Confrontation with rabbits The Ivanovo Region Prosecutor's Office informed about a unique method of defending a defendant accused of petty theft. A 45-year-old unemployed man from Ivanovo was charged with theft (secret theft of someone else's property) from a barn and two private houses.

Chapter 6 “Party of the Supreme Council” Yeltsin’s base was radical reformers of about the same generation. In contrast to this “government of reformers,” the “party of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation” included people who may be less bright than the members of Gaidar’s team, but much more

Supporters of the Supreme Council I do not urge the reader to be loyal to the crazy communist idea, the implementation of which caused so much grief to Russia... and not only to Russia. But the fact remains - the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, even for purely reasons

OPEN LETTER to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev I address copies of this letter to the UN Secretary General and the heads of state - permanent members of the Security Council. I am writing to you on the issue

The Headquarters of the Main Command was created on June 23, 1941. Its composition was somewhat different from the project proposed by the People's Commissariat of Defense. It included: People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, N G. Kuznetsov.

Our project, which provided for the appointment of J.V. Stalin as Commander-in-Chief, should have been accepted. Indeed, given the order that existed at that time, one way or another, without J.V. Stalin, People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko could not independently make fundamental decisions. It turned out there were two commanders-in-chief: People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko - legal, in accordance with the resolution, and I.V. Stalin - actual. This complicated the work of commanding troops and inevitably led to unnecessary waste of time on making decisions and issuing orders.

We also proposed to include First Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin in the Headquarters. But J.V. Stalin did not agree.

A group of advisers on various issues was formed at Headquarters. In practice, the group played a nominal role, since all the advisers soon received other appointments, and their replacement did not take place.

Throughout the war, Headquarters was in Moscow. This had great moral significance. Due to the threat of enemy air strikes at the beginning of July, she was transferred from the Kremlin to the Kirov Gate area to a small mansion with reliable work space and communications, and a month later, operators of the General Staff - working body of the Headquarters.

On June 30, 1941, following the model of Lenin’s Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense during the period of foreign military intervention and civil war, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, an emergency body was created - the State Defense Committee, headed by I.V. Stalin.

The State Defense Committee became an authoritative body for managing the country's defense, concentrating all power in its hands. Civil, party, and Soviet organizations were obliged to comply with all his decisions and orders. To control their implementation in the territories and regions, military-industrial people's commissariats, at the main enterprises and construction sites, the State Defense Committee had its representatives.

At meetings of the State Defense Committee, which took place at any time of the day, as a rule, in the Kremlin or at J.V. Stalin’s dacha, the most important issues were discussed and resolved. Plans for military action were considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. People's commissars were invited to the meetings, who were to take part in ensuring operations. This made it possible, when the opportunity arose, to concentrate enormous material forces in the most important areas, to pursue a unified line in the field of strategic leadership and, backed by an organized rear, to link the combat activities of the troops with the efforts of the entire country.

Very often, heated debates broke out at GKO meetings, with opinions expressed definitely and sharply. If no consensus was reached, a commission was immediately created from representatives of the extreme parties, which was tasked with reporting the agreed proposals at the next meeting.

In total, during the war, the State Defense Committee adopted about ten thousand decisions and resolutions of a military and economic nature. These decrees and orders were strictly and energetically executed, work began to boil around them, ensuring the implementation of a single party line in leading the country at that difficult and difficult time.

On July 10, 1941, in order to improve the leadership of the armed forces, by decision of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Main Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and on August 8 it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ( Throughout the war, the Headquarters successively included B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff. The last change occurred on February 17, 1945, when by decree of the State Defense Committee the Headquarters was determined to consist of I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, N.A. Bulganin, N.G. Kuznetsova. - Approx. author). From then until the end of the war, J.V. Stalin was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. With the formation of the State Defense Committee and the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by the same person - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the creation of the structure of state and military leadership of the war was completed. The Central Committee of the Party ensured the unity of action of all party, state, military and economic bodies.

Now I began to work directly with I.V. Stalin. I had never had such close contact with him before, and at first I felt some constraint in his presence. In addition, my lack of experience in strategic matters affected me, and I was not confident in the accuracy of my forecasts.

At first, J.V. Stalin spoke to me little. It was felt that he was looking closely at me and that he had not yet formed a firm opinion about me as the Chief of the General Staff.

But as experience accumulated, I began to express my opinions bolder and more confidently and noticed that J.V. Stalin began to listen to them more and more.

On July 19, 1941, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, J.V. Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense.

It must be said that with the appointment of I.V. Stalin as Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense, his firm hand was immediately felt in the General Staff, the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the State Planning Committee of the USSR and in other government and national economic bodies.

Each member of the State Defense Committee received a specific task and was strictly responsible for the implementation of national economic plans. One of them was responsible for the production of tanks, another - artillery weapons, a third - aircraft, a fourth - supplying ammunition, food and uniforms, etc. JV Stalin personally ordered the commanders of the military branches to join the members of the State Defense Committee and assist them in their work to implement the program for the production of certain military products exactly at the appointed time and of the required quality.

Under the influence of party-political work, the improvement of the art of command and control, and the accumulated experience of armed struggle, the resistance to the enemy intensified. Warriors of all branches and types of weapons acted heroically and selflessly in battle. Military discipline has noticeably improved among the troops.

However, despite the energetic measures of the Headquarters and the front command, the situation at the fronts continued to worsen. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our troops retreated into the interior of the country. I have already said above that the most difficult situation developed in the first months of the war in the western and northwestern directions. In conditions of unfavorable developments in military events for us, the strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces also took shape. She was distinguished by very active forms and tenacity of struggle.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the State Defense Committee showed serious concern about the state of the country's air defense, since the fascist German aviation was very active. The enemy had high hopes for the Luftwaffe. He hoped to use a mass of aircraft to disrupt mobilization in the western regions of our country, to disorganize the work of the immediate rear, transport and state apparatus, and to undermine the will of the people to resist. Hitler showered the air robbers and their leader Goering with favors and rewards.

Analyzing the current situation and taking into account the unfavorable forecasts regarding the air defense of the state's main facilities, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with his characteristic energy, set about strengthening the combat capability of air defense. He invited a group of senior air defense officials to his place and strictly demanded that within two days they present fundamental considerations for strengthening air defense forces and assets, improving their organizational structure and management. The chief of artillery of the Red Army, General N. N. Voronov, generals M. S. Gromadin, D. A. Zhuravlev, P. F. Zhigarev, N. D. Yakovlev and others provided him with great and useful advice.

The main task of air defense then was to cover Moscow, Leningrad and other large industrial centers where tanks, aircraft, artillery weapons were produced, oil was extracted and the most important railway communications, energy and communications facilities were located.

The most powerful grouping of air defense forces and means was created for the defense of Moscow. In July, it already consisted of 585 fighter aircraft, 964 anti-aircraft guns, 166 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns, up to 1,000 searchlights and a large number of barrage balloons. This air defense organizational structure has completely justified itself. Fascist aviation, taking massive actions, suffered enormous losses, but was still unable to break through to Moscow in large forces. In total, many thousands of bombers took part in the raids, but only a few of them (two to three percent) managed to penetrate the city, and even those were forced to drop their deadly cargo anywhere.

During enemy air raids on Moscow, the Supreme Commander repeatedly appeared in the underground premises of the capital's air defense command post and personally observed the work to repel enemy air forces. General D. A. Zhuravlev led here calmly and clearly. After the raid, I.V. Stalin usually stayed and talked with the officer-operators. He asked them about what, in their opinion, the Headquarters still should do to ensure that the air defense was able to carry out its tasks, primarily for the defense of Moscow.

In the subsequent years of the war, air defense continued to improve and made a worthy contribution to the common cause of defeating the Nazi aggressors.

I still remember with great respect and gratitude the air defense personnel of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet: the soldiers and officers of these troops heroically, with true skill, repelled massive, almost daily enemy air raids on the city and fleet.

Of course, the process of creating Soviet strategic leadership bodies took some time and underwent a number of fundamental changes dictated by the course of the war and the nature of the military-strategic situation. But gradually, Soviet military science, guided by the experience of armed struggle accumulated even before the Great Patriotic War, achieved significant success in the area of ​​troop control.

The people - the command and political personnel and staff personnel at the operational-strategic level - were mostly well selected, and from among young, energetic and capable officers and generals. They eagerly set to work, daily improving their knowledge in the field of strategy and operational art. The General Staff, the Main Headquarters of the Naval Forces, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the commanders of fronts, navies, districts and their headquarters did a lot to ensure the greatest combat capability of the armed forces and win victory.

