USSR air assault troops

"... The nature of war can have a significant impact on the balance of the various branches of the armed forces."
K. Clausewitz, "On the War"

From the author
In this article, the author tried to summarize his knowledge of the airborne assault units of the Soviet Army and, having formulated briefly, put them out for general viewing and study. Immediately make a reservation that this study is not final. First of all, this is due to the fact that so far there has not been a single official open (i.e., not secret) publication on the history of the DShV, their combat personnel, not to mention their organizational and staff structures, methods and methods of combat use and etc. Everything you read here was collected naturally bit by bit, from many different sources - the vast majority of the work is based on surveys of veterans of youth sports schools, people who came into contact with them by type of service, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask you to judge me severely, but in fairness, for "... otherwise where in my book with this rudeness is written or negligent, I pray you: do not look at my curse, do not curse, but correct it, it was written not by an angel of God, but man is sinful and zealously full of ignorance ... "

The author expresses great gratitude to everyone who helped him, providing their memory, and spent time on the answers.
The author will be grateful to everyone who expresses their opinion about the article, points out inaccuracies, incorrectness, or vice versa, will be able to confirm the author's analysis (which could not be done without).

ABOUT THE ESSENCE OF AIRborne Troopers

The moment when the idea of \u200b\u200bairborne assaults appeared, like sending military units behind enemy lines in the air, it was not known when. However, for a long time it was strictly fantastic and only during the First World War, it was able to receive at least some kind of material basis in the form of creating an air vehicle - an airplane-airplane. And if at first, the idea was exclusively of a diversion-reconnaissance character, then soon, due to the rapid development of aviation during the war years, with the creation of sufficiently reliable and capacious aircraft, it began to take a larger scale logical form, which led to the Mitchell’s idea of \u200b\u200blanding in the rear of German troops at first divisions, and then the whole "airborne" army. However, we can only guess if this project would be implemented, the war would last another year or two, or not. In any case, after the end of the war, this idea, although it did not receive a serious material embodiment, continued to soar minds. "Positional Nightmare" Western front everyone was in plain sight, and many military theorists (or considering themselves as such) who persisted in innovation, persistently searched for innovative ways to prevent such a situation in the future.

Thus, for air landing troops (Airborne Forces), the main, determining goal was immediately revealed - to assist the advancing ground forces. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of airborne assault forces (VD) confirms this thesis *.

* A special position is occupied by VD on the islands. As a rule, they are carried out as part of the promotion of amphibious assault, or in general as part of multi-scale military operations at sea. That is, the role of the Ground Forces in this case is played by the Navy.
The absolute exception is the scandalous Cretan VD operation (VDO) that did not have a tight link with the actions of either land or sea forces; thus having a strictly independent character. However, if the link with the Ground Forces was not possible for obvious and objective reasons, then a weak connection with the fleet was forced.
Within the framework of such a goal, the Airborne Forces were also tasked with, as a rule, the capture of a certain section of the terrain (usually behind the line of contact of the parties) and its subsequent retention for some time (for example, until the approaching ground forces).

Specific combat mission determines the methods and methods of action of the Airborne Forces consisting in landing (drop, landing), attack (attack, assault) and defense.

This leads to a general definition of the combat capabilities of the VD formation, which are:
1. in the ability to capture a certain territory (plot of land, object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) the enemy who is there;
2. in the ability to organize an effective defense of the seized territory (object) for a certain period;
3. but, all this is subject to the condition for the ability to be thrown over the air.

Such a lengthy introduction was required for me so that the reader (maybe quite a stranger, but interested in the issue) would immediately catch the essence of the combat use of airborne assault forces.

BACKGROUND

The emergence of DShV is tightly connected with the appearance of helicopters, more precisely, with the creation of samples having the necessary set of properties. So it was already in military historywhen technological progress brought new types and types of armed forces to the arena of battles. However, there was another forerunner consisting in the specifics of the forms of combat use of airborne forces expressed in their use as part of operations of an operational-tactical scale.

... Alas, it is probably worth recognizing that the first air assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landings were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is a list of some of them: Vardingborg bridge (Denmark, 1940), Eben-Emael fort (Belgium, 1940), bridges across the Alberta Canal (Belgium, 1940), a complex of bridges across the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges through West Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them completely fall under the definition of air assault operations, although they were carried out by the German Airborne Forces and Special Forces. All of them were carried out as part of a macro-goal - to ensure the most rapid advancement of their ground forces, to block (hold) enemy troops in their positions, etc. At the same time, the methods of landing were very different: parachuting, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the following years of the war, such landings were not actually used. The belligerents became interested in larger-scale airborne airborne forces, which, by themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational and strategic situation at the front. In the same vein, post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, the theory of application of the Airborne Forces.

The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensive of 1944-45. not clear. Most likely, three main factors are involved here.

FirstlyThe failures of large-scale airborne airborne systems somewhat undermined the belief in the effectiveness of landing operations in general (in any case, given the material and technical base and general level of organization).

Secondly, the very idea of \u200b\u200bsmall landings probably seemed wrong; their possible results were not seen as effective (although those were provided for by the "Instructions for the Combat Use of Airborne Forces" of 1943 *).

Thirdly, the command simply did not consider it necessary to apply them - i.e. believed that it works better with proven and attorney purely ground methods.

But this is all just an assumption. Personally, it seems quite possible for the author to isolate from the many hundreds (by 1945 more than 1000 units) that were already available by 1944 of the excellent military transport aircraft Li-2 and S-47, several dozen aircraft and throw them on the same routes by the paratrooper battalion supplies or to capture riverheads - this could in some cases significantly facilitate the actions of ground troops. But - what was, was.

... In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters just burst onto the scene - new class aircraft. Helicopters (which at this point reaches a level of technical excellence sufficient for combat use) have successfully proved themselves in the Incheon Naval Airborne Operation (MAO) and in the subsequent actions of the American troops in Korea. Admonished domestic designers represent a rather successful machine - Mi-4 - which begins in 1953. enlist in large numbers in the troops.
Already in 1954, the first major experimental landing was carried out with 36 infantry helicopters with cars and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also conducted (including with real application nuclear weapons) on the landing on the enemy rear of helicopter assault forces of a battalion and regimental scale ... However, that was the reason for this. That is, no organizational measures to create specialized formations were adopted.
The reasons for this are seen as follows:

Firstly, the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor played a negative role.

Secondly, oversized airborne forces - they are in the first half of the 1950s. count as many as 15 divisions; and to have some other airborne units is already arrogance, especially since the Khrushchev’s general reduction of the armed forces has begun.

Thirdly, nuclear paranoia that had completely hit the world by this time did not leave a place in the battle formations for clean (without armored personnel carrier armor) infantry infantrymen; the helicopter was seen as too "fragile" in comparison with the APC machine.

Fourth, besides the parachute-landing units of the airborne forces, there were plenty in abundance until 1957, and rifle divisions, divisions of both, could, in the case of such a task, be landed from helicopters to the rear of the enemy.

Well and finally fifthlyTo the Soviet military commanders brought up with the power of tank armored cocks, the clumsy, slow and weakly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on their tops (this is in the age of "jet speeds" and swiftly licked aerodynamics!) did not seem to be a means that could give the troops new opportunities hitherto unseen.

TRIAL STEP

The capitalists

In general, a similar situation was with the theory of VDO and the Americans. The following phrase by American Airborne General James Gavin from his book, Airborne Warfare, can serve as a better illustration: "...<воздушно-десантные> troops should be used massively, not in small groups. and only where their actions can have a decisive influence, and not in many places where they are able to achieve only local tactical successes. "However, they had experience of war on what later became known as" poorly equipped theater ", t. ie, on the Korean Peninsula, made the US command think and act more flexibly.The helicopter proved to be a very promising means of transportation in mountainous and wooded areas and lack of roads. whereas in the beginning there were only 56 units, the American command also created an experimental unit — the 11th Air Assault Division — based on it and on the basis of two more units (the 10th air transport brigade and the 2nd infantry division) in July 1965 created (or rather reorganized from the existing) 1st Cavalry (airmobile) division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile). it became a fact that for the first time helicopters as a transport and combat weapon total number up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was transferred to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of proper theoretical study of airborne (helicopter-landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, she showed herself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam included a large number of helicopters. So if in ser. 1967 was approx. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!

Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were rather vague, then the war in Vietnam raised the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until this time, they were nevertheless perceived rather as a kind of exotic purely auxiliary purpose. The Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to claim the sunset of parachute (from airplanes) landing as such.

