A sabotage and reconnaissance group is specially trained soldiers who are sent to the location of the enemy, behind the front line to destroy not only military, but also civilian targets. Tactical, strategic purpose points and command personnel are being eliminated. DRG is a special full-time military unit.

The main goal of the participants is secretly to overcome long distances in the shortest possible time. The number of personnel is small, which increases its chances of a positive result of actions, maneuverability and mobility, making it completely invisible to the enemy.

Equipment requires military clothing, characterized by a high degree of strength. The most powerful and reliable equipment is used, modern facilities communications, preparing places, warehouses for stocks (weapons, equipment, ammunition, food).

Each member of the staff is trained:

• physical;
• psychological;
• fire;
• underwater;
• climbing;
• the development of mine-blasting;
• parachute landing.

The composition of the group operates for a long time in the territorial environment of the enemy.

The main objectives of the GDR

The tactics of military operations is a deep thought-out maneuver for encircling and embracing the enemy with cutting supply routes. The main tasks of the intelligence group include:

• complete disorganization of transport links;
• incapacitation of strategically valuable objects;
• the spread of panic to demoralize enemy troops;
• collection of important strategic data (composition and number of troops, the location of military facilities).

During operations, their feature will consist in secrecy, quality training, surprise, dynamism, mobility, and serious material damage. To perform these actions, such tactical methods are used as: raids, ambushes, raids.

For this, various tricks can be used up to the use of uniforms of the Armed Forces different countries, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, fictitious documents.

The actions of the DGR are not carried out against civilians, medical centers and humanitarian facilities.

Increased danger

Weapons and ammunition are used by the group in extreme cases, the unit needs to remain in the shadows for as long as possible and not give out itself. Losses such reconnaissance to the enemy can bring quite large, both material and in the number of civilian and military population.

The activity of such a group has a degree of increased danger; in the event of a seizure of a unit, no action is taken to release it from the command.

One of the requirements for equipment is a form with distinctive marks the state to which the group belongs. In another case, the activities of the unit will be considered illegally formed. Tactical clothing must be reliable and of high quality; at Velmet you will find durable, durable clothing at an affordable price.

The main principle of tactics in general is to inflict maximum damage to the enemy with minimal losses of their troops. You can stop here, but partisan tactics, especially in the first phases of the uprising, are very different from the tactics used by the regular army.

For example, partisans cannot constantly be in fire contact with the enemy due to the lack of rear structures that provide continuous and ever-increasing supply of manpower, equipment, weapons, ammunition, food and equipment on the battlefield. Consequently, the partisans must act in accordance with the ancient principle - "kill and leave."

In partisan actions, templates and blind copying of regular army tactics are unacceptable. Any attempt to make the enemy "Stalingrad" or "the fall of Berlin" is fraught with, if not complete defeat, then at least the aimless waste of a large part of the ammunition. Therefore only covert actionsallowing to seize and hold the initiative, can underlie partisan actions.

Partisan tactics are only offensive. Defense in its classic form - with kilometers of trenches, wire fences and hectares of minefields - is not for partisans. Faced with superior enemy forces, one should not stand to death, but avoid battle. A failed battle is a battle won, and time during the partisan war works against the enemy.

One of the main principles of guerrilla tactics was successfully formulated by Mao Zedong: "The enemy is advancing - we are retreating, the enemy is stopping - we are disturbing, the enemy is tired - we are beating, the enemy is retreating - we are pursuing."

There are circumstances when partisans must defend themselves. This happens, for example, when protecting liberated areas. But even in these cases, the actions of the partisans are offensive.

Defense should begin on distant approaches and consist of a series of constant attacks on enemy troops so that, having seized territory and thereby formally achieving their goal, they would be exhausted, burdened by dead and wounded, lose their morale and “saving bonds of subordination”. So defeat turns into victory.

In all other cases, for example, in the case of a sudden attack of the enemy troops on the partisan camp, the purpose of the defense is not to defeat the enemy, but to create conditions for withdrawal or a breakthrough from the encirclement.

Partisans must be able to neutralize strengths the regular army, consisting primarily of gigantic firepower and practically inexhaustible stocks of weapons, ammunition, food and ammunition.

This was learned, for example, by the Afghan Mujahideen, who skillfully used the weaknesses of the Soviet and Afghan government armies. For example, with the advent of aviation, Mujahideen gave false signals with “Here are their troops” missiles. To complicate the work of the aircraft gunners, who identified themselves as colored smoke, they lit a large number of smoke bombs, while trying to hit the gunner with fire. Taking advantage of the fact that at the beginning of the war, Soviet and government troops relatively rarely used guided (high-precision) ammunition and surround-explosive ammunition, which made it possible to hit the enemy in shelters, during shelling and air raids, Mujahideen took refuge in caves, leaving only observers at positions or observing the terrain using periscopes. Faced with remote mining systems, they began to use special scoops and scrapers, or even just brooms on long handles, to overcome minefields.

Another tactical technique widely used by partisans around the world is the so-called "grab by the belt". Fighting at a throwing range of a hand grenade allows you to compensate for the lack of heavy weapons and does not allow the enemy to realize their advantage in firepower.

One of the main features of guerrilla tactics is the constant and, if possible, covert maneuvering. Partisans must move “like flowing water and fast winds” (Mao Zedong). The stop, in the broad sense of the word, entails the danger of the environment and the death of the partisan detachment.

Such maneuvering allows deceiving the enemy in full accordance with Sunydzy’s aphorism: “When the target is close, show (to the enemy) that it is far; when it’s really far, give the impression that it is close. ” If the partisans are constantly on the move, then air and artillery strikes will be carried out on an empty place, and the enemy troops will be aimlessly spending fuel, ammunition, food and the resource of vehicles.

The presence of heavy weapons should not limit partisan maneuvers. Everything that cannot be taken with you should be hidden or destroyed.

If due to various reasons (for example, adverse terrain, the presence of a large number of wounded and sick), maneuvering opportunities are limited, it is necessary to use a network of well-camouflaged natural and artificial shelters ("caches").

For example, the soldiers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) built and used a huge number of underground structures. In this case, special attention was paid to disguise. In this art, the Vietnamese achieved unprecedented mastery: the enemy discovered the Viet Cong bunkers only when they opened fire. If this did not happen, then the American and South Vietnamese soldiers combing through the jungle could be literally over the heads of the partisans for weeks.

The partisans should not forget that, according to Mao Zedong, "our strategy is to be one against ten, our tactics is to be ten against one." This means that it is practically impossible to achieve strategic superiority in forces and means for partisans, however, skillfully maneuvering, it is possible to achieve tactical superiority over the enemy at the right time and in the right place.

To achieve such superiority, partisans must be able to quickly and discreetly concentrate small groups in one area and combine them incompanies and battalions of up to 200-300 or more people. Large detachments at large could widely use heavy weapons (up to artillery and tanks) and fight on equal terms with army units. After the operation, the battalions should again disperse into small groups, disperse and “disappear”.

The “loose retreat” was worked out by Denis Davydov. Such a retreat can be carried out as “triples” and “fives”, and, in the case of the retreat of a large partisan unit, in groups of 10-30 people.