However, our lack of a supreme body of military leadership, which the Headquarters should have been at the time of the attack by Nazi Germany, naturally could not but initially affect the command and control of troops, the results of the first operations and the general operational-strategic situation. Moreover, the enemy has already gained considerable experience in Europe in organizing war and sudden invasions by shock forces. It must be admitted that both the commanders-in-chief of the directions and the front commands at the beginning of the war made significant shortcomings in troop control. This also had a negative impact on the results of the armed struggle.

I am sometimes asked why, by the beginning of the war with Nazi Germany, we were practically not fully prepared to lead the war and control the troops on the fronts.

First of all, I think it is fair to say that many of the then senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff overly canonized the experience of the First World War. The majority of the command staff at the operational-strategic level, including the leadership of the General Staff, theoretically understood the changes that had occurred in the nature and methods of waging the Second World War. However, in reality, they were preparing to wage war according to the old pattern, mistakenly believing that a big war would begin, as before, with border battles, and then the main forces of the enemy would only enter into action. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with offensive actions by all ground and air forces of Nazi Germany.

It must also be recognized that a certain share of responsibility for shortcomings in the preparation of the armed forces for the outbreak of hostilities lies with the People's Commissar of Defense and senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense. As the former Chief of the General Staff and the closest assistant to the People's Commissar, I cannot absolve myself of blame for these shortcomings.

Finally, an important role was also played by the fact that until the last moment - the beginning of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union - I.V. Stalin did not abandon the hope that the war could be delayed. This to some extent connected the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not dare to approach I.V. Stalin with the project to create Headquarters until the spring of 1941.

At the end of spring, I had to once again, already in an urgent form, ask the People's Commissar to report to I.V. Stalin on the need to consider the draft plan for organizing the Headquarters of the High Command developed by the General Staff and allow it to be tested in practice at large command and staff exercises. This time the report took place, and J.V. Stalin agreed to conduct such an exercise, but away from the border, somewhere on the line Valdai - Orsha - Gomel - r. Psel, and then present to him the draft organization of Headquarters, its functional responsibilities and working bodies.

Reconnaissance of the line for the exercise was carried out in May 1941, but the exercise was not carried out. Due to lack of time and other circumstances, activities for the practical preparation of the High Command Headquarters and its bodies were not considered.

Many chapters of my book will still talk about mistakes in troop control. This is especially true of the first period of the war, right up to the Stalingrad counter-offensive operation. Of course, this most difficult period for us consisted not only of mistakes. At that time, major operations were prepared and carried out, not without success, the enemy’s plan to capture Leningrad was thwarted, and the Nazi troops near Moscow were defeated. These and other battles and battles taught the command staff a lot. Our army matured, troop leadership improved. When the difficulties of the first period were left behind, the leadership of the armed struggle on the part of the Headquarters and the front command improved significantly.

Upstairs, at Headquarters, it was especially clearly visible that in war there are different types of mistakes: some of them are correctable, others are difficult to correct. It all depends on the nature of the errors and their scale. Tactical errors, as experience has shown, could be quickly eliminated by higher command. Miscalculations on an operational scale are immeasurably more difficult to correct, especially if the command does not have the necessary forces, means or time at its disposal to put these forces into action where and when it is needed.

To correct the operational-strategic mistakes made by the Headquarters and the command of some fronts in the summer of 1942 (which made it possible for Hitler's troops to reach the Stalingrad area and the North Caucasus), extraordinary efforts were required throughout the country.

Looking back, I allow myself to say that no military-political leadership of any other country would have withstood such tests and would not have found a way out of the extremely unfavorable situation that had arisen.

As you know, strategy is completely dependent on politics, and mistakes of a military-political nature on a national scale are difficult to correct. Only a country that is waging a just war and has the necessary military and material capabilities can cope with them. Conversely, when the goals of the war do not meet the vital interests of the people, mistakes of this kind, as a rule, lead to catastrophic consequences.

But there are also irreparable mistakes. Such a miscalculation was made by the fascist leadership of Nazi Germany when they risked attacking the Soviet Union. This miscalculation stemmed from an incredible overestimation of its forces and means and an underestimation of the potential capabilities of the USSR - a country where a socialist system exists, where the armed forces, people, party and government are united.

Intoxicated by previous easy victories, Hitler and his political and military entourage believed that their troops would march victoriously through the Land of the Soviets, just as they had in Western Europe. But this did not happen. Guided by the adventuristic, nationalist ideology of fascism, the Nazis were unable to correctly understand the issues that were decisive for the outcome of the war, which in preparation for war must be known and resolved without emotion, on the basis of the science of society and war.

Having soberly assessed the reasons for our unsuccessful operations in 1942, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, relying on the undeniable advantages of the socialist social and state system, were able to mobilize all the forces of the country for new efforts to repel the enemy. Thanks to the selfless support of the people, the Soviet Supreme High Command found the most acceptable methods and forms of struggle in the given situation, ultimately wrested the initiative from the enemy, and then turned the course of the war in its favor. After the Stalingrad operation, the leadership of military operations at all command levels of the Soviet Armed Forces, up to and including the Supreme High Command, reached high perfection. The majority of front and army commanders performed well. Having lost the initiative, the Nazi command failed to cope with the difficulties that arose both in terms of organizing operations and in their practical implementation, which significantly brought the hour of their catastrophic defeat closer. This was the beginning of the general defeat of Nazi Germany.

During the war, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government paid great attention to the leadership of the armed forces. During the war years, more than 200 meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party took place. Decisions made on issues of foreign policy, economics and strategy were carried out respectively through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars, the State Defense Committee or the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The work of the Headquarters was based on the Leninist principles of centralized command and control of troops. The headquarters directed all military operations of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, and built up strategic efforts during the struggle through reserves and the use of partisan forces. Its working body, as already mentioned, was the General Staff.

New forms and methods of warfare naturally required an organizational restructuring of military command and control. As a result of the measures taken, the General Staff was relieved of a number of functions that were transferred to other departments. The activities of the General Staff covered all types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces - ground, navy, aviation, etc. Its main attention was focused on operational-strategic issues, a comprehensive and in-depth study of the situation, on analyzing and ensuring the decisions of the Supreme High Command in organizational terms.

As a result of the reorganization, the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to carry out the tasks assigned to it much more effectively throughout the war. Of course, there were shortcomings even after the reorganization, but only in isolated cases and on some complex issues.

To improve the management of the fronts, on July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed three Main Commands of the troops of the directions: - North-Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council - A. A. Zhdanov, chief of staff - General M. V. Zakharov); - Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council - N.A. Bulganin, chief of staff - General G.K. Malandin); - South-Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S. M. Budyonny, member of the Military Council - N. S. Khrushchev [since August 5, 1941, chief of staff - A. P. Pokrovsky).

By creating the Main Commands of the Directional Troops, the State Defense Committee hoped to help Headquarters ensure the possibility of better command and control of troops and organize interaction between the fronts, air force and naval forces. It was assumed that the Military Councils of the directions, to a greater extent than the front commands, would be able to use Local forces and means in the interests of the armed struggle.

However, already the first months of the existence of the Main Commands of the Directional Forces showed that they did not live up to expectations. Headquarters still directly controlled the fronts. According to the practice that existed at that time, the commanders-in-chief of the directions did not have at their disposal reserves of troops and material resources to influence the course of military operations. They could not implement any fundamental decisions without the consent of the Supreme High Command and, thus, turned into simple transfer authorities. As a result, in 1942 the Main Commands of the Directional Troops were liquidated.

Headquarters again had to direct the actions of a large number of fronts deployed over a vast area. This was inevitably associated with significant difficulties, especially in the area of ​​coordinating the efforts of troops of several fronts operating nearby. The search began for new management methods, which ultimately led to the emergence of an effective form of direct influence of strategic leadership on the activities of the fronts. This is how a very unique institution of strategic leadership emerged - representatives of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, who were sent to the most important sectors.

Military history has known similar examples dating back to the First World War, when representatives of the high command, sent directly to the scene of hostilities, had a very important influence on the course of operations. In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, some Soviet generals, due to the prevailing circumstances, also had to work in the active forces under the authority of Headquarters and, using the power given to them, achieve a more favorable development of the situation. But now, after a year of war experience, the activities of Headquarters representatives in certain areas of the armed struggle took on a purposeful character. From now on, its representatives were sent only to those fronts or groups of fronts where the main tasks that determined the course of the most important operation or campaign were currently being solved.

Representatives of the Headquarters were appointed from among the most trained military leaders. They knew the situation in every detail and, as a rule, were participants in the development of the concept and plan for upcoming operations. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command steadily demanded from its representatives leadership and full responsibility for the decision of the operation and endowed them with full power for this purpose. In this regard, let me quote one of J.V. Stalin’s telegrams to the Headquarters representative on the Crimean Front L. Z. Mehlis in May 1942.

