operations, while in 1980-81, the attacks of Akhmat-Shah Masuda squads did not have frequent from the nearby mountains, which came from Panjshera gorge.

25. Now in the area from the Soviet presence, there are only a few concrete buildings and half a decrease in rusty tanks T-55.

27. According to the stories of local, earlier baked and abandoned tanks here were hundreds - yes most of the equipment have already been sold on scrap metal to Pakistan and Tajikistan.

28. The remaining technique is the personal property of some kind of ex-Mujahed, which fought in the eighties in these mountains against the Soviet troops.

29. Tank gun trunk:

30. Tank:

31. Mountains, sand and spines:

And the secret of the world for Afghanistan is extremely simple - no need to climb into Afghanistan with military intervention and projects of the Soviet republics, it will only cause resistance. You just need to allow this country to develop normally, gradually increase GDP and improve education - which, in fact, with active assistance to the United States now and occurs. Slowly, step by step Afghanistan approaches civilization - every year the number of schools increases, the situation with the rights of women is improved, gradually grow salary, more and more people connect to the Internet, exchanges and wants to live in the world.

And personally, I look at the future of Afghanistan with hope - albeit not very soon, but this people, as a result, will be able to cope with the darkness and backwardness and to heal a normal civilized life. Just because as in the whole rest of the world - bad people in Afghanistan are less than good.