Good connections with the local population allow them to "dissolve" in settlements, including those controlled by the enemy.

Guerrilla action is a form of armed propaganda. Operations must be planned in such a way that along with the military, the partisans would receive a propaganda effect. In some cases, this effect is even more important than the military. So, at the beginning of 1968, during the Tet offensive, a detachment of Vietnamese seized the building of the American embassy in Saigon. After some time, the attackers were destroyed, but the fact of the seizure of the embassy caused an increase in the anti-war movement in the United States, which ultimately led to the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

The main methods of guerrilla warfare are sabotage, ambushes, raids and raids.

Sabotage

Sabotage is a method of defeating an enemy without coming into direct fire contact with him. The purpose of the sabotage war carried out by revolutionary guerrilla groups is not “scorched earth” and the aimless destruction of civilians, but the destruction of the military and economic foundations of the existence of the ruling regime. Partisan saboteur - not an invader, but a liberator.

Sabotage can achieve the goal only with their mass implementation. Not a single explosion or arson is capable of causing serious damage to the enemy, unless, of course, it is an explosion of a nuclear power plant, large dam or chemical plant. Of course, sabotage in relation to such facilities is unacceptable.

Massing will lead to the dispersal of the enemy’s forces, but he will not be able to be strong everywhere. In any defense, there are vulnerabilities and gaps.

When preparing a massive sabotage operation, it is necessary to identify key objects whose defeat can help achieve the tactical or strategic goals of the partisan movement. For their identification, it is necessary to analyze the intelligence information, compare its results with the capabilities of the partisan detachments, take into account the measures taken by the enemy for defense and carefully draw up an action plan.

During World War II, such facilities were mainly railways and roads.

Sabotage can be carried out both with the use of explosives, and without it.

Explosive devices used for sabotage should have three main qualities:

1. Power sufficient to achieve the goal of sabotage.

2. Security for the saboteur.

3. The indestructibility and non-neutralization of enemy sappers.

These requirements were fully met by mines delivered to Soviet partisans during the Great World War II - PMS, AS, NM-4 and others.

Power is provided necessary amount EXPLOSIVES calculated by special formulas.

Security - the use of devices that put a mine on a combat platoon after a certain time after installation.

The indestructibility and non-harmlessness is ensured by the use of special fuses.

If guerrilla mines satisfy these requirements, then the enemy will have to destroy them undermining, which will lead to the complete or partial achievement of the objectives of sabotage. Moreover, the enemy will undermine empty boxes, taking them for mines.

No less effective sabotage can be carried out without the use of explosives - by arson or by improvised means.

For example, in the twenties in India, during one of the uprisings against the colonialists, the rebels set up blockages on the paths of the British troops with the help of elephants.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet partisans derailed, digging a railway embankment or laying special wedges on rails.

Partisans should also take into account the fact that sabotage carried out by arson or other means not related to the use of explosives does not require scarce (for partisans) means, as well as specially trained personnel.

A special, recently appeared type of sabotage is sabotage in relation to computers and computer networks. The spread of the Internet has opened up a ton of opportunities both in the field of propaganda and directly in the field of armed struggle. This is due to the fact that many state and economic institutions make extensive use of the communication capabilities of global computer networks. These are, first of all, banks, exchanges, telephone companies, as well as authorities state power, including power structures.

The most common types of sabotage:

2. Hacking and penetration into local area networks connected to the Internet with the aim of stealing, changing or destroying information.

3. Overflow of electronic mailboxes.

4. Overloading servers with an excessive number of hits.

Of course, sabotage in computer networks requires highly qualified personnel and expensive equipment, but their effectiveness is many times higher than all the costs of purchasing powerful computers, modems, phone numbers and training or recruiting “hackers”.

When carrying out sabotage, as well as in general when conducting military operations, partisans should avoid patterns, be cunning and ingenuity. Two examples of non-standard actions that have led to significant success.

In the summer of 1937, the Spanish partisans, operating in the deep rear of the Nazi troops, managed to blow up a heavily guarded road bridge with a mine installed in the field kitchen, "accidentally" detached from the army truck.

In October 1943, the Soviet partisans managed to blow up the railway bridge, using a kind of “torpedo” - a motorbike loaded with explosives and German officers stuffed for masking.

Ambush

An ambush is a method of warfare, consisting in a secretive approach to enemy communications, taking up positions and waiting for the enemy, followed by a sudden attack on him with the aim of destroying or capturing prisoners, weapons and other property.

An ambush can be organized on the road or railroad, at previously damaged pipelines, communication and power lines, in settlements, on the routes of flight of aircraft and even on waterways. Accordingly, the objects of the attack may be automobiles, armored vehicles, trains, maintenance crews, aircraft and helicopters, sea and river vessels.

The typical scheme for organizing an ambush on a road is as follows.

Before conducting ambushes, it is necessary to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the terrain, choosing a position, determining the ways of secretive advancement and withdrawal, the ways of the possible approach of reinforcements to the enemy, the intensity and schedule of movement, etc.

One of the main requirements for an ambush position is to limit the room for maneuver of an enemy who has been ambushed. This is achieved both by choosing an ambush site (in the defile, in a mountain gorge, on the river bank, etc.), and by appropriate engineering support - mining the terrain, destroying roads, etc.

The partisan detachment participating in the ambush must be divided into several subgroups: assault, capture, cover, reserve, and also a transport subgroup.

The task of the attack subgroup is to inflict fire damage to the enemy with controlled or automatic mines, small arms and heavy weapon fires, as well as covering the capture group.

When attacking columns, it is very important to capture or destroy the first and last vehicle (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks), which will block the movement and prevent a possible breakthrough or retreat of the enemy. If a large number of equipment moves in the convoy, machines moving in the middle of the convoy should also be destroyed, thereby tearing it apart.

When attacking enemy units marching, it is first necessary to destroy officers and signalmen. An important role in this can be played by snipers.

When preparing an ambush, the possibility of the appearance of enemy aircraft, artillery and tanks should be foreseen in advance. In order to reduce the effectiveness of their fire, as well as the fire of guarding the convoy, the following technique can be used: grenade launchers and mortar guns fire at one position until the ammunition is used up, after which they transfer their weapons to another position where ammunition must be prepared in advance. The same applies to the calculation of recoilless guns, anti-tank systems and heavy machine guns. If the terrain and situation allow, enemy fire should be carried out from a minimum distance, using hand grenades, that is, carry out a "grab for the belt."

The tasks of the capture subgroup are clear from its name. Partisans are not rich people. Therefore, all ambushes, if possible, should result in the seizure of weapons, ammunition, equipment and food. Everything that cannot be taken with you should be destroyed on the spot.

A cover subgroup monitors approaches to the ambush site and does not allow enemy reinforcements to approach it. Observers from this subgroup can be located covertly or openly, disguising themselves as civilians, military personnel and enemy police. In addition, this subgroup should cover the withdrawal of the attack and capture subgroups.

The transport subgroup is designed for the export of trophies, prisoners, evacuation of dead and wounded.

The objective of the reserve is to assist other subgroups, primarily the subgroups of capture and cover. The most trained partisans should be allocated to the reserve under the supervision of an experienced and initiative commander (or the commander of a partisan detachment).