We have

Such an active and so successful use of helicopters impressed the Soviet command. The idea is being revived - during the Dnepr-67 strategic exercises, mainly on the basis of the 51st Guards. The formation of the experimental combined 1st 1st Airborne Brigade under the command of the beg. Department of combat training of the Airborne Forces Directorate General-Major Kobzar. It is used to capture the bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion with attached self-propelled guns is also involved. In a specially created working group under the General Staff, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out. And now, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is being made on the formation of completely new military units for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades (ovbr). Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968 in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (FEO) brigades begins. By mid-July, brigades had already been formed. (According to other sources, the 13th brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, the third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (ZKVO).

Brigades formed, as they say, with " a clean slate". Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the posts of airborne service specialists and to the positions of brigade commanders (for example, the former Colonel Reznikov, commander of the 51st Guards.

But even here, a number of subjective factors played a role in the characteristics of Soviet military thought. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry, underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough to act on the Euro-TVD. That’s why they were deployed in areas with a lower threat than the western one - it was deemed advisable to have them only for operations in mountainous-wooded (taiga) terrain impenetrable for ground equipment where foci of hostilities were inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were not so much intended for conducting landings behind enemy lines in the usual way, but for covering a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a poster for visual agitation with a somewhat surreal inscription: “The paratrooper attack aircraft is the hour’s border.”) The aviation component of each of the brigades was an air group consisting of two regular helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Air Force, and the air component - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in the organization of interaction.

For the implementation of the air operational-tactical and tactical landings on EuroTV, it was planned to attract ordinary parachute-landing or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions) pulling them out of the airborne and combined arms divisions.

Here, a little should be said about terminology. It is no good to use the terms created by the capitalists and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were chosen; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed into air assault. Thus, the American terms “air-assault” and “airmobile” gradually ceased to be applied to the Soviet LHC and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.

By the end of 1971, all available brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staff structure (OSH).

IDEA LAYS ON THE ROAD

"Volumes"

In the 70s. behind the thick walls of the buildings of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and research institutions, a clearly serious discussion and, in terms of its consequences, extremely important scientific debate unfolded in conjunction with a carpet and undercover struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions ...

In 1975, a working group led by Lieutenant General I. Yurkovsky put forward the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a new type of operation - the so-called "volumetric operation" in return, as they claimed the outdated concept of "deep operation". Its essence was not to “gnaw through” the enemy’s defense, but to “jump” through it bypassing the infection zones and defense nodes - thus, the pace of attack sharply increased. The idea was supported by some military leaders (Lieutenant General I. Dzhordzhadze and G. Demidkov) and deepened. The question was posed of a global change in the whole theory of operations; the creation of a fundamentally new “air echelon” of ground forces.

The implementation of such an idea required a radical change of priorities in military development and fundamentally crowded the positions of the supporters of armored armada ruling in the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military prospects, instead of understanding the dialectic of development, departmentalism and inflexibility prevailed, and the “voluminists” were defeated ...
New wave

And yet, the “traditionalists” had to make room a little bit - painfully interesting arguments were presented by the “voluminists”. In the middle of 1978. the new chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, it was decided to form in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st) another second wave of air assault units of two types.
Firstly, eight separate airborne assault brigades of district (group) subordination:

11 oddbr July 1968 Trans-Baikal Military District Mogocha and Amazar (Chita oblast) *
13 oddbr July 1968 Far Eastern Military District of Magdagachi (Amur Region) *
21 odshbr 1973 Transcaucasian HE. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)
35 guards odshbr December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Cottbus (GDR) **
36 oddsbr December 1979 Leningrad Military District Garbolovo (Leningrad region)
37 odshbr December 1979 Baltic HE Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)
38 guards Vienna December 1979 Belarusian Military District Brest (Belarus)
odshbr
39 oddbr December 1979 Carpathian Military District, city of Hyrov (Ukraine)
40 odshbr December 1979 Odessa VO s. Great Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine)
56 guards Oshbr December 1979 Turkestan Military District Azadbash (district of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***
57 odshbr December 1979 Central Asian Military District Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan Region, Kazakhstan)

Notes:
* Elements of the air groups of these brigades could be deployed separately.
** Literally approx. For a month, the brigade was originally referred to as the 14th guard., and only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
*** Formally, the 56th Guards. the brigade is considered formed in Chirchik on the basis of 351 guards. pdp. However, de facto, its deployment for entry into Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagai, Fergana, Iolotan), and brought into a single whole already before entering Afghanistan in Termez. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer cadre), as its formal frame, was initially deployed in Chirchik.

SecondlyTwenty Separate LH Battalions:

48 odshb December 1979 Turkestan Military District,
1st AK / 40th OA (*) location unknown

139 odshb december 1979 Baltic VO,
11th Guards OA of the city of Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)
145 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
5th OA settlement Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory)
899 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
20th Guards OA of the city of Burg (GDR)
900 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
8th Guards OA Leipzig - Schinau (GDR)
901 odshb December 1979 Central Group of Forces in the district of N / A Riechki (Czechoslovakia)
902 odshb december 1979 Southern Group of Forces, Kecskemét (Hungary)
903 odshb December 1979 Belorussian Military District,
28th OA of Brest (South), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus)
904 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
13th OA Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)
905 odshb december 1979 Odessa VO,
14th OA of the city of Bender (Moldova)
906 odshb December 1979 Trans-Baikal Military District,
36th OA settlement Hada-Bulak (Chita region, borough Borzya)
907 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
43rd AK / 47th OA of the city of Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)
908 odshb December 1979 Kiev Military District,
1st Guards OA Konotop, from 1984 - town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region)
1011 odshb December 1979 Belorussian Military District,
5th Guards TA Art. Maryina Gorka - city of Pukhovichi (Belarus)
1044 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
1st Guards TA Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the Königsbruck district)
1156 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
8th TA, Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)
1179 odshb December 1979 Leningrad Military District,
6th OA Petrozavodsk (Karelia)
1151 odshb December 1979 Belorussian Military District,
7th TA, Polotsk (Belarus)
1185 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
2nd Guards TA Ravensbrück (GDR)
1604 odshb December 1979 Trans-Baikal Military District,
29th OA of Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug)

Notes:

* Just a few months after the formation, 48 odshb (or, presumably, the 148th) was poured into the 66th ovbr (omsbr) in Afghanistan. In general, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (ACSV) in Afghanistan, there were two brigades of a special organization known as the "people" as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (but in reality bearing the name "Separate Combined Arms Brigade" - regiment.) . They included one odshb each.

During August-December 1979, these parts were mainly created.

In 1984, 83 odshbr and two separate regiments were formed - the 1318th and 1319th odshp for the regular Operational-Maneuverable Groups (OMG) - they are also the so-called. Separate army corps (KLA). And in 1986 several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.

23 odshbr 1986 The High Command of the South-West direction (SC YuZN) Kremenchug (Ukraine)
58 odshbr 1986 (presum.) Kiev VO Kremenchug (Ukraine)
83 oddsbr 1984 Northern Group of Forces Bialogjard (Poland)
128 odshbr 1986 (presumed.) Southern Command High Command (UN Civil Code) Stavropol (Stavropol AK)
130 odshbr 1986 (presumed.) High Command Far East (Group of Airborne Forces) Abakan (Khakass Autonomous Okrug)
1318 odshp 1984 Belorussian Military District, 5th Guards. UAC Borovukha-1 - Borogla (district of Polotsk, Belarus)
1319 odshp 1984 Zabaykalsky Military District, Nth UAC of Kyakhta (Chita Region)

Thus, at the end of 1986 in the Soviet Army there were 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 detachments. battalions. The total number of staff war time amounted to 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - an average of approx. 31-34 thousand people At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.

The principle by which the numbering of brigades and regiments was carried out is not known to me. But, with a certain accuracy, it can be argued that it was the same for odshbr, obrSpN and omsbr - i.e. within all ST. Differences in the numbering of odshb are due to three consecutive orders by which they were formed. However, these explanations I have heard seem insufficient.
Subordination

Many people are interested in the question - were the DShCHs included in the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they didn’t. DShCh were part of the High Command SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the DShCh military personnel are not airborne paratroopers? Does not mean. The organizational, administrative affiliation of the children’s military school to the GK SV is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the Civil Code of the Northern District, the school children’s direct military commanders were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms associations — corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of forces — in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation was repeated with them as with parts special purpose - there were such military units, but there weren’t such troops. It was the commander’s office tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no control of the commander of the air assault troops. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one side of the airborne forces, and on the other side of the GK SV. The “second-rate” (this was especially true in the first years of existence) position in the unspoken internal army hierarchy led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: poor attention to problems, poor supplies, less attention to staffing and training, etc. In the minds of officers and the Airborne Forces and Special Forces, their definition in the DShV was often considered a "reference" (perhaps, apart from units in military groups - all places there, of course, were valued higher).

In the operational plan ( combat use), parts of the DShV were subordinate to the command of combined arms associations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of forces). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of the DShV units and their training - the combat training department of the SV SV group was in charge of the Airborne Forces command and control division. The general principles of the combat use of DShV lay on the conscience General Staff USSR Armed Forces.