Having caught in a telegram from L. Z. Mehlis an attempt to evade responsibility for the serious failures of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, J. V. Stalin writes to him:

“You hold the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the Crimean Front’s cause. This position is very convenient, but it is completely rotten. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If the whole “situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning!”, and you did not take all measures to organize resistance, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as State Control, but as a responsible representative of Headquarters..." ( Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, f. 48-A, op. 1640, building 177).

There is hardly any need for any comments on this very clear document defining the responsibilities of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

As the scale of offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces expanded, the responsibilities of the Headquarters representatives also changed. For example, in the summer campaign of 1944 in the western strategic direction, the Bagration plan was implemented. According to this plan, developed by the collective efforts of the Headquarters, the General Staff and the Military Councils of the fronts, four Soviet fronts, long-range aviation, and partisans launched simultaneous attacks. They were given the task of crushing Army Group Center, the main group of troops of Nazi Germany.

The conditions of the situation then required expanding the powers of the Headquarters representatives. During the Belarusian operation, representatives of the Headquarters were given the right to directly manage the operations of the fronts. I was personally entrusted with the 2nd, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, with whom we directly interacted, led the offensive of the 2nd, 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

In my opinion, this measure of the Headquarters, which at that time provided broad initiative to its representatives, contributed to mobile, operational command and control of troops. The task assigned to the troops was successfully completed, and the Red Army then liberated Soviet Belarus, a significant part of the Lithuanian SSR and the Latvian SSR, the western regions of Ukraine and the southeastern part of Poland.

Who did Headquarters send as its main representatives to the active army?

First of all, members of the Headquarters, including K. E. Voroshilov, G. K. Zhukov, S. K. Timoshenko. The permanent representative of the Headquarters in the troops was the Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky.

In addition to the main representatives of the Headquarters, generals N.N. Voronov, A.I. Antonov, S.M. Shtemenko, L. Z. Mehlis and others were sent to the troops.

In addition to the authorized representatives who directly on the ground carried out the decisions of Headquarters on a particular operation, special representatives were also sent. They went to the troops in order to help the command of the troops and the main representatives of Headquarters in organizing the use of various types of armed forces and branches of the military.

Personally, during the war years I had to go to the active army as a representative of Headquarters at least 15 times.

Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky also visited the front a lot. More than once we had to travel together to the area of ​​military operations and participate in the development and conduct of such major operations as Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, the offensive in Right Bank Ukraine and the liberation of Belarus. Everyone who had to work with Alexander Mikhailovich noted his deep knowledge, clarity and clarity of thinking. A. M. Vasilevsky did not tolerate shortcomings and guesswork, but always demanded solid, accurate data and reasonable forecasts from those preparing the operation. I always remember with great satisfaction our friendly work in organizing and conducting operations.

Representatives of the Headquarters did not command the fronts. This function remained in the hands of the commanders. But endowed with great powers, they could influence the course of the battles in which they were located, correct the mistakes of the front or army command in a timely manner, and specifically help them in obtaining material and technical resources from the center. I do not remember a case of non-compliance with the recommendations of a Headquarters representative.

Of course, it should be said that not all of them fully possessed the same capabilities. Many representatives of the Headquarters did not have the power that, for example, A. M. Vasilevsky and I had: they did not have direct communication with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, did not have the necessary staff apparatus and means of communication, etc. This forced them to use workers and communications facilities of the front or army, which were already overloaded.

The Supreme Commander demanded daily reports or reports from Headquarters representatives on the progress of preparations and operations. Particularly important assessments of the situation and proposals for new operations, on the instructions of I.V. Stalin, were written by hand in one copy and delivered to him through A.N. Poskrebyshev. If for some reason there were no reports from Headquarters representatives during the day, the Supreme Commander himself called them on HF and asked: “Don’t you have anything to report today?”

I remember one incident in this regard. Somehow, at the end of September 1942, the Supreme Commander summoned me and G.M. Malenkov from the Stalingrad area to Headquarters. After I reported the situation, J.V. Stalin sternly asked G.M. Malenkov:

Why didn’t you, Comrade Malenkov, inform us about affairs in the Stalingrad area for three weeks?

Comrade Stalin, I signed the reports that Zhukov sent you every day,” answered G. M. Malenkov.

“We sent you not as a commissar to Zhukov, but as a member of the State Defense Committee, and you had to inform us,” said J.V. Stalin sternly.

The institution of Headquarters representatives existed almost until the end of the war. The need for it disappeared only during the final campaign. This alone convincingly indicates that the presence of such a management link in the strategic management system was extremely necessary and, of course, useful. The need for representatives of the Headquarters ceased only when the strategic front of the struggle was more than halved and the number of front-line formations decreased. By this time, front commanders had grown into major commanders, and headquarters had acquired experience in organizing and directing large-scale operations.

Therefore, the operations of the final campaign of 1945 were already prepared and carried out without the participation of representatives of the Headquarters. The leadership of the actions of the fronts in these operations - East Prussian, Vistula-Oder and some others - was carried out directly by Headquarters directly from Moscow. This was the case in the final battle of the war - the Berlin Operation, when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally took control of the fronts. Only Marshal S.K. Timoshenko remained with the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts until the end of the war in Europe.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the collective body for directing the military operations of the armed forces. Her work was based on a reasonable combination of collegiality and unity of command. In all cases, the right to make the final decision remained with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Concepts and plans for strategic operations and campaigns were developed in the working apparatus of the Headquarters - in the General Staff with the participation of some members of the Headquarters. This was preceded by a lot of work in the Politburo and the State Defense Committee. The international situation for this period of time was discussed, the potential political and military capabilities of the warring states were studied. Only after research and discussion of all general issues were predictions of a political and military nature made. As a result of all this complex work, the political and military strategy that guided the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was determined.

When developing the next operation, I.V. Stalin usually called the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy and painstakingly examined with them the operational-strategic situation on the entire Soviet-German front: the state of the front troops, data from all types of intelligence and the progress of training reserves of all types of troops.

Then the chief of logistics of the Red Army, the commanders of various branches of the military and the heads of the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who were supposed to practically support this operation, were called to Headquarters.

Then the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Supreme Commander and Chief of the General Staff discussed the operational-strategic capabilities of our troops. The Chief of the General Staff and the Deputy Supreme Commander received the task of thinking through and calculating our capabilities for this or those operations that were planned to be carried out. Usually the Supreme Commander gave us 4-5 days for this work. After the deadline, a preliminary decision was made. After this, the Supreme Commander gave the order to the Chief of the General Staff to request the opinion of the Military Councils of the fronts on the upcoming operation.

While the front command and headquarters were working, a lot of creative work was going on at the General Staff on planning the operation and interaction between the fronts. Tasks were outlined for reconnaissance agencies, long-range aviation, partisan forces located behind enemy lines, military communications agencies for the transfer of reinforcements and reserves of the Supreme High Command, and material supplies.

Finally, a day was appointed when the front commanders were to arrive at Headquarters to report on the front's plan of operation. Usually the Supreme Commander listened to them in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Supreme Commander and some members of the State Defense Committee.

After careful consideration of the reports, I.V. Stalin approved the plans and timing of the operation, indicating what exactly should be paid special attention to. It was determined who was personally sent by a representative of the Headquarters to coordinate the actions of the fronts and who would exercise control over the logistics of the troops and the timely regrouping of troops and reserves of the Supreme High Command.

Of course, its activities were far from limited to all these issues that the Headquarters had to resolve when preparing operations or military campaigns. Its volume and degree of complexity largely depended on where, when and against which enemy and with what forces and means the operations were carried out.

Headquarters decisions were communicated to the executors in the form of directives signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. Sometimes directives were given signed by J.V. Stalin and his deputy. Since 1943, the directives of the Headquarters, together with I.V. Stalin, were signed by A.I. Antonov, since the Deputy Supreme Commander and the Chief of the General Staff were often in the troops. When developing smaller operations, front commanders were usually not called to Headquarters, but, at its request, presented their views on the conduct of the operation in writing.

General plans for logistics support, as a rule, were previously developed at the General Staff with the participation of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army A.V. Khrulev, the Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate N.D. Yakovlev and other heads of the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, after which they were reported to Headquarters or the State Defense Committee. Those fronts that were to carry out the operation, simultaneously with the operational directive, received instructions on issues of logistics.