If the enemy’s column is heavily guarded — a cover moves along the road, as well as in front and behind the column, helicopters are escorted by the helicopter, etc. You must strike with guided mines or bombard it from the maximum distance with rockets, small arms fire, recoilless guns , Anti-tank systems, mortars.

In this case, the fire raid should not exceed 10 - 15 seconds. During this time, the enemy should inflict maximum losses in manpower and equipment and carry out a quick withdrawal, breaking away from the pursuit. At the same time, as in all other cases, the escape route should be mined with anti-personnel, and, if necessary, anti-tank mines.

When organizing an ambush at the railway, you must first destroy the track or mine it with guided or automatic mines. Further actions are similar to those for ambushes on highways.

When attacking rail transport, railroad workers sympathizing with the partisan movement can provide invaluable assistance. They can stop the train in the right place at the right time, which will do without destroying the tracks and unnecessary victims.

When attacking sea and river vessels, tactics of modern pirates should be used, such as, for example, taking a ship on board or stealthy penetration on board with the subsequent neutralization of the crew.

Ambushes against aviation are organized along the flight paths of airplanes and helicopters or in the area of \u200b\u200baerodromes. The implementation of such ambushes, as a rule, requires the presence of anti-aircraft weapons - heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft gunsMANPADS. However, you can very effectively use other types of weapons - light and machine guns, machine guns, sniper rifles and anti-tank grenade launchers (rocket-propelled grenades).

Partisans should know the features aircraft the enemy and their places vulnerable to small arms fire. For example, in helicopters - a swashplate, the main gearbox and the place where the tail boom and the fuselage meet, in aircraft - the bow, where sighting and navigation equipment is usually concentrated.

The main detail of any aircraft is the crew. Therefore, if the enemy does not use attack aircraft (armored helicopters and airplanes), the fire of small arms and grenade launchers should be concentrated on the pilot's cockpit.

Ambushes can also be organized against counter-guerrilla groups separated from the units special purpose army, police and counterintelligence. For their successful conduct should study the tactics used by such groups. So, upon receipt of information that in a certain area the enemy special forces are preparing an ambush against guerrilla transport, a counter-ambush should be arranged on the route of advancement of the “hunting team”, thereby turning hunters into game.

Of course, it is impossible to give recommendations for all occasions. The methods described above for ambushes are far from the only ones. For example, the Soviet partisans operating in 1941 - 1944. in Ukraine, they organized mobile ambushes: groups of partisans, dressed in German or in police uniforms, moved along roads on carts and cars, attacking the occupants' vehicles.

Raids

Plaque - a sudden attack by partisans on military and economic targets of the enemy. The purpose of the raid may be the seizure of supplies, the release of prisoners, the elimination of posts and small garrisons, the destruction of aircraft and helicopters at airfields, etc.

Plaque - more complex view fighting than an ambush. This is due to the fact that it is much easier to prepare and carry out competent defense of a stationary object than to organize the protection of transport columns.

In the course of preliminary reconnaissance, the object’s security (defense) system, the location of wire and mine-explosive barriers, signaling devices, reinforcements approach routes, the search for the starting position, the route of secret extension and retreat, etc., should be identified, as well as the penetration of the scouts at the object plaque. Great help can be provided by local residents who are at the facility, as well as prisoners. When preparing the raid, you must also take photos and videos, connect to wired communication lines or organize a radio interception. Reconnaissance by observation should be carried out both day and night, continuously, until the implementation of the raid.

In the course of reconnaissance, attention should be paid to any, even the most insignificant at first glance details. So, in November 1944, in preparation for a raid on a railway bridge in the Mons area, the Belgian partisans did not take into account the presence of durable metal nets on the windows of the fascist barracks. As a result, the Free Belgium detachment suffered significant losses from fragments of its own grenades, which bounced off the windows. In this case, blinding the enemy with smoke bombs and then blowing up the building with concentrated or cumulative charges, or using a Molotov cocktail or other incendiary weapons would be more effective.

If possible, you should build a full-scale model of the object of attack and conduct training personnel on working out secretive advancement and retreat, overcoming obstacles (if any) and interaction in battle.

The partisan detachment participating in the raid should consist of subgroups of attack, capture, destruction, cover, transport and reserve. The commanders of these subgroups, together with the squad leader, must participate in the collection of information about the object, and immediately before the attack conduct reconnaissance of the area and clarify the action plan.

The attack subgroup covertly advances to its original position and, at the set time, after silently removing the sentries and observers, suddenly attacks the enemy. To remove sentries and observers, use silent firearms or melee weapons. To overcome obstruction, this subgroup must be provided with all the means necessary for this: elongated and concentrated explosive charges, barbed wire shears, probes, mine detectors, etc.

It is not necessary to attack objects “on the forehead”. In the summer and autumn of 1965, South Vietnamese guerrillas, covertly seeping behind the guard line, carried out attacks on airfields in the Da Nang, Cha Lai and Marble Mountain areas. During these raids, 27 aircraft and helicopters were destroyed, and 42 aircraft were severely damaged. The greatest damage was caused by the use of hand grenades. Particularly noteworthy are the successes of guerrilla intelligence: one of the killed Vietnamese who participated in the raid on the Marble Mountain base, the Americans discovered an airfield plan reflecting the changes that occurred in the security system and the placement of aircraft 12 hours before the attack on him.

After the suppression of the external security, the capture subgroup must come into effect. Fighters of this subgroup should be prepared for close combat and combat in buildings; appropriate equipment includes automatic weapons, hand grenades, assault ladders, gas masks, and if possible helmets and body armor. In close combat, hunting smoothbore guns (self-loading or magazine) can also be effectively used.

After the destruction or suppression of the enemy’s resistance, a destruction subgroup comes into play, mining the object or destroying it in another way (for example, arson). In this case, mines-traps should be installed, as well as mines and incendiary devices of a delayed action, the operation of which will delay the restoration of the destroyed during the raid.

A cover subgroup monitors the approaches to the object and does not allow enemy reinforcements to approach it, and also miners the escape route.

The transport subgroup, as during the ambush, takes out trophies, prisoners, evacuates the dead and wounded.

Raids

Raid - the rapid advance of partisan units behind enemy lines.

The raid differs from the usual redeployment to another area, carried out, if possible, secretly, in that during its conduct partisans conduct combat operations. However, the main purpose of the raids is not to carry out sabotage, ambushes and raids, but to establish ties with supporters of the uprising, conduct propaganda and, as a result, create new partisan areas.

Unlike maneuvering, which is usually carried out on a rather limited territory, partisans partly force or completely leave the area in which they previously operated during raids.

During guerrilla warfare, raids are of the utmost importance.

In the summer of 1944, Soviet partisans, who previously operated in Ukraine, entered raids on the territory of Slovakia, where they played the role of a detonator of a popular uprising, as a result of which the Slovak army turned from an ally of Nazi Germany into its enemy.

In the spring of 1958, Cuban partisan detachments under the command of Raul Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Ernest Che Guevara, fighting several hundred kilometers, spread an uprising throughout Cuba, which soon led to the fall of the Batista regime.