In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the LH units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Command.

This had two opposing consequences.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that in this way the children’s youth found their “own father" instead of the suspicious stepfather and evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a "legitimate" look.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with previously superior, and now unknown as related, headquarters of combined arms associations was disrupted. DShV, designed for action in the interests of combined arms associations ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, sharply reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a subordination scheme: to the administrative - to the Airborne Forces Commander (manning, development of methods and forms of actions, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operational (combat use) - to the Commanders of operational and operational-strategic associations in whose interests this formation supposed to use.
However, when it began in 1989. the collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces, all this has played little role. But that's another story…

Differences between Airborne and DShV

If the Airborne Forces, according to the established opinion, are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (AED) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature to a great depth (up to 100-150 km and more) , then the idea of \u200b\u200busing DShV lies in the area of \u200b\u200brather purely tactical or, at most, operational tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the question of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (SV) is not strictly raised - they are thrown out in the interests of no less than a front (group of fronts), or even the Supreme High Command (VGK), then for the DSV it is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCH do not even have their goals, but only a task. (They act within the framework of the goal set for their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This "macro target" defines the "micro target" of the landing forces, also determines the task, the composition of forces, the method of application.) Thus, we can distinguish the main all-defining feature of the infantry fighting vehicle - their application It is carried out in accordance with the goals and objectives of the land combined-arms command authority, as a rule, at the army-corps level, or, in some cases, even divisions. The hierarchically younger the command authority, the smaller the scale of the forces involved in the LH, as a rule. If the Airborne Forces operate with divisions, then the Children's Airborne Forces operate with companies and battalions, less often with a brigade / regiment.
Picking

To create and staff the "second wave" of the children’s infantry infantry fighting division, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards. Airborne and 80th Guards. pdp 104th airborne. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent to understaff. So, the 36th ODSBR was formed on the basis of the 237th Guards. pdp (he was staged) who allocated the officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the officers of the headquarters of the 105th Guards. Airborne Forces, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.

In the military school of military districts most of there were officers from the military districts of the districts: for oddsh only commanders were selected from the airborne forces, the rest from the districts; In ODSB groups of troops, a battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, partially, company commanders. To staff the newly created parts, in 1979. in military schools preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, the enrollment was increased, and from 1983-84. Already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were assigned to the OshBR of groups of troops, less often to the OshBR of districts, and even less often to the OshBR. In 1984-85. a shuffle of officers in the army groups was carried out - almost all the officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most trained graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces. True, it was not without patronage, but this only concerned the distribution into groups of forces - there was a war in Afghanistan, airborne officers went there in the second round, and the temptation to build their own away was great.

With regard to manning with fixed-term military personnel, the medical requirements and other selection rules, as for the Airborne Forces, also applied to the infantry infantry fighting squad. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent stood out. High selection requirements (growth - not lower than 173cm; physical development - not lower than average; education - no lower than secondary, the absence of medical restrictions, etc.) determined rather high capabilities in combat training.

In contrast to the Airborne Forces, in which there was its own large "Gaijunai training" - the 44th air traffic control unit; The DShVs were staffed by junior commanders and specialists, mostly graduating from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, Gaijunai pets.
Outfit and equipment

Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of the Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowance standards almost completely corresponded to those in the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined arms form and equipment with amphibious assault, nor did it take into account the moral factor. In general, to ser. 1983, the entire DShV l / s went in the usual form of motorized rifles - however, for a very clear discrepancy, the standard sidor bags were replaced by RD-54 amphibious backpacks. However, at the same time, “non-statutory” departures from this rule also occurred. So, it was possible to see the Airborne "birds" on the red buttonholes, and those who left the active service tried to get a "normal" landing uniform - with a vest and beret - and in such a way go "on a demobilization". To perform parachute jumps were issued the so-called. "jump" overalls airborne.

In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DShV to the supply standards and the form of the Airborne Forces, which was done by the spring of next year almost everywhere. And the soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests quickly getting rid of the disgusting and despised "red".

For a combat situation, you can outline the standard view of a Soviet paratrooper like this. Underwear including and a vest (T-shirt with a long sleeve and a vest of double knitting, i.e. insulated); the so-called "jump" jumpsuit of greenish-olive color; head-covering cloth helmet (in winter - insulated with lining), boots with side lacing (or, less commonly, with straps); finally - camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit worn consisting of a short jacket and bloomers; all colors are khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. Mandatory for everyone - RD-54 paratrooper backpack. In addition to it, there could be: additional combined-arms pouches for AK stores, a pouch for SVD sniper rifle stores, portlets for carrying shots to RPGs, etc. For parachute jumps, special covers were used for weapon and cargo container GK-30.

Also, in ser. In the 1980s, to supply the DShV, a BVD transport and unloading vest was designed that was structurally reminiscent of the Gedeeer landing vest. However, he never entered the army in droves.
ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS

Speaking about the organizational and staff structure (OSH) and the configuration of weapons and equipment (IWT) of units and parts of the DShV, the following reservations should be made immediately. Firstly, the same rules and features apply to the DShV that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the OSH and the configuration of military equipment from part to part. Secondly, changes in time - the OSH and the IWT equipment were gradually changing. This concerned both grassroots units and the general structure of units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the OSB with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local characteristics; which is connected with the notorious secrecy regime in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OSS of DSH quite problematic and requiring a separate serious study. Below, I give only the principal structure of the CSDS and CSDS.

Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of the air assault brigades is not known to me. Therefore, we have to confine ourselves only to the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (BVP) and transport-combat (TBVP), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three airborne assault (standard airborne infantry squadrons of the standard for airborne airborne squadrons) and one air assault (airborne squadrons had the original airborne squadron reinforced compared to the airborne squadrons) of the battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, in general, not characteristic of the Soviet airborne units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical association - i.e. was equal to the division.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st oddsbr for the 1970s:

management brigade
- three air assault companies (SPG-9D, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-2M), communications, support, first-aid post.
- air group (until 1977, from this year - only a helicopter regiment), consisting of:
- combat helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- A separate battalion of aerodrome-technical support (two communication companies and RT support, two TEC, security company)
- mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 ATGM "Baby", later - "Bassoon")
- jet battery (140-mm MLRS RPU-16) - soon disbanded
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company

- repair company

- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
1. The battalions, air group and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 div. air assault battalions; 211 air groups consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, since this year - only 329 helicopter regiments).
- at 13 oddsbr: ..., ... and ... depart. air assault battalions, ... an air group of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- in 21 odds: 802, 803 and 804 div. air assault battalions, 1171 air groups consisting of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, since this year - only 325 helicopter regiments).
2. In addition to those indicated in the brigade, there were also the following units: a company of young soldiers (RMS), a club, a special department of the KGB with a security platoon, and economic structures.

Organizational structure of the 23rd, 35th guards., 36th, 37th, 38th guards., 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th oddsbr for 1979-88. :

management brigade
- three parachute landing companies (ATGM Metis, 82 mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)

- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- one (4th) air assault (on armored vehicles) battalion:
- three air assault companies (BMD-1 / -1P, BTRD, 82 mm M, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- since 1981 - a mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38) is added, and from the beginning 1983, it is replaced by a self-propelled artillery battery (120 mm SAO 2S9 Nona) *
- platoons: grenade launcher (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.

- reactive battery (122 mm MLRS BM-21V Grad-V)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982) **:
- two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Strela-10M)
- anti-aircraft missile battery (MANPADS Strela-3)
- platoons: management, support.
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Arrow-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, Bassoon)
- reconnaissance company (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- airborne assault company
- car company
- medical company
- repair company
- transport and business company (since 1986)
- a platoon of radiochemical reconnaissance, and since 1984, in part of brigades - a company of radiochemical and biological defense
- platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
* Initially (1979-81), there was no minbatre in the dshb.
** The antiaircraft division has been in the majority of the oshdbr since 1983. For some time in the 35th guards oshdbr there were also ZSU-23-4 Shilka.

The total number of brigades deployed in wartime states reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.

Some brigades had a structure different from that presented above. So, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two paratrooper (1st and 2nd) and one paratrooper assault (3rd) battalion. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigades who fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, it was distinguished by the presence of three air assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one parachute-airborne (4th) battalions. The team had a non-standard organization, which also changed over time.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st oddsbr for 1979-88:

management brigade
- Three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate airborne assault (foot) battalions:
- three air assault companies (82 mm M, ATGM Fagot, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Bassoon, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- howitzer artillery battery (122 mm D-30)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- mountain-cannon battery (76 mm GP 2A2 model 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- airborne assault company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- transport and business company
- platoon radiochemical reconnaissance
- platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
* Battalions and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 div. air assault battalions; 329 helicopter regiment (in early 1988 removed from the brigade).
at 13 oddsbr: ..., ... and ... depart. air assault battalions, ... a helicopter regiment (in early 1988 removed from the brigade).
in 21 odds: 802, 803 and 804 div. air assault battalions, 325th helicopter regiment (in early 1988 removed from the brigade).
For some time, there were no ZRVs in the battalions - they were part of the DSRs.
802 (1st) oddsb 21 oddsbr had a different organization from the standard.