We have already said that Headquarters and the General Staff were in Moscow throughout the war. When German troops approached the capital, the General Staff was divided into two parts. One part, led by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky, remained in Moscow at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the other, led by B. M. Shaposhnikov, temporarily moved to the area where a reserve command post was prepared. However, she soon returned to Moscow. During the war, J.V. Stalin performed five duties. In addition to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he remained as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the State Defense Committee, and was People's Commissar of Defense. He worked intensely, 15 - 16 hours a day. J.V. Stalin highly valued the work of the General Staff and completely trusted it. As a rule, he did not make important decisions without first listening to the analysis of the situation made by the General Staff and considering its proposals.

Typically, the analysis began with data about the enemy. As the experience of war has shown, the ability of the command to skillfully conduct reconnaissance of the enemy, quickly process the received data and draw the right conclusions is of paramount importance. It must be said that during the entire war, the Headquarters, with the exception of some moments in its first period, correctly directed all types of intelligence, which carried out the tasks assigned to it in a timely and efficient manner, and learned to analyze the situation well.

The headquarters was well aware of the situation on the fronts and promptly responded to changes in the situation. Through the General Staff, she closely monitored the progress of operations, made the necessary adjustments to the actions of the troops, clarified them or set new tasks arising from the current situation. If necessary, it regrouped forces and means to achieve the goals of operations and the tasks assigned to the troops, and in special cases stopped the operation.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief established a strict procedure according to which the General Staff reported to him twice a day a map of the situation on the fronts with all changes over the elapsed time. The map was accompanied by a short explanatory note from the Chief of the General Staff.

An important link in the system of organs of the General Staff was a special corps of General Staff officers. Along with senior operational management officials, the so-called directional officers, they performed enormous work directly in the troops, including in combat areas. The size of the corps of General Staff officers made it possible to provide permanent representatives of the General Staff to all headquarters of fronts, armies, corps and divisions.

The selfless and useful work of these officers of the General Staff has not yet received a proper description in our military-historical literature. These were combat officers who knew their job. Many of them gave their lives in the name of Victory. Humble workers of war, they deserve our greatest gratitude and good memory.

The officers of the General Staff who worked in the troops, the directing officers who were in the apparatus of the General Staff, were worthy and tireless assistants to the Supreme High Command.

We have already said above that the work of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in leading the troops was distinguished by advance planning of military campaigns and strategic operations. In this regard, let me express my thoughts on the effectiveness of the plans and decisions of our Headquarters. It is known that any planning is groundless if it is not based on scientific prediction of the possible course of operations, forms and methods of armed struggle, with the help of which the goals set for the troops are achieved. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command saw further and better than Hitler's strategic leadership. She was armed, firstly, with knowledge of the general laws of struggle, based on the solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, she understood better than the enemy the specific situation that determined the course of events on the fronts. Therefore, as a rule, our Headquarters clearly understood the likely actions of the Nazi command and took measures to destroy its intentions and achieve its goal. All this taken together ensured the high efficiency of our military planning.

Of course, the activities of the Headquarters could not be limited to the management of only the main operations of the armed forces. The war required the firm hand of the Supreme High Command on the entire strategic front - on land, on water and in the air, and the forces operating in the main operations needed the support of the troops interacting with them in secondary directions. For example, at the end of the Stalingrad counter-offensive operation, a number of offensive operations were prepared and carried out on other fronts. Their goal was to pin down or defeat the forces and means that the Nazi command could transfer to the site of the decisive operation, where the enemy suffered one defeat after another and was in dire need of reserves. This was the case in the south of our country, on the Western and Kalinin fronts at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943. This was the case when the blockade of Leningrad was broken in January 1943.

Typically, operations in secondary directions were carried out not according to pre-developed plans for a military campaign, but in the course of the general situation in an administrative manner at the direction of the Supreme High Command. They were prepared in a limited time and were relatively small in scale. In their totality and overall results, together with the main operation, they constituted the content of the military campaign.

Planning and preparation of planned operations is a very complex, multifaceted matter, requiring not only sufficient time, but also a lot of creative effort and organizational efforts of a huge team of people, primarily the Headquarters itself, the General Staff and the front command. The burden of responsibility to the people, which rests on the shoulders of those entrusted with this work, is great.

The Battle of Kursk and its development were planned, for example, over three months in the spring of 1943. All subsequent campaigns - 2-3 months before the start of the offensive.

In preparing the campaign, the Headquarters, without revealing its essence, made sure to acquaint the front commanders with their specific tasks arising from the general plan of the upcoming actions. The commanders of the front troops, in accordance with the instructions received, developed and then submitted their views on the front operation plan to the General Staff. Here they were carefully examined, analyzed, corrected, and then, together with the front command, were reported to Headquarters.

In many cases, thinking through the course of armed struggle in upcoming operations, Headquarters was engaged in solving not only operational-strategic, but also fundamental tactical issues, for example, building battle formations of formations, methods of using artillery, mortars, tanks, etc. It even happened to solve some specific tactical issues of the situation when they directly related to the course of combat operations at key points of the front, armies, corps and divisions, as was the case, for example, during the defense of Stalingrad and there during the counteroffensive. Advance planning was based on complete and timely intelligence data, which allowed Stavka to have an accurate picture of the enemy's intentions and condition.

No less necessary was a correct analysis of the general military situation and our own strengths and capabilities. The active army, reserves of human resources and materiel have always come first in the calculations of the top military leadership. In addition, the Soviet Union was fighting a coalition war, so the plans and actions of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition were also taken into account.

An essential condition for the correct planning of campaigns and strategic operations was a deeply scientific prediction of the course of the war by the Soviet military leadership. Relying on it, the Supreme Command Headquarters correctly assigned precisely those forces and means that ensured the rapid defeat of the enemy in the operation and made it possible to create favorable conditions for further actions.

The events of 1943 give an idea of ​​the well-prepared, pre-planned operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Then, after the brilliant Battle of Stalingrad and the expulsion of enemy troops from the North Caucasus, successful operations followed near Ostrogozhsk and Voronezh with access to the Kursk Bulge. This made it possible to straighten the front in the Moscow direction, which was very important then.

As a result of the defeat of the strike group of fascist German troops in the Battle of Kursk, on the success of which Hitler’s high command had high hopes, we created for ourselves a favorable situation on the entire Soviet-German front throughout all further summer-autumn operations of 1943. In all these operations, the fascist German troops suffered major and irreparable losses in people, weapons and military equipment, and, most importantly, the morale of the fascist German troops sharply decreased.

Despite the absence of a second front in Europe, Nazi Germany was forced by Soviet troops to face a military catastrophe. For this catastrophe to become a fact, it was necessary to organize and carry out a series of new crushing blows. As you know, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command organized and carried them out brilliantly.

The actions of the Soviet troops had a huge impact on the military situation on other fronts of the Second World War. It was thanks to the victories of the Soviet Army that our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at this time were able to successfully conduct operations in Sicily and southern Italy.

The defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 completely undermined the confidence of Nazi Germany's satellites in the Hitler regime. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. An even more favorable strategic environment was created for the Soviet Armed Forces. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully used it to prepare for the 1944 operations.

At that time, none of the allies of Nazi Germany and neutral countries believed that the Hitler regime would be able to avoid complete defeat. But the most important thing was that even those circles in Germany that brought Hitler to power and fully supported him in subsequent years lost faith in Hitler’s leadership. Intoxicated by the intoxication of easy victories in the first period of the war, many in Germany realized that all the years of fascist power they had been captivated by destructive misconceptions, that Germany could not resist the Soviet Armed Forces, the growing anti-Hitler coalition.

Returning from the Tehran Conference, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief said:

Roosevelt gave his firm word to open broad Action in France in 1944. I think he will keep his word.

As always, in moments of good spirits, J.V. Stalin leisurely filled his pipe with Herzegovina Flor cigarettes, smacking his lips, lit it and, releasing several puffs of smoke, slowly walked along the carpet of his office.

Well, if he doesn’t hold back,” he continued, reasoning out loud, “we have enough of our own to finish off Hitler’s Germany.”

This conversation in J.V. Stalin’s office preceded a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee and some members of the Headquarters, which took place in December 1943. Here the issues of the military-political situation of the country were comprehensively considered. In this regard, A. M. Vasilevsky and I were called from the fronts, where we were then located as representatives of Headquarters. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief entrusted Alexander Mikhailovich and his first deputy on the General Staff, A.I. Antonov, with reports on the situation on the Fronts.

At this meeting, the main conclusion was made - the Soviet people, led by the party, achieved military-economic superiority over the enemy. Our superiority now determined the further course of the war. It followed that we had to outline ways to make the best use of this superiority.

Headquarters and the General Staff calculated all our capabilities and made a deep analysis of the enemy’s condition along the entire strategic depth of the front from the Barents to the Black Sea. The analysis showed that the turning point achieved during the war opens up broad prospects for us.