During the war of liberation in Ireland (1919-1921), raids of the “flying columns” of the shinnefiners gradually led to the complete disorganization of the British colonial regime.

When preparing the raids, it is necessary to establish in advance ties with the underground in the areas through which the partisans will have to move, or create it anew. It is necessary to conduct reconnaissance of traffic routes in all possible directions. We need to prepare weapons, equipment, vehicles and create supplies of food, ammunition, as well as fuel (if the partisans use vehicles) or forage (when using horses or other pack animals and mounts). Such stocks must also be prepared on traffic routes. For settlements with the local population, partisan units entering the raid must be provided with money (or other means of payment).

In order to prevent information leakage, in preparation for the raid it is necessary to implement a set of counterintelligence measures, including active misinformation of the enemy.

During the movement, you should confuse the enemy as much as possible, trying to leave him in the dark regarding the true route of movement and the ultimate goal of the raid. During civil war in the USA, the troops of the northerners under the command of General William Sherman, who carried out the “march to the sea”, consisted of four columns moving in parallel, surrounded by a large number of small reconnaissance groups and detachments of foragers, forming a kind of “smoke screen” around the main forces.

At present, in addition to the “Sherman” detachments, methods such as sabotage using mines or incendiary devices of a delayed action set with a long delay can be used to hide routing routes and organize the protection of raiding partisan detachments, disabling wired communication lines, jamming operating frequencies enemy radio stations, use for traveling scheduled buses, freight and passenger trains, etc.

In all settlements along the route, partisans must work with the population, implementing the set of measures described above. In addition to creating partisan infrastructure, this will make it possible to compensate for the losses incurred during the raid by volunteers.

In areas where the partisans will immediately receive significant support from the population, you should leave the group of organizers, providing it with everything necessary, and move on, until you return to the base, or until the final goal of the route (the newly created partisan district or base).

Features of the urban guerrilla warfare

As already noted above, partisan units operating in cities must solve strictly defined tasks of limited scope, being, in fact, reconnaissance and sabotage groups. This is due to the fact that, according to their conditions (high population density, dense transport network, vigorous activity of the police and counterintelligence, etc.), the cities, as well as the suburban area, are the most unfavorable terrain for guerrilla warfare.

The urban guerrilla warfare differs from terrorism in that the operations conducted by the urban guerrillas are subordinate in nature, are carried out to support the actions of the main forces, and are led from areas controlled by the partisan army. No initiative should be allowed in actions: city guerrillas are obliged to confine themselves only to strict implementation of command orders.

Tasks solved by similar units:

1. Destruction of government officials, military, police, and propagandists of the ruling regime.

2. Expropriation.

3. Sabotage and sabotage.

4. Protection of acts of civil disobedience.

5. Intelligence.

Terrorist acts against civilians (arson or explosions of houses, shops, public transport, etc.) are unacceptable. All this can only lead to discrediting the liberation movement. Allowed only to inflict "point" strikes, that is, the holding of individual terror acts.

When planning operations, urban guerrillas should strive to avoid unnecessary casualties. If this fails, it is better to refuse to perform such an operation.

Urban partisan detachments should consist of isolated from each other cells, operating on the principle of "triples" and "fives". The total number of one partisan detachment should not exceed 20-30 people.

There are two options for organizing urban partisan units. In the first case, all fighters are in an illegal position. In the second, partisans lead a normal lifestyle, changing it only during operations.

Both options have their advantages and disadvantages. So, while constantly in an illegal situation, the partisans are forced to use false documents, which greatly increases the risk of failure. When in a semi-legal position, the intensity of hostilities decreases sharply. Therefore, in practice, urban guerrilla groups usually consist of both illegal immigrants and people leading a “double life”.

To reduce the likelihood of failure, partisans operating in cities must strictly abide by the rules of conspiracy, outwardly not standing out from the general population. In case of danger of exposure, the partisans must leave the city and go to areas controlled by the partisan army.

The armament of urban partisans should be different from the armament used by partisans in other areas. Here the main requirement is the possibility of hidden carrying and shelter in hiding places. Therefore, city partisans should be armed mainly with pistols and small-sized assault rifles (submachine guns), hand grenades, incendiary weapons and explosives. In some cases, it may be effective to use poisons, sawn-off shotguns and edged weapons.

When carrying out terrorist acts, sabotage and sabotage, one should strive for their mass implementation, since only massaging will paralyze the work of government agencies, banks, the media, the police and counterintelligence and bring the proper military and propaganda effect.

Everything written above about guerrilla warfare is by no means a complete description of this diverse phenomenon. Therefore, to facilitate the search for answers to questions regarding specific forms and methods of partisan action, a list of literature used in writing this book is provided.

The works of V.I. Lenin in the above list are given without an indication of the output data, since, in addition to the five editions of the Complete Works, they were published in various collections, as well as published separately. All listed below leninist works were written during the Revolution of 1905-1907.

In addition to the books mentioned in the list, it is possible to recommend the study of materials on guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare, tactics of special forces, as well as the conduct of hostilities in mountainous and wooded areas and towns, published at different times in the magazines Military Thought and Foreign military review”,“ Soldier of Fortune ”,“ Profi ”,“ Equipment and Armament ”and“ Special Forces ”.

A large number of Literature in English and other languages \u200b\u200bregarding guerrilla action in various settings can be found on the Internet.

1. Abdulaev E. “Callsign -“ Cobra ”, M., Almanac“ Pennant ”, 1997.

2. Bassistov Yu.V. “A special theater of operations. Leaflets on the fronts of the Second World War ", St. Petersburg," Rusko-Baltic information Center BLITZ ", 1999

3. Bogdanov V.N. et al. “The Army and Internal Troops in Counterguerrilla and Counterinsurgency”, M., joint publication of the Civil Code of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the IVI of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 1997

4. " Fighting Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan ”, collection, M., publication of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, 1991

5. Vershigora P.P. "The military creativity of the masses", M., Military Publishing House, 1961

6. Verkhovskaya B.K. “Civilian population and war”, M.-L., 1930

7. “Internal troops (structures similar to them) in the system of ensuring internal security of foreign states (1945-1997)”, Moscow, joint publication of the Civil Code of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1998

8. "Military engineering training", M., Military Publishing, 1982

9. Voronkov V.M. “How Partisans Act,” M.-L., 1927

10. Davydov D.V. "Military Notes", M., Military Publishing, 1982

11. Dixon, Charles and Heilbrunn, Otto. "Communist partisan actions", M., Military Publishing, 1957

12. Drobov M.A. “Small war. Partisanism and sabotage ”, M., Almanac“ Pennant ”, 1998

13. Drozdov Yu.I. “Fiction excluded”, M., Almanac “Pennant”, 1996.

14. Klembovsky V.N. "Partisan actions", M., 1919

15. Kondratov V.L. Outlaw, M. Globus, 1999

16. Krysko V.G. "Secrets of psychological warfare (goals, objectives, methods, forms, experience)", Minsk, Harvest, 1999

17. Lavretsky I.R. “Ernesto Che Guevara”, in the series “Life of remarkable people”, M., “Young Guard”, 1972

18. Lenin V.I. "Tasks of the detachments of the revolutionary army."

19. Lenin V.I. "On the issue of guerrilla warfare."

20. Lenin V.I. "On the guerrilla speech of the teaching staff."

21. Lenin V.I. "Partisan War."

22. Lenin V.I. "The current situation in Russia and the tactics of the workers' party."

23. Lenin V.I. "Tactical platform for the unification congress of the RSDLP."

24. Lenin V.I. "The lessons of the Moscow uprising."

25. Lysenko A.E. “Hear us, Motherland! History of the Buchenwald underground ", M., CJSC" Newspaper "Pravda", 1999

26. The Little War, reader, Minsk, Harvest, 1998

27. Mao Zedong. Selected War Works, Beijing, Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, 1964

28. Mao Zedong. Selected Works, M., Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1953

29. Middeldorf, Eike. “Russian Campaign: Tactics and Weapons”, M., “ACT”, St. Petersburg, “Polygon”, 2000

30. “Mine-blasting for partisans”, M., Central headquarters of the partisan movement, 1942