The OshP organizational structure differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: the 1st airborne assault (on foot) and the 2nd air assault (on the BMD), as well as the somewhat reduced composition of the regiment's units. The total number of regiments deployed in the wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.

The OSSB organizational structure at the European theater and the Far East theater was generally similar to the OShB PDB brigades, but also included a fourth company - an airborne assault company (on BMD) and a reconnaissance platoon (either with BMD or UAZ-469), and in a mortar battery the number of trunks increased to 8 units. The total number of battalions deployed in the wartime states reached 650-670 people.

In the winter and spring of 1988, organizational changes began that ended by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time the brigades were renamed the airborne assault forces and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly facilitated by removing all the armored vehicles from there having removed the airborne assault battalion on the BMD / BTRD from its composition.

Organizational structure 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th guards., 36th, 37th, 38th guards, 40th, 56th guards., 83rd ovdbr for 1990-91:

management brigade
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) airborne (foot) battalions:
- three parachute landing companies (ATGM Metis, 82 mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Bassoon, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-3 / Igla), communications, support, first-aid post.
- howitzer artillery division:
- three howitzer batteries (122 mm D-30)
- platoons: management, support.
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Arrow-3 / Needle)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM "Bassoon")
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company (UAZ-3151, PK, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- airborne assault company
- car company
- medical company
- repair company
- a company of material support
- company radiochemical protection
- platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

Organizational structure 224 TC for 1990-91:

management brigade
- 1st training parachute airborne battalion:
- three training parachute companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- training reconnaissance company (PK, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd training parachute airborne battalion:
- 1st training automobile company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd training automobile company (for GAZ-66)
- training medical company
- training communications company
- training artillery division:
- training howitzer battery (122 mm D-30)
- training mortar battery (120 mm M)
- training anti-tank battery (ATGM Bassoon, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Arrow-3 / Needle)
- a company of training vehicles (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- communications company
- medical company
- repair company
- a company of material support
- airborne assault platoon
- commandant platoon
- orchestra.

HELICOPTERS - THE MAIN PROBLEM

Domestic DShV had many problems both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly affected the combat readiness of the DShV was to provide them with an aviation component, in other words, helicopters.

The mass “second wave” LHC formed in 1979 consisted only of a ground component — that is, unlike their older counterparts - the "first wave" brigades - there were no helicopter regiments in their composition. One can try to explain this situation with several points.

Firstly, This was contrary to the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic association (armies and fronts). And that means they should be organizationally composed of them for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts to use in the chosen direction. Theoretically, apparently, the true desire to give helicopter forces to each association actually led to the dispersal of helicopters into very numerous associations due to the general enormity of the SA. Here it was necessary either to eliminate unnecessary (or not superfluous?) Associations, or to deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or to speed up the release of helicopters in order to saturate the troops to the maximum.

SecondlyThe production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the currently prevailing doctrine. As already mentioned above, the "volumisers" who advocated the creation of raising part of the ground forces into the air, and hence the sharp increase in the number of necessary air vehicles, were defeated in the struggle against supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the release of helicopters and increased to the beginning. 80-ies., However, this was more a consequence of objective prerequisites, an objective course of development of the country's armed forces, and not a doctrinal stage revolution.

Thirdly, the fact of combining the air and ground components in the tactical combination apparently caused objections among many military leaders - not only subjective, but also quite justified. Being a part of such a formation, helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational association "tied" solely to ensuring the actions of the children’s infantry fighting squad. It seems to the author of the article that the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the long-range aircraft on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of airborne operations by BTA airplanes, not paying attention to the specifics expressed in the much closer and more mandatory symbiosis of the landing with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first one falls. Moreover, according to operational calculations and the experience of the exercises, it turned out that about 70% of the transport helicopter resource was supposed to be used for landing tasks in any case. And what could interfere with the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the JLO / JJ?

Finally, fourthly, as is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was insufficient to equip, like, for example, the Americans, all the connections they might need, and even have a reserve. However, there seems to me a lot of incomprehensible things. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official figures, between 1962 and 1997, 11,000 units were manufactured. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the author’s calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There are no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let losses in Afghanistan and in catastrophes amounted to 400 units, let 1000 machines that worked out a resource be disabled, but where then did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.

So, landing assault brigades theoretically, being an ideal weapon, with focal (non-linear) nature of military operations due to the lack of an airborne component giving them maneuverability, sharply reduced their potential capabilities, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental way out of this situation could be the creation of special tactical formations — air assault corps of brigade regiment personnel — subordinate to front-line departments in wartime. This connection would include a ground component (LMS from the composition of the SV or Airborne Forces) and an airborne helicopter component (from the composition of the ASV). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat effectiveness and at the same time, all concerned departments to "stay with their sheep."

Let's look at an example of how it was supposed to distribute helicopters for DShV. We take standard conditions as initial conditions — a frontal offensive operation of four armies. The group includes one transport and combat helicopter regiment (otvp), six combat helicopter regiments (otvp), and one detachment. air assault brigade (3 battalion) and three detachments. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained in operations as part of the Tactical Division. An analysis of the possible contents of the operation and the tasks typical of airborne assault operations during it show that within the framework of the airborne infantry regiment in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne detachment as an air traffic detachment and eight to ten air defense squadrons as part of an airborne assault squadron and reinforced ISB.
The average standards for the separation of airborne helicopters are: air traffic control units - up to four regimental sorties (airborne missions) otvpp *; TakVD as a part of odshb - one p / in otvp; Reinforced MSB - one reconnaissance detachment without squadron (BE). In addition, an outfit of combat escort helicopters is required.
Estimated staff: otvp - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; OBVP - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.

* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions in armored vehicles in the OshBR sharply increased the necessary outfit of helicopters for transportation, and especially of the heavy Mi-6A. Transportation approx. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share in the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties and in real life the Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking 2 units on board. BTD class BMD / BTRD (for Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation for the better. In general, the author is doubtful about the possibility of transferring the entire BTT dshb helicopters Mi-6A.

It is unnecessary to prove that the landing of the air traffic control unit by three flights, not to mention four, is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer of no more than two flights (trains). And here you can’t do without taking out military transport helicopters from the OBVP for a period of its operations (for a total of 1-2 p / v), that is, they will have to leave them without the Mi-8T / MT.

The duration of the landing of the air traffic control unit in two flights is usually 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent preparation of helicopters, only after a day you can count on their repeated actions (in the same Afghanistan, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense forces are left without ve Mi-8 and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is required to land at least one or two more TAKVDs as part of the battalion, then almost all air regiments remain without transport and landing helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the time of restoration of the combat readiness of the ODSBR, the repeated landing of the air traffic control unit is practically impossible.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land another eight to nine TakVD as part of the oddsb / uss.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving problems not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landings. This was considered an acceptable norm for a decentralized application of TakVD.
Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was necessary to involve transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force, mainly the An-12, for the landing of DShV. This created additional inconvenience. So, dshb on the BTT had to follow independently to such an initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of lifting aircraft with landing on board.
Quality

A certain problem was the adaptability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family to air assault operations and wider, to airborne landing in general. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.

RESULTS

As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, major changes were made in connection with the transfer of LH units to the Airborne Forces. Most of the air assault brigades are reorganized into heavily lightened airborne brigades in armament (in fact, the relief process was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (57th and 58th), and the 39th will be transformed into the 224th CA of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband everything. In the summer of 1990, all major transformations were already completed. Brigades - reorganized, and most of the battalions - disbanded. As of November of this year, of the former, only 5 battalions remained.
The overall picture of the transformations can be traced from the data presented below:

11 odshbr g. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region.) * In 1988 the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. And by Aug 1 1990 transferred to the states of the air. brigades.
13 oddbr of the city of Magdagachi (Amur Region) * In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the states of the air. brigades.
21 oddsbr of Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) In 1988, a helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the states of the air. brigades.
23 oddsbr, Kremenchug (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air des. brigades.
35 guards Odshbr city of Cottbus (GDR) ** In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states of the air. brigades.
36 oddsbr town of Garbolovo (Leningrad region). In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states of the air. brigades.
37 oddsbr Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region) In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states of the air. brigades.
38 guards Vienna, Brest (Belarus) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air des. brigades.
odshbr
39 oddsbr, city of Khirov (Ukraine) In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into 224 CA Airborne.
40 odsbr s. The Great Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to the state of air des. brigades. And completely relocated to Nikolaev.
56 guards Oshbr settlement Azadbash (district of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** In the winter of 1989, she was withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Iolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states
air - des. brigades.
57 odshbr town. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan Region, Kazakhstan) Moved to s. Georgievka Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and there it was disbanded in 1989.
58 oddsbr. Kremenchug (Ukraine) Disbanded in December 1989.
83 oddsbr, Bialogyard city (Poland) Moved to Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990, transferred to the states
air des. brigades.
128 oddsbr Stavropol (Stavropol AK) Disbanded in the beginning. 1990.
130 oddsbr city of Abakan (Khakass Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded in the beginning. 1990.
1318 odshp g. Borovukha-1 - Borogla (district of Polotsk, Belarus) It was disbanded in August 1989.
1319 odshp city of Kyakhta (Chita region) Disbanded in March 1988.