The superiority in forces and means over the enemy, the presence of initiative in the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces, the favorable location of troops, large human and material reserves and other favorable factors now made it possible to solve strategic problems on the Soviet-German front in a new way. The heroic and uninterrupted work of the Soviet rear ensured the systematic supply of the active army with everything necessary. Now we could prepare and conduct large operations not in one or two directions, but consistently along the entire strategic front. At the same time, the enemy's ability to parry these attacks was significantly reduced.

In a narrow circle of people who then gathered in the office of I.V. Stalin, the Supreme Commander raised the question of a new form of conducting the 1944 campaigns. Previously, he asked for the opinion of each of the participants.

The meeting, as usual, took place without minutes. They discussed where exactly it was necessary to concentrate forces and means for a new defeat of the main enemy forces and the final defeat of the fascist bloc. There were ten such areas along the entire strategic front. After discussion, the Supreme Commander ordered the General Staff to prepare preliminary calculations for carrying out strikes in these ten areas.

As soon as the main plan of each operation was outlined and the necessary forces and means were preliminarily calculated, the Headquarters, as usual, asked for the opinion of the commanders of those fronts where the operations of the winter campaign of 1944 were planned. When the proposals were collected, the General Staff began a broad development of all operations. At the same time, work was in full swing to prepare reserves, train them and arm them. The heads of the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the chief of logistics of the Red Army made a great contribution.

The Supreme Commander tirelessly supervised the preparation of the 1944 operations. He found within himself the strength and energy to always keep in view the comprehensive support of decisions made, paying special attention to tank forces, air force, artillery, and the organization of party political work at the front and in the rear.

Each period of the war and each major operation had its own characteristic features. A distinctive feature of the operations of 1944 was the power of the attacks and their surprise in different areas of the strategic front. The calculation was made so that the enemy, while maneuvering forces and means, would be late everywhere and everywhere, so that he would weaken the density of troops exactly where our next attack was planned. I must say that the foresight of the Headquarters was completely justified.

Particularly difficult tasks in preparing the 1944 campaigns were assigned to intelligence of all types. She coped with her tasks, and the picture of the enemy’s condition emerged quite fully.

The first blow to Nazi troops was struck near Leningrad and Novgorod in January 1944. As a result of our victory near Leningrad, the city was completely liberated from the fascist blockade. Soviet troops liberated the Leningrad and part of the Kalinin region and entered Estonia.

The second blow took place on Right Bank Ukraine. It was very complex and consisted of a series of large offensive operations carried out mainly in February - March 1944 in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area and on the Southern Bug. Then the German troops were defeated and thrown back beyond the Dniester. As a result of this blow, the entire Right Bank of Ukraine was liberated, Soviet troops reached lines favorable for the subsequent deep offensive in the south-eastern regions of Europe, in the Balkans against Romania, where the dictatorship of the fascist I. Antonescu was still dominant, against Horthy Hungary and other enemy forces .

In April - May 1944, the Red Army launched a third strike in the Odessa and Crimea region. Odessa, Sevastopol and the entire Crimean Peninsula were liberated from Hitler's occupation.

The fourth blow on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area of ​​Lakes Ladoga and Onega led to the liberation of a large part of Soviet Karelia and predetermined Finland’s exit from the war on the side of Germany. An extremely unfavorable situation was now developing for the fascist German troops in the Arctic.

The fifth blow was struck in June-August 1944 against the German troops of Army Group Center in Belarus, which covered the main and shortest routes to Germany. Having utterly defeated German troops near Vitebsk, Mogilev and Bobruisk, our armed forces surrounded and destroyed more than 20 German divisions east of Minsk. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops liberated Belarus, a significant part of eastern Poland and most of the Lithuanian SSR. The enemy himself assessed these events as a disaster for German troops in Operation Bagration in Belarus.

The sixth blow was delivered by the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lviv region. Red Army troops crossed the Vistula and formed a large bridgehead across the Vistula, west of Sandomierz. At the same time, the 1st Belorussian Front created two bridgeheads south of Warsaw: one in the Magnuszew area, the other in the Pulawy area. Now the Soviet fronts received favorable conditions for the development of a decisive blow - to Berlin.

The seventh blow led to the encirclement and defeat of German-Romanian troops in the Chisinau-Iasi region. It ended with the liquidation of about 22 enemy divisions and the withdrawal of our troops into the central regions of Romania. As a result of this blow, which brought the liberation of the Moldavian SSR, Romania was withdrawn from the war and declared war on Nazi Germany. Following this, our 3rd Ukrainian Front and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet entered Bulgaria, where a popular revolution took place on September 9, 1944. Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The eighth strike took place in the fall of 1944 in the Baltic states. The entire Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and most of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic were liberated. The remnants of the defeated German armies found themselves pressed to the shore of the Baltic Sea in Courland. On September 19, Finland signed an armistice agreement.

In October-December 1944, the offensive operations of the ninth strike unfolded between the Tisza and the Danube in Hungary. As a result of this blow, Germany actually lost its last ally - Hungary. The Red Army provided direct assistance to Yugoslavia in the liberation of its capital Belgrade. The tenth strike took place in October 1944 on the extreme northern section of the Soviet-German front. It ended with the defeat and expulsion of Nazi troops from the Soviet Arctic and the northeastern part of Norway.

The major victories of the Soviet troops in 1944 were the best evidence of the correct method of strategic planning adopted by the Supreme High Command at this stage of the war, an eloquent confirmation of the depth of foresight of our top military leadership. The main enemy forces suffered a severe defeat, and Soviet troops reached favorable starting positions for the final campaign of the war.

Throughout the war, the methods and means of influencing the Headquarters on the course of events were improved and increased. The regroupings of forces and means were carried out more and more skillfully, the interaction of the fronts, ground forces with aviation, and the navy became better and better. Our operators have learned to direct troops to the target, assigning them appropriate demarcation lines and changing them if necessary.

The main means of suddenly radically changing the operational-strategic situation for the enemy were and remained throughout the war the reserves of the Headquarters. In the chapters of this book devoted to the heroic defense of Moscow, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Operation Bagration in Belarus, and others, the reader will find a description of the specific circumstances of the use of strategic reserves and will see that their introduction into battle was carried out, as a rule, on a massive scale and on the main directions. This allowed us to achieve great results.

After all, no matter how good the ideas and plans outlined on the maps were, they would remain mere paper if they were not provided with the appropriate forces and means. The success of campaigns and operations is directly dependent on how well the troops are provided with reserves, weapons, ammunition, fuel and other material resources, how the matter of treating the wounded and returning them to duty is handled.

The formation and preparation of reserves was far from simple and easy. To guide and control the formation of reserves, spare and training units, and to prepare marching reinforcements, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Red Army Troops (Glavupraform) was formed in 1941, headed by Army Commissar 1st Rank E. A. Shchadenko. During the Civil War, Efim Afanasyevich was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First and Second Cavalry Armies. He was a demanding person and a skillful organizer.

Glavupraform concentrated in his hands the issues of recruiting and creating trained reserves of all branches of the military (except for the Air Force, armored forces and artillery), as well as control over the direction of reinforcements from reserve and training units to the fronts of the active army.

The Main Directorate of Logistics was responsible for providing the troops with material resources. The activities of the organizers and leaders of the rear are worthy of wide coverage. It was difficult and not always noticeable, but the contribution of the rear of the Soviet Armed Forces to the victory was great and earned the deep gratitude of the Soviet people. After J.V. Stalin’s address to the Soviet people on July 3, 1941 and the special decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in mid-July 1941 “On organizing the struggle in the rear of German troops,” partisan detachments began to actively operate everywhere where the Nazis invaded. created and led by local party organizations. Already in 1941, 18 underground regional committees, more than 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other underground party bodies, over 300 city committees and district Komsomol committees ( History of the Second World War 1939-1945. M., Voenizdat, 1975, vol. 4). The combat activities of the people's avengers and the secret front of underground work became a factor of great military-political significance, which had to be skillfully used to weaken and destroy the enemy.

If in the first year of the war there was still no proper organization and centralization in the leadership of the partisan movement, then subsequently the Headquarters controlled military operations behind enemy lines confidently and firmly. This was done through the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, created under her on May 30, 1942, headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus (Bolsheviks) P.K. Ponomarenko.

I have known Panteleimon Kondratievich for a very long time. A firm communist, he justified the trust of the party and became a true organizer of the activities of the people's avengers.

In addition to the Central Headquarters, republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement were created, and departments for relations with partisan forces were created at the front headquarters. As a result, a real opportunity arose to direct the actions of all forces of the partisan movement in the interests of the army, to coordinate the interaction of partisan detachments with the operations of the fronts.