31. Ocalan, Abdullah. “Kurdistan reality from the 19th century to the present and the PKK movement”, M., “Axina V \\ feiat”, 1998

32. “Single training of a scout”, M., Military Publishing House, 1990

33. "Partisan detachments and their tactics", M., Military Publishing, 1941

34. “Partisan textbook”, translation from Finnish, M., Military Publishing, 1940

35. Popenko V.N. " Explosives and explosive devices ”, dictionary, M., 1999

36. Popenko V.N. “War without rules”, M., 1999.

37. Popenko V.N. “The work of a secret super agent”, M., 2000

38. Potapov A.A. "Reference sniper", M., LLC "NIPKTS Sunrise", 1998

39. “Intelligence training units of the airborne troops”, M., Military Publishing, 1995

40. Ronin R. “Own Intelligence”, Minsk, “Harvest”, 1997.

41. “Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War. Partisan movement during the years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: documents and materials ”, series“ Russian Archive ”, vol. 20 (9), M.,“ Terra ”, 1999

42. Starinov I.G. "Notes of a saboteur", M., Almanac "Pennant", 1997

43. Starinov I.G. "Mines delayed action", M., Almanac "Pennant", 1999

V2: Theme 15. MONEY. BASIS OF CREDIT AND MONETARY POLICY OF THE STATE

Introduction The introduction justifies the relevance of the chosen topic, characterizes the need for research

Counterintelligence Activities and Action Tactics of NATO Troops in Combating Reconnaissance Groups

Protection of territories and important objects includes security, defense and surveillance. Protection of objects is organized at the far (10-15 km) and near (3-4 km) approaches, along the perimeter of the object and near vital centers. A regime is being created that would preclude the penetration of enemy intelligence on these objects. The objects are surrounded by a NATO fence of wire mesh, barbed wire, the vegetation around them is removed by at least 100m. For direct protection of objects, in addition to units, service dogs, technical alarm equipment, television cameras and other means can be used. To organize the defense of facilities, well-camouflaged fire installations are arranged, air defense systems are attracted, and reserves are created for armored personnel carriers, cars, helicopters, which can arrive at the facility in a short time. A system of ground and air observation posts equipped with optical, television, infrared and radar equipment is being deployed to monitor the approaches to the object.

Identification and Destruction Activities are the final stage of counter-guerrilla warfare and include reconnaissance and liquidation fighting. Intelligence is organized and conducted to ensure the conduct of hostilities against the SPG and partisans with a view to their destruction. For the conduct of intelligence, the forces and means of undercover, military, air, radio and radio intelligence are involved. They conduct constant monitoring of the identified SPG and partisans, determine their location. Special attention given to conducting intelligence. The fighting to eliminate the "irregular forces" (the Special Forces WG and partisans) is carried out using various methods of combat operations, taking into account intelligence data. It is an environment; offensive followed by the pursuit; ambushes, raids, including those carried out by rangers; setting minefields using remote mining; striking by combat helicopters.

Force tactics special operations boils down to the following. A group of 5-7 people (sometimes up to 12) is delivered to the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the SPN WG subject to conspiracy measures. Detection of the presence of the forces of partisans, bases and reconnaissance group days is usually carried out by deep raids into the reconnaissance area 40-50 km or more from the main stronghold, covert surveillance using technical means of observation, eavesdropping, information, capture of single scouts and interrogation of local residents. Then the group commander gives the command his recommendations: either strike at the discovered Special Forces groups or partisans with air, helicopters, artillery, or use a mobile landing to surround and destroy the scouts. For target designation and adjustment of field artillery fire and attack by combat helicopters against detected targets of the enemy’s special forces group, observation posts are equipped (most often on trees).

The basis of the tactics of the regular troops involved in the fight against partisans, airborne assault forces and reconnaissance groups of the enemy is reconnaissance, search and search and punitive action. Most operations are airmobile.

Depending on the terrain and environment ground troops when destroying the identified forces of partisans and special intelligence agencies, various maneuvers are used under the name: “Environment” or “Ring”, “Hammer and Anvil”, “Double Jump”.

Maneuver "Environment"

The specified maneuver is carried out by the usual infantry unit and consists in combing through a rather large area from several directions in order to force the forces of the partisans or the reconnaissance group of the Special Forces to retreat to the so-called "death zone", where they are completely defeated after massive air strikes and other fire weapons. To carry out such a maneuver, it is considered necessary to attract at least four infantry battalions.

Ring Maneuver

The Ring maneuver is carried out by airmobile units in those cases when the forces of the partisans, the reconnaissance bodies of the Special Forces and their location are precisely reconnoitered and differs from the Surrounding maneuver in that fewer troops can be used here. Units landed from a helicopter near the object of attack and therefore they do not need to comb over large areas.

Maneuver Hammer and Anvil

This maneuver is the actions of two groupings of troops, one of which occupies blocking positions, performing the functions of an anvil, the other is an attack group, is intended to attack against the forces of partisans or the Special Operations Regiment in order to force them to withdraw towards the group located at blocking positions, and thereby create favorable conditions for their complete defeat between the blocking positions, which usually take the form of a “bag”. During the implementation of this maneuver, a battle may develop into the Ring maneuver. To carry out the Hammer and Anvil maneuver, significant forces of infantry, airmobile troops, or both are involved.

Double Jump Maneuver

The specified maneuver represents the actions of two groupings of units involved in the destruction of partisans and SPG, one of which lands on helicopters near the partisans or SPG to attack them and force them to retreat in a certain direction, the second in the rear with the task of advancing towards the departing partisan forces. The second group lands after the first, sometimes after 4-6 hours, at a distance of up to 20 km. In the event that the partisan forces and the Special Forces WG do not withdraw, but take the battle with the first group, the second group lands directly in the rear of the partisans and attacks them together with the first group.

For units of the marine corps operating in helicopters near the water lines, maneuvers “Claws” and “Line” will be characteristic.

Claws maneuver

The indicated maneuver by units of the marines operating on helicopters was used in cases where the forces of partisans or intelligence agencies operated in the area of \u200b\u200bthe river or canal. In this case, the Marine Corps units are divided into two groups, each of which is landed 100-500m (or more) from the water edge on opposite banks, and then simultaneously advance towards each other in order to force the guerrilla forces to move to the water milestone. Marine units landed from flanking helicopters occupy blocking positions.