FROM separate battalions acted as follows: in 1989 (the maximum beginning of 1990), all battalions with infantry-fighting detachments in the USSR were disbanded at the same time redeploying to the USSR located in groups of troops in Europe. Then, to the beginning. 1991 they were disbanded. Only the 901th battalion survived.

139 odshb city of Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
145 odshb pos. Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) Disbanded no later than 1989.
899 odshb city of Burg (GDR) In 1989 it was transferred to the village. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than the beginning of 1991.
900 oddsb Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) It was withdrawn to the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.
901 odshb in the district of n.p. Riecki (Czechoslovakia) In 1989 he was transferred to the city of Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 disbandment began, but,
soon, the battalion was redeployed * and in May 1991 was transferred to Abkhazia (Gudauta).
902 oddsb Kecskemét (Hungary) In 1989, transferred to Grodno (Belarus).
903 odshb city of Grodno (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
904 oddsb Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) Disbanded no later than 1989.
905 odshb city of Bender (Moldova) Disbanded no later than 1989.
906 odshb pos. Hada-Bulak (Chita Oblast, borough of Borzya) Disbanded no later than 1989.
907 odshb city of Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Area) Disbanded no later than 1989.
908 odshb village. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1011 odshb st. Maryina Gorka - city of Pukhovichi (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1044 odshb city of Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the Königsbrück district). Translated in 1989 in the city of Tuarag (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1156 oddsb Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1179 odshb Petrozavodsk (Karelia) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1151 odshb city of Polotsk (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1185 odshb city of Ravensbrück (GDR) Moved in 1989 to the city of Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1604 oddsb Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded no later than 1989

Notes:

* At this point, he was already referred to as a separate airborne battalion.

Thus, in early 1991, the former air assault units in the airborne forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.

In 1989, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the helicopters from the Air Force to the NE and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault forces. However, following this, in early December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DSHV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thereby leveling the formation of army aviation, which was positive for the DSHV. The coordination between the air assault units and the command of the combined arms associations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of DShV to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. No doubt, the similarities in acquisition and training did not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the airborne command to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landing in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" to the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter-landing" doctrine were on the face of both us and the NATO. In principle, a logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all the airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to ensuring the actions of the Airborne Forces by BTA airplanes and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of landing forces with helicopters without which the landing efficiency drops sharply.

Acronyms and abbreviations

Airborne Forces - Airborne Troops
CB ̵

16.02.2018, 13:30

For more than a quarter century, the village of Magdagachi has been the landing capital of the Amur region. Thousands of Soviet, and later Russian, guys went through a difficult soldier’s school in the 13th air assault brigade. At one time, such units cooled the ardor of those wishing to unleash the Third world war in the Far East. On August 2, veterans of the brigade can be found not only on the streets of Blagoveshchensk, but also in many cities in total post-Soviet space. Even decades later, they reverently pronounce the name of Pavel Borisovich Gladstein. It was he - a Stalingrad boy and a pupil of Vasily Margelov himself - who stood at the origins of the foundation of the famous military unit. Today he is 90, but he continues to live according to the laws of the main motto of the Airborne Forces: "Nobody but us!"

Stay in service

Every day, Pavel Borisovich Gladstein begins with checking email. Despite his venerable age, he remains an active Internet user. He likes to communicate on Skype with colleagues from all over the former Soviet Union, and his account in Odnoklassniki is a page of memoirs. Veterans of the 13th air assault brigade recognize each other after decades, recall how they escorted each other to Afghanistan and slept with arms on the alarming days of Damansky.

In this rhythm he lives for two decades. It was then, in the year of the 70th anniversary, that relatives gave him a computer. They say they noticed some sadness in the eyes of their father and grandfather. Hit what’s called a bullseye - signs of boredom instantly evaporated. The active paratrooper nature of Pavel Borisovich allowed not only to quickly understand the high technologies, but also to teach computer literacy to children and grandchildren. Staying in service is his life credo, implicated in German bombing and service under the flags of the Airborne Forces.

Childhood in kerosene solution

Stalingrad, boiling Volga and tanks that go beyond the gates of the tractor factory. The 14-year-old Pavel watched this picture from the workshop and clearly understood: tomorrow, the equipment, knocked out and crumpled, will be dragged back again. And he, along with the same juvenile volunteers, will restore it. They were instructed to bring tank fuel pumps to mind. I had to customize every detail, wash it in a kerosene solution.

In 1994, the 13th Magdagachi air assault brigade was relocated to Orenburg. A year later, its units entered into battle with the fighters of Dudaev in Chechnya.

The fights were on the very outskirts of the city, and the boys, exhausted by hard work, received a cup of porridge for lunch, a glass of tea and literally fell from their feet by the end of the 12-hour shift. Bread in the city has long been given in limited portions. Workers received 800 grams per day, non-working - half as much. After work, he ran home, hastily dined, went with his mother and sisters to spend the night in the basement. The Germans regularly bombed the boiler room near the house. The tall chimney was mistaken for a landmark.

- Incendiary bombs were constantly dropped on the roofs of houses. If you do not extinguish in time, then nothing will save from the fire. Therefore, adults were on duty on the roofs and attics. They picked up German “lighters” with large metal tongs and threw them into barrels of water, ”recalls Pavel Borisovich’s childhood. - In the morning we left the basement and did not know if our apartment was intact. They gathered and again dispersed to workplaces. I got to the factory right from the school bench. In May 1942 he was finishing seventh grade. A representative of the enterprise came and said bluntly - men are at the front, there are not enough workers. My friends and I got together and went to forge a victory.

Simple General Uncle Vasya

The Margelov family left Stalingrad the day before the Germans arrived. Father, the head of a large trust, was given the task of transporting the equipment of the plant to the Urals at any cost. On the Baikal-Amur Railway, railroad tracks were urgently dismantled, the rails were transported to Stalingrad. Of these, they built a road that led straight from the workshop to the Volga. There is a railway ferry. The last echelon of the enterprise crossed to the safe coast, and the next day fighting was already going on throughout the city.

At Yurga station in the Kemerovo region, machines were installed directly in the open. The son of the great boss Pavel Gladstein worked as a locksmith. Two years after the victory, he graduated from college, became a specialist in the production of artillery systems. He returned to his native destroyed Stalingrad, so that after a while literally flee from it.

The management of the Barricades factory, where Pavel Gladstein headed the work team, discerned a promising specialist in it. When he mentioned the desire for a military career, threats immediately rained down. He was frightened by the court for his reluctance to restore the national economy - after the war, every specialist was worth its weight in gold. Paul still fled to Kiev, entered the military school of self-propelled artillery.

He dreamed of volleys of guns, but, to his own surprise, was assigned to the Airborne Forces. At first, however, I had a chance to serve in my specialty: in the 125th Kostroma Guards Airborne Division there was a self-propelled artillery division. However, less than a year later they had to say goodbye to artillery. On April 1, 1952, Lieutenant Gladstein was sent to the Far East. The joke was successful. Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya, now Belogorsk, Amur Region, has become a new duty station. An airborne corps was deployed under the command of Vasily Margelov himself.

- Hero of the Soviet Union, lieutenant general, founder of the Airborne Forces ... A man deserved in all respects and at the same time completely easy to communicate. Before talking with him, I was worried, and he meets every young officer, explains to him the specifics of the service in the Far East. Himself in an ordinary cap and a flying leather jacket without shoulder straps, Pavel Borisovich recalls the details of the historical meeting.

Fall on the enemy’s head

In the late sixties of the last century, little was written about the events on the Soviet-Chinese border. Soviet citizens lived a normal life, and only the military understood what the complication of the situation was fraught with. The summer of 1968 in the border areas of the Union turned out to be hectic, less than a year remained before the main bloodshed on Damansky Island.