General tasks for the partisan forces were set by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In accordance with the situation, they were concretized locally by party organizations and bodies of the partisan movement.

The tasks of the partisan movement mainly boiled down to creating an intolerable situation for the Nazis, destroying manpower, military equipment and material assets of the enemy, disorganizing the work of his rear, disrupting the activities of the military authorities and administrative bodies of the fascist occupiers. The actions of the partisans strengthened the confidence of the Soviet people who found themselves in the temporarily occupied territories in our final victory over the enemy and involved them in an active struggle against the invaders.

The war with the partisans brought great losses to the enemy, suppressed his morale, disrupted the transport and maneuvering of troops, which had a particularly detrimental effect on the operations carried out by the Nazi command. Despite the brutal measures used to eliminate the partisans, the forces of the people's avengers multiplied and grew stronger day by day, the burning hatred of the enemy and the desire of the Soviet people to quickly defeat the Nazi invaders grew.

The range of listed tasks of the partisans and their importance suggests that the partisans could only act in an organized manner, in entire formations and detachments. All partisan forces and underground organizations of people's avengers participated in the implementation of these tasks.

The day-to-day leadership of the partisan forces on the ground was carried out by the underground organizations of our party. The work of these underground party organizations is difficult to overestimate. Underground Komsomol organizations became active assistants of the party. Our younger generation should know about the heroic work that the communists and Komsomol members carried out, organizing and inspiring the Soviet people who temporarily found themselves under the heel of the Nazis to fight the enemy.

The central headquarters of the partisan movement existed until the end of 1943. When at the beginning of 1944 most of the Soviet territory was liberated, it was disbanded and the leadership of the partisan forces completely passed to the party bodies of the republics and regions.

Considering the issues of political and military-strategic leadership of the war, special mention should be made of such important collective bodies of the party as the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, Military Councils and political departments of the fronts and fleets. Their role, like that of all party political bodies, in ensuring victory over German fascism during the Great Patriotic War was enormous. It deserves separate and detailed consideration and analysis.

This problem has recently been solved in a number of military-historical works. However, the need to create a fundamental scientific work that would comprehensively examine the multifaceted activities of political bodies during the war years is long overdue. The work of GLAVPURK became especially fruitful when in mid-1942 it was headed by a prominent figure in the party and state, a candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Moscow Party Committee, Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov.

J.V. Stalin treated Alexander Sergeevich with great respect and trust. Until 1945, A.S. Shcherbakov was also the head of the Soviet Information Bureau. During the period of the heroic defense of Moscow in 1941, A.S. Shcherbakov was one of those who knew how to ignite in the hearts of the capital’s defenders a fire of burning hatred for the fascists, who were striving to capture Moscow at any cost.

All political work in the army, the leadership and influence of the party on the masses of soldiers was carried out through political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations directly in units and subunits. Troop commanders and commanders of all levels relied extensively on this developed system of party political work. Political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations had special responsibility for the condition of each military unit and its combat effectiveness. They ensured that communists and Komsomol members led fighters in difficult and complex combat situations and resolutely fought against manifestations of confusion and disorganization. Party political bodies popularized combat experience, examples of courage and courage, initiative and resourcefulness, and mutual assistance in battle. Political work in the troops was constantly being improved, yielding positive results, and was of great importance for achieving victory.

The activities of the Headquarters are inseparable from the name of J.V. Stalin. During the war years I often met with him. In most cases, these were official meetings at which issues of managing the course of the war were decided. But even a simple invitation to dinner was always used for the same purposes. I really liked the complete absence of formalism in the work of I.V. Stalin. Everything that he did through the Headquarters or the State Defense Committee was done in such a way that the decisions made by these high bodies began to be implemented immediately, and the progress of their implementation was strictly and steadily controlled personally by the Supreme Commander or, at his direction, by other leading persons or organizations.

The GKO and the Headquarters were two independent emergency bodies created by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the period of the war. But since J.V. Stalin headed both the Committee and Headquarters, formality was usually not observed. Members of the Headquarters were often invited to meetings at the State Defense Committee and, conversely, members of the State Defense Committee were present at Headquarters when important issues were considered. Working together brought great benefits: no time was wasted studying issues to implement them, and the people who were part of these two government bodies were always up to date with events.

Of course, this practice of work by the Headquarters and the State Defense Committee was physically very difficult for their members, but during the war this was not thought about: everyone worked to the fullest extent of their strength and capabilities. Everyone looked up to I.V. Stalin, and he, despite his age, was always active and tireless. When the war ended and the days of relatively systematic work began, J.V. Stalin somehow immediately aged, became less active, even more silent and thoughtful. The past war and everything connected with it had a strong and tangible impact on him.

Readers of the first edition of my book have repeatedly asked me whether there were mistakes in the work of the Headquarters and J.V. Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief?

In those sections of the book where specific events of the war are discussed, I talked about some of the mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the armed forces that occurred. I already said above that with the accumulation of experience in warfare, mistakes and miscalculations were skillfully corrected, and they became fewer and fewer.

J.V. Stalin made a great personal contribution to the cause of winning victory over Nazi Germany and its allies. His authority was extremely great and therefore the appointment of Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief was received with enthusiasm by the people and troops. Of course, at the beginning of the war, before the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Commander made mistakes, which, as we know, happen to everyone. He thought through them deeply and not only experienced them internally, but sought to learn from them and prevent them from happening in the future.

Relying on the comprehensive assistance of the Central Committee and the organizational activities of the party on the ground, the ardent patriotism of the Soviet people, who had risen to the holy war against fascism, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief skillfully coped with his responsibilities in this high post.

Mikhail Sholokhov said very well in an interview with the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper on the days of the 25th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany: “You cannot dumb down and belittle Stalin’s activities during that period. Firstly, it is dishonest, and secondly, it is harmful for the country, for the Soviet people, and not because the winners are not judged, but first of all because the “overthrow” does not correspond to the truth.”

It is hardly possible to add anything to these words of M.A. Sholokhov. They are accurate and fair. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did everything possible to ensure that the Headquarters, its working apparatus - the General Staff and the Military Councils of the fronts became truly wise and skillful military assistants of the party in achieving victory over Nazi Germany.

JV Stalin usually worked in the Kremlin in his office. It was a spacious, fairly bright room, the walls of which were lined with bog oak. There was a long table covered with green cloth. On the walls are portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin. During the war, in addition, portraits of Suvorov and Kutuzov appeared. Hard chairs, no unnecessary objects. A huge globe was placed in the next room, next to it there was a table, and on the walls there were various maps of the world.

In the depths of the office, near the closed window, stood J.V. Stalin’s desk, always littered with documents, papers, and maps. There were high-frequency and intra-Kremlin telephones, and a stack of sharpened colored pencils. JV Stalin usually made his notes in blue pencil, writing quickly, sweepingly, and legibly.

The entrance to the office led through the passage room of A. N. Poskrebyshev and the small room of the head of the personal security of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Behind the office is a small rest room. In the communications room there were telegraph machines for negotiations with front commanders and representatives of Headquarters.

Workers of the General Staff and representatives of Headquarters unfolded maps on a large table and, while standing, reported to the Supreme Commander the situation at the fronts, sometimes using notes. JV Stalin listened, usually walking around the office with slow, wide steps, waddling. From time to time he approached the large table and, bending down, closely examined the laid out map. From time to time he returned to his desk, took a box of Herzegovina Flor cigarettes, tore several cigarettes and slowly filled his pipe with tobacco.

The style of work, as a rule, was businesslike, without nervousness, everyone could express their opinion. The Supreme Commander addressed everyone equally - strictly and officially. He knew how to listen carefully when they reported to him knowledgeably. He himself was a man of few words and did not like the verbosity of others; he often stopped someone who was talking with remarks - “in short!”, “Clarify!”. He opened the meetings without introductory or introductory words. He spoke quietly, freely, only to the essence of the issue. He was concise and formulated his thoughts clearly.

Over the long years of the war, I became convinced that I.V. Stalin was not at all the kind of person to whom it was impossible to pose pressing questions or argue with him, firmly defending his point of view. If anyone claims otherwise, I will say frankly that their statements are false.

J.V. Stalin demanded daily reports on the state of affairs at the fronts. To go to report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, you had to be well prepared. It was impossible to show up, say, with maps on which there were at least some “blank spots”, to report approximate or even more exaggerated data. He did not tolerate answers at random; he demanded completeness and clarity.