Maneuver "Line"

The “Line” maneuver is also used by the Marine Corps units when operating near water lines, but in cases where there are not enough forces and helicopters for their transfer. With the specified maneuver, units land from helicopters on both banks of the river and canal. Moreover, the landing of units can be carried out in two ways: perhaps closer to the riverbed (option 1) or at some distance (option 2). In the first case, the offensive is conducted along the river, in the second - in convergent directions, and then - as in the first case. If necessary, in the second case, intermediate objects for the offensive can be assigned.

Americans consider combing and search and punitive actions as one of the main tactics in the fight against intelligence agencies of the Special Forces, partisan units. Infantry and other battalions when combing the area in order to detect and destroy the enemy usually have a battle formation in one echelon (all companies in a line). The companies, depending on the situation and mainly on the nature of the terrain, build their battle formation in one, two, and sometimes three echelons. With two echelon construction, the interval between platoons of the first echelon is of the order of 50 m, the platoon of the second echelon advances at a distance of 100 m from them. The platoon of weapons is located behind the platoon of the second echelon and moves "jumps". In platoons, two squads are located in the first echelon and one squad in the second. Such a battle formation in a platoon makes it possible to ensure circular guarding and combing the terrain along the front for about 500 m. Typically, squads advance alternately under cover of fire from other platoon squads. Combing the terrain is planned to be carried out during daylight hours. Before dark, the units involved in combing the area break up a bivouac and organize a circular defense.

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The main method of striking for the RDG was sabotage on enemy communications, at military and industrial facilities. In carrying out these operations, shell charges and a wide variety of mine devices were used - from miniature magnetic mines to large landmines. During the four years of the war, the conditions for conducting sabotage operations changed, especially on railways and highways. The enemy’s system of guarding railway stations and railroad tracks became more and more sophisticated. If in 1941-1942. Since the matter was limited, as a rule, to patrols (usually three paired patrols per kilometer), then from the summer of 1942 police officers (up to 10 people) began to be allocated to help these patrols. In the years 1943-1944. the road protection system has reached its maximum saturation with combat force and equipment, means of detecting and destroying reconnaissance saboteurs, which they laid mines. Patrolling on strategically important roads was supplemented by the device of security towers equipped with searchlights and machine guns, firing points. The Germans created open spaces, for which 200-300 meters on both sides of the track cut down forests, installed mines-traps, noise devices, wire fences on the approaches to the tracks.

The most carefully guarded railway bridges. Each of the large bridges was a real defensive line with barbed wire, minefields, tower systems with machine guns, bunkers, searchlights, rocket alarm. At certain intervals, armored trains passed along the highways, firing at forest approaches to roads. Well-trained guard dogs were widely used. In an effort to divert the explosions from the locomotives and wagons, the Germans launched empty platforms in front of the trains. On particularly dangerous sections of the road, traffic slowed down, and on some it was allowed only during the day and only after a thorough inspection of the corresponding section of the road in order to find mines. The most serious danger for saboteurs was enemy ambushes, waiting for them on the approaches to highways and on the escape routes. They could be expected on any part of the route. But the bombers-scouts every time had to make a huge journey from the base camp to the place of sabotage. Overcoming thickets and windbreaks, swamps and open spaces of 30–40 km, and in some cases up to 100 km (when the goal was to carry out sabotage in a particularly remote section of the highway), despite any obstacles, saboteurs still performed their tasks.

The tactics of actions of saboteurs on the railway was usually the following. A group of bombers almost always acted under the guise of a security subgroup. Having approached the road, the group lay down within the visibility of the railway track, studied the situation, conducted observation, and chose the place of approach to the track. Sometimes it lasted several days. The installation of each mine required genuine skill, utmost tension and attention. Of particular danger was the installation of non-recoverable mines that could work from any vibration of the soil. Masking mines also required great skill. There should not have been any traces at their installation site. It was impossible to mix dry upper layers with raw lower ones - this would immediately arouse suspicion of protection. Excess land was carried away with them on a raincoat. Having set a mine, pebbles were laid on top - as they lay along the canvas before mining. When leaving, they cleaned their tracks. But all this was done at night, in absolute darkness, in silence: at the slightest sound, rockets soared into the sky and instantly fire opened ... Theoretically, in order to interrupt a rail, 200 grams of TNT or 400 grams of ammonite or ammonal, but in fact in fact, the explosion should be so strong as to snatch a funnel in the flooring of the canvas, through which the wheelsets of the engine and the wagon cannot jump. And for this you need at least 3-4 kilograms of TNT. Under a large echelon put 3-4 charges in different places of the canvas. It was convenient to blow up the canvas at the turn, where the charge was put in the junction of the rail - then the effect was greater.

Scout saboteurs for sabotage on highways have developed an original tactic called the "death field." The essence of this method is that two or three push mines are installed on the road, and the rear mines are triggered by the explosion of the front mine in the direction of travel. Thus, if the front car explodes, it explodes another 1–2 cars following it. At the same time, along the movement of the column, along the ditches, German trophy mines “spring-minen” S-34 were installed. This anti-personnel mine bounces when exploding up.

When the cars exploded, the surviving Germans threw themselves into the ditch and fell there on jumping mines.

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As already noted, reconnaissance groups in the rear often fell into ambush of the enemy themselves, evaded pursuit. Moving away from the pursuit, scouts usually mined landmines your mark. They also broke away from their pursuers with the help of F-1 grenades. "Lemon" was fixed in a fork in the bush, next to the path. The grenade was almost pulled out, leaving the very tip holding back the hammer. The twine from the checks was pulled across the path, disguising it. Then, after every 100 m, extended ropes were left, but without grenades. The calculation was like that. Having been undermined, the pursuers will become more attentive, their twine will stop, when their vigilance will be dulled, when they will become tired of empty searches, then another charge will work. If the Nazis took the group in a ring, surrounded, then the method of breaking the "battering ram" was used. First of all, they found in the German chain the most extended line, where there were gaps between the pursuers, so that firepower the group was stronger than that of the enemy in the place where the breakthrough was planned. Location of the RDG - wedge, ledge. In a minute of breakthrough, everything is decided by speed, onslaught and surprise. The soldiers rammed the chain with a wedge, firing from everything that they had, and disappeared, leaving behind them the persecutors shot at point blank range.

SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 1/2006, pp. 18-21

The use of territorial troops in counter-sabotage

Lieutenant colonel HE. LOVE,

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus

Colonel A.I. BORODEYKO,

head of research department

Research institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,

candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor,

professor, Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation

Colonel V.N. CHAPAYLO,

head of Department, Faculty of Internal Troops

Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus

An analysis of the experience of the conduct of military conflicts of recent decades shows that one of the main tasks solved during the conduct of hostilities is the fight against landing forces, enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs), illegal armed groups (IAFs), individual terrorist groups and lone terrorists . To solve this problem, as a rule, all state power departments are involved. However, the chronicle of the events of military conflicts indicates that their efforts to ensure stability and prevent cases of terrorist acts, sabotage, attacks on military and government controlledcolumns military equipment obviously not enough

It can be assumed that in the event of an armed conflict on the territory of our state, this task will arise with all its severity. Therefore, in this article, the authors tried to consider some aspects of the participation of territorial troops in the fight against enemy DRGs and illegal armed groups.