Against this background, paratroopers began to arrive in the Amur village of Magdagachi from all over the country. They were entrusted with a serious task - to cover 400 kilometers of the state border. Liability line - from Erofei Pavlovich station to Shimanovskaya station. The theater of possible military operations of an unprecedented extent, even such tasks have never been set for combined arms units.

The stake was on high mobility and a completely new type of landing units. They had to land on small military transport helicopters and operate in the near rear of a likely enemy. Simply put, fall directly on the enemy’s head.

- In July 1968, Mikhail Timofeevich Reznikov, the chief of staff of the 98th Guards Svir Red Banner Airborne Division, was summoned to the General Staff. We set the task - to form a separate air assault brigade. Everything rested in the absence of time. The brigade was to be formed at an accelerated pace, - describes the events of the disturbing 1968, Pavel Gladstein.

He was among the first officers to arrive at the Magdagachi station. I didn’t even imagine that his fate would be connected with the 13th air assault brigade for more than ten years. The paratroopers of the older generation perfectly remember this brave major, who two years later became the chief of staff, and then led the brigade. It was a powerful mobile fist, which included mortar, anti-aircraft, anti-tank and even howitzer units. Effectively commanding such a unit could only people with rich worldly and military experience.

We have nothing to fear

In March 1969, Damansky’s snow was saturated with the blood of soldiers and officers. However, the Third World War did not reach. The enemy did not have to jump on their heads. On the other side of the Amur, they knew perfectly well what method would be prepared in the event of full-scale aggression.

In Stalingrad, after work, Pavel ran home, hastily dined, and went with his mother and sisters to spend the night in the basement. The Germans regularly bombed the boiler room near the house.

In July 1978, the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Army General Tretyak conducted exercises with the troops of the 35th Army (Amur Region). The 13th Special Forces Detachment was raised on alarm and received orders to advance to the area, which was 300 kilometers from the place of permanent deployment.

- Marines on the Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters landed in the indicated areas and took up the defense. At the analysis of the exercises, the commander noted that the brigade first participated in such exercises and coped with its tasks. The assessment of the 13th ODBSR is good. The remaining units of the 35th Army are satisfactory, recalls Pavel Borisovich. - After analyzing the exercises, the commander called me and said that he would not sign my dismissal report, which I had submitted in connection with the 50th anniversary. I must serve until a candidate for the position of brigade commander is determined. He was found only two years later.

OPINION

Clara Gladstein, wife of Pavel Borisovich, a famous Amur restaurateur:

- Despite his venerable age, Pavel Borisovich remains an indisputable authority for all family members. In addition to two children, he has six grandchildren and as many great-grandchildren. He is demanding on everyone, but first of all on himself, therefore he is always collected and obligatory. She’s never late anywhere and accustoms loved ones to this. He is a real role model, well versed in all matters of life. You can talk with him on political topics and get purely everyday advice.

Pavel Borisovich still drives a car, he has very strong confident hands that can fix anything in the house. He lives without resentment and claims to his own. difficult fate. He follows all the events in the country and the world and knows for sure - as long as there are Airborne troops in Russia, we have nothing to fear.

The history of DShB 13 ​

None of the spheres of human activity is developing as dynamically and rapidly as military affairs. New types of weapons, tactics and even types of armed forces appear. Soviet Union can be called the birthplace of the airborne troops. Similar units existed in other armies of the world, but nowhere so much attention was paid to this type of troops.

At the end of the 30s of the last century, airborne corps were formed in the USSR, each of which had a population of more than 10 thousand people. The landing party was considered the elite of the army; the most skilled and trained fighters served in it. The airborne troops took part in the most important battles with the Nazi invaders, during the war several large-scale airborne operations were carried out.

After the war, the Airborne Forces became a separate type of troops, they reported directly to the USSR Minister of Defense. An important milestone in the development of this type of troops was the creation in the mid-60s of airborne assault units, which were subordinate to the command of the military districts. The Airborne assault units did not have other special differences from the usual airborne units (weapons, uniforms, training programs).

History of the 13th Special School Brigade

The idea to form an air assault unit was born after revising the tactics of the Airborne Forces in the event of a full-scale war. Soviet strategists decided to bet on the use of massive landings in the immediate rear of the enemy, which should completely disorganize their defense.

At that time, the army had a significant fleet of transport aircraft (primarily helicopters) and could carry out a similar task. It was planned that the air assault units would land in the nearest enemy rear from helicopters, and act in small groups. The parachute assault troops were supposed to be used in the rear of the enemy, landing them in a parachute manner.
In 1969, two air assault brigades were formed in the Far Eastern District: the 11th and 13th Special Operations Brigade, each of which had a helicopter regiment. In the event of the outbreak of war, these units had to operate in remote areas.

The region in which the 13th Special Forces Brigade was deployed gave a complete picture of what “inaccessible terrain” is. The cities of Magdagachi and Zavitinsk, where the unit was located, can be safely called one of the harshest corners of the Soviet Union. To fully understand this, you need to go there.

The temperature in the summer often reached +40 degrees, and in the winter the thermometer column dropped to -55 degrees. Daily temperature drops sometimes reached 30-35 degrees. And in these conditions it was necessary not only to live, but also to conduct high-quality combat training paratroopers. Not in vain, in the Evenki language, the name "magdagachi" means "the place of dead trees."

Brigade combat training

To become a paratrooper, you need not only strength and endurance. The landing party always fights in extremely harsh conditions, behind enemy lines, without the support of the main forces, the supply of ammunition and the evacuation of the wounded. You have to rely only on yourself. Therefore, each paratrooper must be a skilled fighter.

In the 13th Special Forces Brigade, much attention was paid to the constant honing of military skills of military personnel, not forgetting about physical fitness. The thirteenth airborne assault brigade has always been one of the model divisions of the Far Eastern District; only paratroopers from the 11th Special Operations Brigade could compete with it.

The combat training of servicemen from the air assault brigades was paid a lot of attention for a reason: the Far East was the territory of a possible conflict. Nearby was the border with China, with which the USSR had very tense relations. In 1969, the confrontation between the two countries led to a border conflict on Damansky Island, which almost became the beginning of a major war. So the paratroopers were preparing at any moment to repel enemy attacks.

A clear confirmation of the high level of training of the soldiers of the 13th Special Forces Brigade was the exercises with the landing on Iturup Island, held in August 1988. The brigade was tasked with landing a landing group of two battalions and a battery of mining artillery on the island. The landing took place from Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters.

Mi-6 helicopters (left) and Mi-8 (right).

Suddenly, live ammunition was fired at the first landing group; it was fired from the air defense point guarding the airfield on the island. It turned out that due to bad weather, the garrison was not warned about the upcoming exercises. Only thanks to the excellent training and good preparation of the paratroopers there were no casualties.

After this incident, the leadership of the brigade received gratitude from the Minister of Defense Yazov, and the 13th Special Operations Brigade was awarded a pennant.

Last years

In the late 80s, the country began to change rapidly, and in 1991 the USSR ceased to exist. The "dashing" 90s began. Of course, the armed forces could not stay away from these processes. Numerous reorganizations were carried out, funding was significantly cut, many parts were simply disbanded.

Already in August 1990, the 13th Special Operations Brigade was removed from the command of the Far Eastern District and directly subordinated to the headquarters of the Airborne Forces in Moscow. The airborne assault brigade turned into the 13th separate airborne brigade (13th airborne brigade). Two artillery batteries were disbanded (anti-tank and mountain), they were replaced by a division of D-30 howitzers.

At the end of 1996, 13 air traffic brigades were disbanded. This happened according to the plan for reducing the airborne forces.

The military airborne troops are one of the strongest components of the army. Russian Federation. IN last years, due to the tense international situation, the importance of the airborne forces is increasing. The size of the territory of the Russian Federation, its landscape diversity, as well as the borders with almost all conflicting states, indicate that it is necessary to have a large stock of special groupings of troops that can provide the necessary protection in all directions, which are the air forces.

In contact with

As structure air forces vast, often the question arises of the Airborne Forces and DShB the same troops? The article understands the differences between them, history, goals and military training of both organizations, composition.

Differences between troops

The differences lie in the names themselves. The JBB is an air assault brigade organized and specializing in attacks on the enemy’s near rear in the event of unfolding large-scale military operations. Air assault brigades subordinate to the airborne forces - the airborne troops, as one of their units and specialize only in assault captures.

Airborne - these are landing troopswhose task is to capture the enemy, as well as the capture and destruction of enemy weapons and other operations from the air. The functionality of the airborne forces is much wider - reconnaissance, sabotage, assault. For a better understanding of the differences, we will consider the history of the creation of the Airborne Forces and Airborne Special Forces separately.