The Supreme Commander had some special instinct for weak points in reports or documents; he immediately found them and strictly punished them for unclear information. Possessing a tenacious memory, he remembered well what was said and did not miss an opportunity to rather sharply reprimand for what was forgotten. Therefore, we tried to prepare staff documents with all the care that we were then capable of. Despite the gravity of the situation at the fronts, especially at the beginning of the war, when the rhythm of life in combat conditions had not yet been fully worked out, to the credit of the leadership of the General Staff, I must say that in general a businesslike and creative situation was immediately established in the General Staff, although tension work in those days reached extreme limits.

Throughout the war, I did not lose either personal or official connection with the General Staff, which helped me a lot in front-line affairs, in preparing and carrying out operations. The General Staff, as a rule, skillfully and promptly developed draft directives of the Supreme High Command, strictly monitored the implementation of its instructions, supervised the work of the headquarters of the armed forces and the headquarters of the military branches, and authoritatively reported large and important issues to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

JV Stalin based his judgments on important issues largely on the basis of reports from Headquarters representatives sent to the troops, from the conclusions of the General Staff, the opinions and proposals of front commands and special messages.

I had the opportunity to communicate directly with I.V. Stalin starting in February 1941, when I began working as Chief of the General Staff. They have written about the appearance of J.V. Stalin more than once. Short in stature and unremarkable in appearance, J.V. Stalin made a strong impression during the conversation. Devoid of posturing, he captivated his interlocutor with the simplicity of his communication. A free manner of conversation, the ability to clearly formulate a thought, a natural analytical mind, great erudition and a rare memory forced even very experienced and significant people to gather themselves internally and be on alert during a conversation with him.

J.V. Stalin did not like to sit and during a conversation he walked slowly around the room, stopping from time to time, coming close to his interlocutor and looking directly into his eyes. His gaze was sharp and piercing. He spoke quietly, clearly separating one phrase from another, almost without gesticulating. Most often he held a pipe in his hands, even an extinguished one, with the end of which he liked to smooth his mustache. He spoke with a noticeable Georgian accent, but knew Russian perfectly and loved to use figurative comparisons, literary examples, and metaphors. JV Stalin rarely laughed, and when he laughed, it was quietly, as if to himself. But he understood humor and knew how to appreciate wit and jokes. His vision was very sharp and he could read without glasses at any time of the day. As a rule, he wrote by hand. He read widely and was a widely knowledgeable person in a wide variety of areas of knowledge. His amazing efficiency and ability to quickly grasp the essence of a matter allowed him to view and assimilate in a day such a quantity of the most varied material that only an extraordinary person could do it.

It is difficult to say which character trait prevailed in him. A versatile and talented man, J.V. Stalin was not equal. He had a strong will, a secretive and impetuous character. Usually calm and reasonable, at times he fell into acute irritation. Then his objectivity failed him, he changed dramatically before our eyes, turned even paler, his gaze became heavy, hard. I didn’t know many brave souls who could withstand Stalin’s wrath and fend off the blow.

JV Stalin's daily routine was somewhat unusual. He worked mainly in the evening and at night. I didn't get up until 12 noon. Adapting to the daily routine of I.V. Stalin, the Party Central Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, the People's Commissariats and the main state and planning bodies worked until late at night. This really exhausted people.

In the pre-war period, it was difficult for me to assess the depth of knowledge and abilities of I.V. Stalin in the field of military science, in matters of operational and strategic art. I already said above that when I happened to visit the Politburo or personally with J.V. Stalin, mainly organizational, mobilization and material and technical issues were considered.

I can only say once again that J.V. Stalin dealt a lot with issues of weapons and military equipment even before the war. He often called in aviation, artillery and tank designers and asked them in detail about the details of the design of these types of military equipment here and abroad. We must give him his due; he had a good understanding of the qualities of the main types of weapons.

From chief designers, directors of military factories, many of whom he knew personally, I.V. Stalin demanded the production of models of aircraft, tanks, artillery and other important equipment on time and in such a way that their quality was not only at the level of foreign ones, but also surpassed them.

Without the approval of I.V. Stalin, as I already said, not a single type of weapon was accepted or removed. On the one hand, this infringed on the initiative of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies, who were in charge of armament issues for the Red Army. However, on the other hand, it should be recognized that such an order in many cases helped to quickly introduce this or that new type of military equipment into production.

I am often asked whether I.V. Stalin really was an outstanding military thinker in the field of building the armed forces and an expert on operational-strategic issues?

I can firmly say that I.V. Stalin mastered the basic principles of organizing front-line operations and operations of groups of fronts and led them with knowledge of the matter, and was well versed in large strategic issues. These abilities of I.V. Stalin, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, were especially revealed starting from the Battle of Stalingrad.

The widely spread version that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief studied the situation and made decisions on the globe does not correspond to reality. Of course, he didn’t work with tactical cards, and he didn’t need to. But he had a good understanding of operational maps with the situation marked on them.

In leading the armed struggle as a whole, J.V. Stalin was helped by his natural intelligence, experience in political leadership, rich intuition, and broad awareness. He knew how to find the main link in a strategic situation and, seizing on it, outline ways to counter the enemy and successfully carry out one or another offensive operation. Undoubtedly, he was a worthy Supreme Commander.

Of course, J.V. Stalin did not delve into the entire sum of issues that the troops and command of all levels had to painstakingly work on in order to well prepare the operation of an army, front or group of fronts. This was not necessary for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In such cases, he naturally consulted with members of the Headquarters, the General Staff and specialists in artillery, armored, air and naval forces on logistics and supply issues.

Personally, J.V. Stalin was credited with a number of fundamental developments in the fundamentals of military science, including methods of artillery offensive, gaining air supremacy, methods of encircling the enemy, cutting up encircled enemy groups and destroying them piecemeal, etc.

This is wrong. All these most important questions are the result obtained by the troops in battles and battles with the enemy; they are the fruits of deep reflection and generalization of the experience of a large team of leading military leaders and command staff of the troops.

The merit of I.V. Stalin here lies in the fact that he quickly and correctly accepted the advice of military experts, supplemented and developed them, and in a generalized form - in instructions, directives and manuals - immediately transferred them to the troops for practical guidance.

In addition, in supporting operations, creating strategic reserves, organizing the production of military equipment and, in general, creating everything necessary for waging war, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, frankly speaking, proved himself to be an outstanding organizer. And it would be unfair if we did not give him credit for this.

But, of course, first of all, we must bow to the ground to our Soviet man, who, denying himself the most necessary things - food and sleep, did everything in his power to fulfill the tasks that the Communist Party set for the people in order to defeat the enemy .

I will return to the activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and its bodies more than once in this book, speaking about those campaigns and operations in which I had the opportunity to participate. Here I also consider it necessary to say that each specific operation had its own characteristics, which were related to the purpose of the action, the tasks of the troops, the specifics of the enemy - his intentions, composition, combat effectiveness and disposition of forces and means, their maneuverability and, if I may say so , the ability to give us an unexpected surprise.

The operations also differed in their scope - the width of the troop action zone, the depth of strikes, and the pace of the offensive, if it was an offensive operation.

Each of our military campaigns or operations required deep reflection. The same applied to a well-thought-out plan, a precise definition of the general and specific goals of the troops participating in the operation, their tasks corresponding to the goals and objectives of the operational formation and battle formations.

In preparing for the operation, the Headquarters attached special importance to developing close interaction between the fronts and armies among themselves, between the types of armed forces and combat arms. All this data, indicating the number of troops and materiel, was placed primarily on the maps of the General Staff and Military Councils of the fronts participating in the operation. But that is not all.

At the most crucial moments, representatives of the Headquarters directly in the area of ​​​​operations, not only on maps, but also on the ground, linked tasks, specific times and boundaries, forces and means, methods of action of branches of the armed forces and branches of the military, so that none of their capabilities were wasted, not missed the target. Based on the daily reports of its representatives on the work they personally did, Headquarters could accurately judge the degree of readiness of the operation.

Among the main issues that were subjected to comprehensive analysis were ways to gain air superiority, organizing all types of reconnaissance, and working out situational data.

Much attention was paid to troop control. Apparently, having comprehended the mistakes in this matter made in the first period of the war, the Supreme Commander more than once told A.M. Vasilevsky and me, sending us to the fronts as representatives of Headquarters, so that we could look with passion at how this or that commander leads the troops.

I must say, to the credit of our commanders of the fronts and armies, that they always remembered the duty of the Motherland to the Party, constantly persistently studied the complex art of military leadership and became its true masters.