The fight against enemy sabotage and terrorist forces lies in their timely identification, localization and neutralization or destruction. It is organized and carried out with the participation of territorial troops during operational-search measures conducted by bodies vested with applicable law with the right to operational-search activities, or during special operations conducted under the leadership of military command bodies or territorial defense control bodies.

In our opinion, to justify the procedure for the use of territorial troops in counter-sabotage struggle in modern conditions it is advisable to take into account the invaluable experience of the struggle of the population against enemy agents and its participation in the protection and defense of national economic facilities and communications. So, during May 1942, about 125 volunteer groups with a total number of more than four thousand people took part in the protection of important facilities in Moscow and Leningrad. In the period 1942 - 1943 in the frontline and in the rear Western front About 60% of the detentions of all agents and saboteurs were carried out using assistance teams created on a voluntary basis from the local population.

An analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the 1950s shows that in the system of territorial defense by the troops of the military districts, in cooperation with the Smersh bodies and the NKVD troops, from 1941 to 1950, 69,683 military operations were carried out to identify and destroy sabotage groups, gangs and nationalist elements. During these operations, more than 230,000 people were arrested or detained. At the same time, over the years of the war, the NKVD troops independently carried out a little more than nine thousand operations to neutralize the bandit formations.

The accumulated experience in organizing territorial defense during the war years and the post-war period confirms the need to attract territorial troops to counter-sabotage, which is implemented in the documents of the regulatory framework of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus. In particular, in accordance with the Charter of the territorial forces, the military units under consideration are entrusted with the task: "the fight against the enemy airborne sabotage forces and illegal armed groups." At the same time, as the analysis of command post and tactical exercises shows, military units and units of territorial troops are not specifically allocated for this task, since it is usually solved in combination with other tasks assigned to the formation of territorial troops. For example, military units of territorial troops that perform the task of strengthening the protection of the state border and border territory are involved to prevent the enemy DRG and illegal armed formations from entering the territory of the Republic of Belarus, as well as to block and destroy them. Moreover, as the results of the studies show, the formation of territorial troops is advisable to use in the forms of reconnaissance, search, ambush and isolation-restrictive actions, the main of which are:

Ambush device;

Blocking the area of \u200b\u200bthe area detected by enemy enemy DRGs and illegal armed formations, with their subsequent destruction together with the border troops.

The specifics of the actions of the enemy’s DRGs and IAFs determine the specifics of organizing the fight against them. In particular, in the case of the struggle against illegal armed groups, the formation of territorial troops can be used both for search, blocking, and for the destruction (liquidation) of bases for the formation and preparation of illegal armed groups, the encirclement and destruction of the bandits there.

At the same time, the search units, namely reconnaissance platoons of battalions of territorial troops, by conducting reconnaissance and search actions, identify areas (places) of concentration and placement of illegal armed formations, notify the command of the battalions about them without getting involved in battle, track the direction of their actions until the arrival of a larger military formation of territorial troops or the Armed Forces, designed to block and liquidate illegal armed groups. It is advisable to designate the search site in such a way that search activities are performed no more than 10 hours per day.

If it is difficult to encircle an illegal armed formation with the available forces, then it is advisable to concentrate on the main efforts to prohibit (slow down) its advancement (withdrawal), cover important objects by conducting restraining or barrier-protective actions. The main content of the actions of the military formations of the TV in this case is the timely advance towards the erupting enemy, taking up defensive positions and holding a certain line, preventing the breakthrough and the withdrawal of illegal armed groups from the controlled zone.

When organizing the fight against enemy DRGs, the procedure for using the formations of territorial troops should be somewhat different, since the detection of DRGs, as a rule, occurs only after its attack on the object. At the same time, the main efforts of the units of the territorial forces should be focused on blocking the DRG and keeping it in a certain area, until arrival military units internal troops or Armed Forces designed to combat them.

It is advisable to block the area where the enemy’s DRG was detected by posting or holding single firing positions. At the same time, the blocking boundaries should provide the maximum observation range. In order to prevent the seizure of single and small groups of the enemy from the blocked area, as well as a breakthrough with the battle of his large forces, reliable visual and fire communication between units should be provided. Studies show that the intervals between the positions of soldiers of territorial troops should not exceed 200 meters. In closed areas or in conditions of poor visibility, it is advisable to use lighting, night vision devices, guard dogs.

The units of the territorial troops that have occupied the blocking line must necessarily carry out its engineering equipment: a fragment of the trenches for firing, the construction of engineering barriers using signaling means, in between the positions. The careful organization of the fire system and the surveillance system also plays an important role.

It is advisable to organize a search for enemy DRGs in a blocked area by combing the area with the involvement of reconnaissance and rifle units.

The participation of territorial forces in the fight against airborne assaults may consist in the fact that with the detection of the start of the deployment of air (tactical) airborne assault (VD (TakVD)) of the enemy or with the receipt of information from the local population, the military formations of the territorial troops carry out the reconnaissance mission ( re-exploration of the area of \u200b\u200bejection (landing), the existing forces block it, and with the approach of military units of the Armed Forces participate in the destruction of the enemy airborne forces (TAC).

The participation of territorial forces in the fight against illegal armed groups and DRG is also manifested in the course of fulfilling their task of guarding and defending objects, since when it is carried out, the purpose of the actions of military formations is not only to repel the attack, but also to destroy (capture) the offenders, including for the boundaries of the object.

Depending on the size and significance of the facilities, the formation of territorial troops is assigned from the squad to the battalion. The most important objects are guarded on the principles of all-round defense, the maximum use of the protective properties of the terrain, the objects themselves and engineering barriers. However, the main form of application of divisions and military units of territorial troops for the protection and defense of objects is usually guarding and guarding operations - directly at the objects, and on the approaches to them - the patrol service.

The analysis shows that it is advisable to closely associate measures for the protection and defense of objects with measures for the protection of public order near the protected object (object-zone method of isolation-restrictive actions and object protection). At the same time, the size of the military formation of territorial troops to block, search and eliminate the DRG that found itself attacking the object is reduced by 1.2-1.5 times than if only the object-based method of protection was used.

It is advisable to organize the direct protection of the facility by setting up guards. Here, the most acceptable classical methods of protection are: observation from the towers, patrolling between guarded objects.

From the composition of the military formation of the territorial troops allocated for the protection and defense of the object, three guard shifts should be appointed, alternating every day. At the same time, duty shift is assigned to one shift, the second shift is the guard reserve, designed to repel the attacks, pursuits, search and liquidation, which found themselves enemy DRGs. The third shift can be involved in the implementation of engineering measures for the construction (improvement) of barriers on the approaches to the guarded object (group of objects), conducting exercises in order to increase the level of combat training, preparation for entering the guard, and also for performing tasks to maintain the life of the garrison. If necessary, it can also be involved to eliminate enemy DRGs and illegal armed groups.