Airborne History

The Airborne Forces begins its history in 1930, when an operation was carried out near the city of Voronezh on August 2, where 12 people parachuted from the air as part of the special forces. This operation then opened the eyes of the leadership to new opportunities for parachute troops. Next year, based Leningrad Military District, a detachment is being formed, which received a long name - airborne landing and totaled about 150 people.

The effectiveness of the paratroopers was obvious and the Revolutionary Military Council decides to expand it by creating airborne troops. The order was published at the end of 1932. In parallel, in Leningrad, instructors were trained, later on they were distributed in the districts according to special-purpose battalions in aviation.

In 1935, the military district of Kiev demonstrated to the foreign delegations the full power of the airborne forces, having arranged an impressive landing of 1,200 paratroopers, who quickly captured the airfield. Later, similar exercises were held in Belarus, as a result of which the German delegation, impressed by the landing of 1800 people, decided to organize their own airborne squad, and then the regiment. Thus, The Soviet Union is rightfully the birthplace of the Airborne Forces.

In 1939, our landing forces there is an opportunity to show oneself in practice. In Japan, the 212nd brigade was landed on the Halkin-Gol River, and a year later 201, 204 and 214 brigades were deployed in the war with Finland. Knowing that the Second World War will not pass us by, 5 air corps of 10 thousand people were formed and the Airborne Forces acquires a new status - the Guards troops.

The year 1942 was marked by the largest airborne operation during the war years, which took place near Moscow, where about 10 thousand paratroopers were dropped into the German rear. After the war, it was decided to attach the Airborne Forces to the High Command and appoint the Commander of the Airborne Forces of the USSR; this honor is given to Colonel General V.V. Glagolev.

Big innovations in the airborne troops came with "Uncle Vasya". In 1954, V.V. Glagoleva is replaced by V.F. Margelov and holds the post of commander of the Airborne Forces until 1979. Under Margelov, the Airborne Forces is equipped with new military equipment, among which artillery mounts, combat vehicles, special attention is paid to work under conditions of a sudden attack by nuclear weapons.

Airborne detachments took part in all the most significant conflicts - the events of Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, North and South Ossetia. Several of our battalions carried out UN peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia.

Nowadays, about 40 thousand soldiers are part of the Airborne Forces, during special operations, paratroopers form its basis, since the Airborne Forces are a highly qualified component of our army.

The history of the formation of DSB

Air assault brigades began their history after it was decided to revise the tactics of the Airborne Forces in the context of the unleashing of large-scale hostilities. The purpose of such airborne balloons was to disorganize opponents by mass landings close to the enemy, such operations were most often carried out from helicopters in small groups.

Toward the end of the 60s in the Far East, it was decided to form 11 and 13 brigades with helicopter regiments. These regiments were involved mainly in hard-to-reach areas, the first landing attempts took place in the northern cities of Magdachi and Zavitinsk. Therefore, in order to become a paratrooper of this brigade, strength and special endurance were needed, since weather conditions were almost unpredictable, for example, in winter the temperature reached -40 degrees, and in the summer there was abnormal heat.

The location of the first DSB the Far East was not just chosen. It was a time of difficult relations with China, which became even more aggravated after a clash of interests on Damascus Island. The brigades were ordered to prepare to repel an attack from China, which could attack at any time.

High level and relevance of DSB was demonstrated at exercises in the late 80s on Iturup Island, where 2 battalions and artillery landed on helicopters MI-6 and MI-8. The garrison, due to weather conditions, was not warned about the exercises, as a result of which they opened fire on the landed, but thanks to the highly qualified training of the paratroopers, none of the participants in the operation was injured.

In those same years, the DSB included 2 regiments, 14 brigades, and about 20 battalions. One team attached to one military district, but only to those that had access to the border by land. Kiev also had its own brigade, another 2 brigades were given to our units located abroad. Each brigade had an artillery division, rear and combat units.

After the end of the USSR, the country's budget did not allow the mass maintenance of the army, so there was nothing else to do but disband some parts of the infantry and infantry combat forces. The beginning of the 90s was marked by the removal of the DSB from the subordination of the Far East and the transfer to full submission to Moscow. The airborne assault brigades are transformed into separate airborne brigades - 13th airborne brigade. In the mid-90s, the plan to reduce the airborne forces disbanded the 13th airborne brigade.

Thus, it can be seen from the foregoing that the DSB was created as one of the structural divisions of the Airborne Forces.

The composition of the airborne

The composition of the Airborne Forces includes the following units:

• airborne;
• air assault;
• mountain (which operate exclusively on mountain hills).

These are the three main components of the Airborne Forces. In addition, they consist of a division (76.98, 7, 106 Guards Airborne Assault), brigades and regiments (45, 56, 31, 11, 83, 38 Guards Airborne Assault). A team is being created in Voronezh in 2013, received number 345.

Personnel of the Airborne Forces prepared in educational institutions military reserve of Ryazan, Novosibirsk, Kamenetz-Podolsk, in Kolomenskoye. The training was conducted in the areas of airborne (airborne assault) platoon, reconnaissance platoon commanders.

The school graduated annually about three hundred graduates - this was not enough to satisfy the personnel requests of the military airborne troops. Consequently, it was possible to get into the Airborne Forces by graduating from the landing faculties in the special areas of such schools as combined arms and military departments.

Training

The commander of the DShB was selected most often from the Airborne Forces, and battalion commanders, deputy battalion commanders, company commanders from the nearest military districts. In the 70s, due to the fact that the management decided to repeat its experience - to create and equip the DSB, educational enrollment is expandingwho trained future airborne officers. The mid-80s was marked by the fact that officers graduated from military service in the school for children, being trained according to the educational program for the Airborne Forces. Also during these years, a complete rearrangement of officers was underway; almost all of them were decided to be replaced in the DSV. At the same time, excellent students went to the service mainly in the Airborne Forces.

To get to the service in the Airborne Forces, as in DSB, it is necessary to meet specific criteria:

• growth of 173 and above;
• secondary physical development;
• secondary education;
• without medical restrictions.

If everything matches, then the future fighter begins training.

Special attention paid, of course, to the physical training of airborne paratroopers, which is carried out constantly, begins with a daily rise at 6 am, hand-to-hand combat (a special training program) and ends with long march-throws of 30-50 km. Therefore, every fighter has a huge exposure and endurance, moreover, guys who were engaged in any kind of sport that develops that very endurance are selected in their ranks. To test it, they pass an endurance test - in 12 minutes a fighter must run 2.4-2.8 km., Otherwise there is no point in the Airborne Forces service.

It is worth noting that it is not in vain that they are called universal fighters. These people can operate in various places in any weather conditions absolutely silently, can disguise themselves, own all types of weapons, both their own and the enemy, control any type of transport, communications. In addition to excellent physical preparation, psychological is also required, since fighters have to overcome not only great distances, but also “work with their heads” to get ahead of the enemy throughout the operation.

Intellectual suitability is determined using tests compiled by specialists. The psychological compatibility in the team is taken into account without fail, the guys are included in a particular detachment for 2-3 days after which the senior employees give an assessment of behavior.

Psychophysical training, which implies tasks with increased risk, where there is both physical and mental stress. Such tasks are aimed at overcoming fear. Moreover, if it turns out that the future paratrooper does not, in general, feel fear, then he will not be accepted for further training, since this feeling is quite naturally taught to control him, and not completely eradicated. The preparation of the Airborne Forces gives our country a huge advantage in the face of fighters over any enemy. Most VDVeshnikov leads a familiar lifestyle even after retirement.

Armament Airborne

As for the technical equipment, the combined-arms technology and specially designed for the nature of this kind of troops are involved in the Airborne Forces. Some of the samples were created during the USSR, but the bulk was developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The cars of the Soviet period include:

• landing combat vehicle - 1 (the number reaches - 100 units);
• BMD-2M (approximately 1 thousand units), they are used both in land and in parachute landing methods.

These techniques were tested over the years and took part in multiple armed conflicts that took place on the territory of our country and beyond. Nowadays, in conditions of rapid progress, these models are outdated both morally and physically. A bit later the BMD-3 model came out and today the number of such equipment is only 10 units, since production has been discontinued, it is planned to gradually replace the BMD-4.

The Airborne Forces also have BTR-82A, BTR-82AM and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and the most numerous tracked armored personnel carrier - 700 units, and it is the most obsolete (mid-70s), it is gradually being replaced by an armored personnel carrier - MDM "Shell". Also available anti-tank guns 2С25 "Octopus-SD", armored personnel carrier - RD "Robot", and anti-tank systems: "Competition", "Metis", "Bassoon", and "Cornet". Air defense It is represented by missile systems, but a special place is given to the new product, which recently appeared on the arsenal of the Airborne Forces - MANPADS "Verba".

Not so long ago, new models of equipment appeared:

• armored car "Tiger";
• Snowmobile A-1;
• truck KamAZ - 43501.