I don’t know of a case when the Headquarters met in its entirety. Even when discussing the most important operations in which 3-4 fronts took part, and military campaigns, only those members who were invited by the Supreme Commander, or those who performed a particularly responsible task in the operation in question, took part in the work of the Headquarters.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not treat the members of the Headquarters equally. He had great respect, for example, for Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. He called him only by his first name and patronymic and never raised his voice when talking to him, even if he did not agree with his report. B. M. Shaposhnikov was the only person whom J. V. Stalin allowed to smoke in his office.

This attitude was well deserved. Boris Mikhailovich was one of the most profound military scientists of our state, combining knowledge of the theory of military science with extensive practical experience in operational and strategic issues. I personally consider the release of B.M. Shaposhnikov from the post of Chief of the General Staff and his appointment as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the construction of fortified areas, when the Second World War had already begun, a mistake.

On July 30, 1941, when I was appointed commander of the Reserve Front, B. M. Shaposhnikov again became the chief of the General Staff. Knowing the intricacies of the General Staff, he quickly carried out a number of organizational measures that contributed to improving the work of this main working body of Headquarters. B. M. Shaposhnikov’s great personal diligence and ability to work with people had a noticeable impact on the growth of the general art of troop management in the field army and especially on the part of the General Staff.

Unfortunately, age, heavy workload and especially illness did not allow him to work throughout the war on the General Staff. In May 1942, he transferred the position to his first and quite worthy deputy, A.M. Vasilevsky, whom he highly valued. In June 1943, B. M. Shaposhnikov was appointed head of the Higher Military Academy named after K. E. Voroshilov.

J.V. Stalin also treated A.M. Vasilevsky with special respect. Alexander Mikhailovich was not mistaken in his assessment of the operational-strategic situation. Therefore, it was he who was sent by J.V. Stalin to responsible sectors of the Soviet-German front as a representative of Headquarters. During the war, his talent as a military leader on a large scale and a deep military thinker developed in its entirety. In those cases when Stalin did not agree with the opinion of Alexander Mikhailovich, Vasilevsky was able to convince the Supreme Commander with dignity and weighty arguments that in this situation a decision other than what he proposed should not be made.

V. M. Molotov also enjoyed great confidence from I. V. Stalin. He was almost always present at Headquarters when operational-strategic and other important issues were considered. Disagreements and serious disputes often arose between them, during which the correct decision was formed.

The Supreme Commander listened with great attention to the opinion of A.I. Antonov, even when he was not a member of Headquarters, but temporarily served as chief of the General Staff. The signature of Alexei Innokentyevich on the directives of the Headquarters often followed the signature of I.V. Stalin.

I consider it appropriate to say here about the attitude of the Supreme Commander towards the commanders and chiefs of staff of the fronts. According to my observations, of the front commanders, J.V. Stalin most valued Marshals of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, L.A. Govorov, I.S. Konev and Army General N.F. Vatutin. Of the army commanders, the Supreme Commander singled out A. A. Grechko and K. S. Moskalenko, now Marshals of the Soviet Union, Marshals of the Armored Forces P. S. Rybalko, P. A. Rotmistrov, Army General D. D. Lelyushenko, Army General I. I. Fedyuninsky.

Among the chiefs of staff of the fronts, the Supreme distinguished V.D. Sokolovsky and M.V. Zakharov, who became Marshals of the Soviet Union after the war, and Army General M.S. Malinin.

I.V. Stalin had a good opinion about the commander of long-range aviation, Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov; commander of the artillery of the Red Army, Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov. He usually assigned important tasks to them personally.

Of the naval commanders, I.V. Stalin highly valued Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union I.S. Isakov.

It is impossible not to say a kind word here about A.V. Khrulev, whose opinion the Supreme Commander took into account and often consulted with him on a wide range of issues of supplying troops.

It is impossible to list all those who enjoyed the trust of J.V. Stalin. I will only say one thing: he knew them well personally, valued them for their knowledge and dedication to the task, and when a particularly important task arose, he first of all entrusted its solution to these people.

From the first to the last days of the war, I had the opportunity to take part in the work of the Supreme Command Headquarters, see the work of the General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Defense and come into close contact with the work of the State Defense Committee. I can firmly say that Soviet military-strategic leadership was at an exceptionally high level.

During the war, our Supreme High Command was able, in a relatively short period of time, to overcome the enormous difficulties that arose at the beginning of the war, as a result of which the Soviet Armed Forces defended Leningrad, defeated the Nazi troops near Moscow, Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge, in Belarus and Ukraine, and wrested the enemy has the strategic initiative in order to then bring the war to a victorious end with crushing blows.

All this suggests that the Soviet military art, based on Marxist-Leninist science, was superior to the Nazi strategy, the art of operations and tactics. Our Supreme High Command subjected a deep analysis to the current operational-strategic situation, developed and implemented effective measures to overcome the difficulties that arose, united the efforts of the front and rear, and the entire people for the final crushing of the enemy. Having treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler and his military entourage were faced with a new type of army, brought up in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, with a clear goal - the defense of the first country of socialism. The Soviet soldier was distinguished by a deep consciousness of his liberation mission, a readiness to make self-sacrifice in the name of freedom and independence of the Motherland, in the name of socialism.

In this regard, I consider it necessary to express my opinion about the high command of the fascist German troops. As noted above, after the capture of most of Europe, Hitler’s political and military leadership confidently believed that the military art of Nazi Germany had reached the highest levels. This opportunistic confidence was not accidental. It was based on the fascist ideology of racial superiority, on the traditional foundations of Prussian militarism, which had more than once brought Germany to the brink of disaster. Having behind them the mobilized military-industrial complex of not only Germany, but also almost all of Western Europe, Hitler and his generals made their main bet on the lightning defeat of the Soviet Union. They overestimated their strengths and capabilities and seriously underestimated the strength, means and potential capabilities of the Soviet state.

Hitler placed all the blame for the failure of the Barbarossa plan and other unsuccessful operations on his field marshals and generals: they, being mediocre, were unable to put his “brilliant” plans into practice.

After Hitler's death, everything went the other way: the accused turned into accusers. Now they openly declared that the main culprit for Germany’s defeat in this war was Hitler, “modestly” keeping silent about the fact that they were all active participants in the war with the Soviet Union, and many of them were direct participants in the atrocities that were committed by the Nazi troops in Soviet land.

For all this, the memory and judgment of peoples nailed both the Hitler regime and his generals to the pillory of history.

While developing plans for war against the Soviet Union and operations to implement the strategic plans of the Third Reich, Hitler's leadership was extremely concerned about maintaining the strictest secrecy of these activities. We must admit that this task was a good success. The “disinformation plan”, developed under the leadership of Keitel and Jodl, which was intended to show that the Germans were allegedly preparing to invade England, was carried out not without benefit for Germany. At the beginning of the war, this seriously complicated the general situation for us.

However, it soon became clear that in general the Barbarossa plan turned out to be unrealistic. The main idea of ​​this plan was, as we know, the encirclement and destruction of the main forces of the Red Army located in the border military districts. The enemy hoped that with their loss, the Soviet Supreme High Command would have nothing with which to defend Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Caucasus. But the fascist German command failed to implement these tasks.

The government of fascist Germany and the Nazi military leadership based their calculations on the mythical weaknesses of the Soviet Union. They never expected that in a moment of mortal danger, the Soviet people, rallying around the Communist Party, would stand in their way with an irresistible force. They immediately felt this in all strategic directions.

Hitler's leadership, without any reason, believed that the Red Army would not be able to withstand the Nazi troops for the reason that it was headed by young military leaders who were not yet sufficiently sophisticated in the experience of modern battles.

A complete surprise for the Nazis was the war on the territory of the USSR, so to speak, on two fronts: on the one hand, against the regular troops of the Red Army, and on the other, against organized partisan forces in the rear.

After the defeat of the fascist German troops in the Stalingrad area and in the North Caucasus, the Hitlerite high command was unable to cope with the situation at the fronts. Having lost the initiative, it made such unwise decisions that only brought closer the hour of the final collapse of the Third Reich.

Soviet military science, based on the advantages of the socialist social and state system, was a significant factor in ensuring victory over Nazi Germany. During the years of the Patriotic War, it made a big step forward and was enriched with valuable experience in the field of tactics, operational art and strategy. Until now, it has faithfully served and will continue to serve in the preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening the defense of our great Motherland.

Firmly remembering the instructions of V.I. Lenin that as long as imperialism exists, the danger of a new war remains, our party pays special attention to building the armed forces, developing methods and forms of armed struggle in order to always have an army and navy at the height of state tasks. At the same time, the experience of the past war is also used. We, veterans of the Soviet Army, participants in the Great Patriotic War, are pleased to know that our knowledge and experience are needed and useful for the socialist Motherland even in the age of missiles, radio electronics and the atom.

Now let's return to the harsh events of the Great Patriotic War.