As for communication systems, they are represented by local developed complexes electronic warfare “Leer-2 and 3”, Infauna, system control is represented by the air defense “Barnaul”, “Andromeda” and “Polet-K” - automation of command and control.

Weapon represented by samples, for example, the Yarygin pistol, PMM and silent PSS pistol. The Soviet AK-74 assault rifle is still a personal weapon of paratroopers, but is gradually being replaced by the latest AK-74M, and the silent Val assault rifle is also used in special operations. There are parachute systems of both the Soviet and post-Soviet type, which can drop large quantities of soldiers and all of the above military equipment. Heavier equipment includes automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame" and AGS-30, SPG-9.

DSB armament

DShB had transport helicopter regimentswhich totaled:

• about twenty mi-24, forty mi-8 and forty mi-6;
• the anti-tank battery was armed with a 9 MD easel anti-tank grenade launcher;
• the mortar battery included eight 82-millimeter BM-37;
• in the anti-aircraft missile platoon, there were nine MANPADS Strela-2M;
• also included several BMD-1, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers for each air assault battalion.

The armament of the brigade artillery group consisted of GD-30 howitzers, PM-38 mortars, GP 2A2 cannons, anti-tank missile system "Baby", SPG-9MD, anti-aircraft mount ZU-23.

Heavier equipment includes automatic launchers AGS-17 "Flame" and AGS-30, SPG-9 "Spear". Reconnaissance from the air is carried out using the domestic Orlan-10 UAV.

One interesting fact took place in airborne history, quite a long time, thanks to erroneous information from the media, special forces (SPN) were not rightly called paratroopers. The thing is, what in Air Force our country in the Soviet Union, as well as in the post-Soviet Union, the Special Forces troops did not exist and do not exist, but there are units and units of the Special Operations Directorate of the GRU of the General Staff that arose in the 1950s. Until the 80s, the command was forced to completely deny their existence in our country. Therefore, those who were appointed to these troops found out about them only after being accepted for service. For the media, they were disguised as motorized rifle battalions.

Airborne Day

Paratroopers celebrate the birthday of the airborne, as well as DSB since August 2, 2006. This kind of gratitude for the effectiveness of the air units, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation was signed in May of that year. Despite the fact that the holiday was announced by our government, the birthday is celebrated not only in our country, but also in Belarus, Ukraine and most CIS countries.

Every year, airborne veterans and active soldiers meet in the so-called “meeting place”, in each city it has its own, for example, in Bratsk kindergarten in Astrakhan, Victory Square in Kazan, Gidropark in Kiev, Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow, Novosibirsk "Central Park". IN major cities arrange demonstrations, concerts and fairs.

The rapid and coordinated deployment of troops in Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries established full control over Czechoslovak territory.

However, despite the obvious military success, it was not possible to achieve political goals. The leaders of the CPC, and after them the Fourteenth Extraordinary Party Congress on August 21, condemned the introduction of allied forces. Representatives of a conservative group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leading posts in the HRC.

On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied forces from Czechoslovakia began, which ended by mid-November.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 22, 1969, the 80th airborne regiment of the 104th Guards Airborne Division was awarded the Order of the Red Star for the successful completion of combat missions during the restoration of order in Czechoslovakia.

In the mid-60s, due to the active development of helicopters (with their amazing ability to land and take off almost anywhere), the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating special military unitsthat could land helicopters in the tactical rear of the enemy in order to assist the advancing ground forces. Unlike the Airborne Forces, these new units were supposed to be landed only by the landing method, and unlike the Special Operations Directorate of the GRU, they had to operate with sufficiently large forces, including with the use of armored vehicles and other heavy weapons.

To confirm (or refute) the theoretical conclusions, it was necessary to carry out large-scale practical exercises that would put everything in its place.

In 1967, during the strategic exercises "Dnepr-67" on the basis of the 51st Guards PDP, an experimental 1st Air Assault Brigade was formed. Major Brigade Kobzar, the head of the combat training department of the Airborne Forces Directorate, led the brigade. The helicopter brigade landed on the bridgehead on the Dnieper and completed its task. According to the results of the exercises, relevant conclusions were made, and starting in 1968 as part of ground forces The formation of the first air assault brigades begins in the Far Eastern and Transbaikal military districts.

On the basis of the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968, by August 1970, the 13th was formed in the settlements of Nikolaevna and Zavitinsk, Amur Region, and the 11th air assault brigades in the village of Mogocha, Chita Region.

Again, as in the very first airborne unit (airborne landing detachment of the Leningrad Military District), the "ground" unit was subordinated to the aviation - two helicopter regiments with an air base each were transferred to the control of the brigades, which included a battalion of airfield support and a separate Communications and Radio Engineering Division.

The structure of the air assault brigades of the first formation was as follows:

Office Brigade;

Three air assault battalions;

Artillery division;

Anti-aircraft artillery division;

Helicopter combat regiment with an air base;

Transport helicopter regiment with an air base;

The rear of the brigade.

Airborne assault units landed on helicopters were able to land in the form of a landing assault on any part of the operational-tactical theater of operations and solve the tasks on their own with the fire support of combat helicopters. Experimental exercises were conducted with these brigades to develop tactics for using air assault units. Based on the experience gained, the General Staff made recommendations on improving the organizational structure of such units.

It was assumed that the air assault brigades will operate in the tactical defense zone of the enemy. The range on which the battalions of air assault brigades were supposed to land did not exceed 70-100 km. In particular, as a confirmation, this is evidenced by the range of communications that came into service with the air assault formations. However, if we consider the specific theater of operations, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich the brigades were deployed, we can assume that the purpose of the 11th and 13th oversaw brigade was to quickly close the poorly guarded section of the border with China in the event of a Chinese military invasion. By helicopter, brigade units could be landed anywhere, while motorized rifle regiments of the 67th motorized division located in that area (from Mogochi to Magdagachi) could only move on their own on a single rocky road, which was very slow. Even after the helicopter regiments were withdrawn from the brigades (in the late 80s), the task of the brigades did not change, and the helicopter regiments were always deployed in close proximity.

In the early 70s, a new name for brigades was adopted. From now on, they began to be called "air assault."

On November 5, 1972, by a directive of the General Staff, and on November 16, 1972 and by order of the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, on February 19, 1973, it was decided to form an airborne assault brigade in the Caucasian operational direction. In the city of Kutaisi, the 21st separate airborne assault brigade was formed.

Thus, by the mid-70s, the so-called airborne forces of the ground forces were three brigades:

11th ODSBR (military unit 21460), ZabVO (n.p. Mogocha, Chita Region), consisting of: 617th, 618th, 619th ODSB, 329th and 307th APS;

13th ODSBR (military unit 21463), Far East Military District (n. ;

21st OdshBR (military unit 31571), ZakVO (Kutaisi, Georgia), including: 802th (military unit 36685, Tsulukidze), 803rd (military unit 55055), 804th (military / h 57351) odshb, 1059th oadn, 325th and 292nd ovp, 1863th od siRTO, 303rd obo.

It was interesting that the battalions in these formations were separate units, while in the airborne forces only a regiment was a separate unit. From the moment of its formation and until 1983, parachute training was not provided for in these brigades and was not included in the plans for combat training, in connection with which the personnel of the air assault brigades wore the form of motorized rifle troops with corresponding insignia. The form of airborne assault landing units received only with the introduction of parachute jumping into their combat training.

In 1973, the airborne assault brigades included:

Management (326 staff);

Three separate air assault battalions (there are 349 personnel in each battalion);

Separate artillery division (171 employees);

Air group (statewide total of 805 people);

Separate division of communications and radio-technical support (190 employees);

Separate battalion of airfield technical support (410 employees).

New compounds began active combat training. Not without accidents and disasters. In 1976, during a major exercise in the 21st brigade, a tragedy occurred: two Mi-8 helicopters collided in the air and crashed to the ground. The disaster killed 36 people. Such tragedies occurred from time to time in all brigades - probably this was the terrible tribute that had to be paid for the possession of such highly mobile military units.

The experience gained by the new brigades turned out to be positive, and therefore, by the end of the 70s, the General Staff decides to form several more air assault brigades of front (district) subordination, as well as several separate air assault battalions of army submission. Since the number of newly formed units and formations was large enough, for their staffing the General Staff went on to disband one airborne division.

Based on the Directive of the General Staff dated August 3, 1979 No. 314/3/00746 to December 1, 1979, the 105th Guards Airborne Red Banner Vienna Division (111th, 345th, 351st, 383rd Guards PDP) stationed in the city of Fergana of the Uzbek SSR was disbanded. The 345th regiment was reorganized into a separate paratrooper regiment and left in the southern operational direction. Personnel disbanded regiments and individual units went on the formation of the air assault units and formations.