When attacking an enemy DRG object, the guard takes measures to repel the attack. The second shift, which makes up the reserve, decreases to block the approaches to the facility and creates a system of guard posts facing the facility, part of the forces conducts search activities on the blocked terrain.

The third shift, together with other units of the territorial troops located in close proximity to the object of attack by a sabotage group, are advanced in the direction of the object, to block the area, search, block and eliminate the DRG.

When attacking an object of superior forces, the second shift of the object’s security is used to strengthen the posts, the third - to block the area and the subsequent destruction of the enemy.

In the event of a threat of enemy capture of an object, it is advisable to provide for the destruction of its most important elements, and for a military formation after restoration of combat readiness, the transition to guerrilla operations in temporarily occupied territory.

With the cessation of the need for the operation of facilities, their protection is usually removed, and the liberated units of the territorial troops are involved in other tasks.

In order to prevent the enemy DRG and illegal armed formations from entering the settlement, with the aim of conducting sabotage activities, as well as maintaining law and order among the population, preventing robbery and looting, other illegal and negative phenomena, territorial formations can carry out tasks in the form of regime-restrictive actions and patrol post service. Given the level of their training in these matters, it is advisable to use them together with the structural divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These territorial units should be regarded as an increase in militia units (VV units). At the same time, as experience in counter-terrorism operations in the Chechen Republic shows, it is advisable to deploy a system of checkpoints (checkpoints) in all access directions to the village, set guard posts around the entire perimeter, and patrol street directions covering residential areas. In this case, almost all road directions passing through administrative centers are intercepted by military units, a system for monitoring compliance with the established position and the order of movement of the population and transport, as well as a round-the-clock monitoring system are created.

Studies show that the composition of the military units of the TV in this case, it is advisable to distribute in two shifts, the alternation of which to produce 1-2 times in two to three weeks. This will make it possible to assign service to the checkpoint (checkpoints, in secrets) to one shift, patrolling the streets of settlements, and temporarily attract another shift to perform other tasks that require an operational solution.

Since the checkpoints are deployed to control the movement of the population, vehicles and to prevent the penetration of enemy DRGs, groups of illegal armed groups into the settlement along road directions, the service at them should be organized together with the police squad. It is advisable to have the number of personnel of territorial troops at the checkpoint from three to the rifle division. If necessary (in the event of an attack on a military outfit of an illegal armed formation), it is advisable to deploy a checkpoint inside a checkpoint prepared for all-round defense.

If illegal movement of people is detected and the transportation of prohibited goods during document verification and vehicle inspection, violators are delayed, a reserve or the nearest mobile patrol is called, which delivers the detainees to the commandant’s office.

The analysis shows that the passage through the checkpoint of vehicles and their verification should be carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the personnel of the territorial troops should be used to maintain fire in police actions in the event of resistance by bandits (saboteurs).

When attacking a checkpoint (checkpoint), his entire military outfit takes up defense and engages in battle, and when the reserve arrives, it participates in the liquidation of the bandit group. When the enemy withdraws, the military outfit remains at the checkpoint, providing the right to pursue the reserve.

It is advisable to organize the service at the observation (watch) posts deployed around the perimeter of a settlement for the timely detection of illegal armed formations, warnings about their appearance, prohibition of their nomination and seizure of a settlement. At the same time, as experience in conducting peacekeeping operations shows, they should be covered by mine-explosive barriers in a controlled form, by signal mines.

The observation (watch) post must constantly maintain contact with the commander who posted it. A dedicated outfit is unchanged throughout the day or night without revealing itself. He does not detain or interrogate anyone. The senior post reports to the appearance of single militants or their groups. Only with a direct attack by the militants at the post does the outfit open fire and depart, continuing to observe.

In order to selectively check documents and search passers-by, prohibit illegal actions against the population and prevent cases of looting, the personnel of formations of territorial troops may be involved in patrolling the streets of settlements. The analysis shows that the rifle divisions of the territorial troops as a whole are most suitable for this task. At the same time, two pedestrian and one mobile (provided with a means of transportation) patrol can be assigned from each squad. It is best to assign up to 11 km of street directions to each branch. Between patrols, communication should be organized, and when detaining suspicious persons or violators, it is advisable to assign a function for their delivery to the commandant’s office on a mobile patrol.

An analysis of the problematic issues of organizing troop movements and ensuring the supply of material assets shows that one of them is the organization of commandant service on routes (tracks). The experience of military operations during the years of World War II, in Afghanistan and Chechnya indicates that in the movement, hiking, troops are most vulnerable to sabotage and ambush. Direct protection does not solve the problematic issues of maintaining the combat effectiveness of a convoy of troops. Therefore, today, along with the regulation of movement, the main task of the curfew service is the protection of routes and troops during the advancement.

Territorial troops may be involved in this task. At the same time, the units of the territorial troops with their deployment to carry out commandant service begin to prepare routes for the deployment and deployment of troops, the equipment of traffic control posts and guard posts. For timely detection of illegal armed formations and notification of them on hidden approaches to troop movement routes, secrets must be set.

It is advisable to deploy regulation posts at road junctions (intersections of routes), railway crossings, bridges of various carrying capacities, difficult terrain and in other important places requiring traffic regulation. To block the main road directions, checkpoints must be deployed.

The posts should be equipped with the calculation of their protection against attacks by enemy enemy DRGs and IAFs. The posts should be equipped with everything necessary to perform service for a short period (from a few days to a week).

In order to prevent sabotage or ambush, it is advisable to provide for the protection of routes and objects on them by serving at sentry (observation) posts and patrolling sections of routes.

At the same time, guard posts are recommended to be deployed in places where the terrain provides the greatest range for observing the route. The distance between posts should provide fire interaction. In terms of the physical and geographical features of the Republic of Belarus, this distance averages 400–600 meters. In the intervals between posts on the approaches to the pavement, it is reasonable to arrange engineering barriers using light and sound signaling devices. With an increase in the activity of illegal armed formations and an increase in cases of attacks on columns, it is advisable to reduce the intervals between the guard posts to 150-200 meters. In the event of an IAF attack on the guard posts, they should be strengthened at the expense of the reserve, and if necessary, deploy checkpoints, for each of which to engage the territorial forces to a rifle platoon.

Secrets are arranged at some distance from the guard posts, while the secrecy routes are equipped with shelters to ensure the safe movement of personnel, the convenience of firing and fire support.

Patrols are organized on foot in closed areas by foot and mobile patrols (equipped with vehicles). At the same time, it is advisable to assign 2 to 5 kilometers to one foot patrol, and up to 11 kilometers of a route section to a mobile patrol.

The speed of the patrol should ensure the protection of the route, from this, it is assumed that it is about 4 km / h for the walking patrol and about 20 km / h for the moving patrol.

In the military unit or unit of the territorial troops, which is entrusted with the task of carrying out commandant service, it is advisable to appoint duty forces and equipment that should be in constant readiness for departure to the area where signs of preparation of an illegal armed formation, DRG for an ambush (sabotage) are found. Close to the routes of movement of troops, it is also advisable to organize the protection of public order, the performance of tasks to protect objects.

With the receipt of a command about the beginning of the movement of troops along the routes, regulatory posts and guard posts are deployed. Hiking patrols continue to patrol the assigned areas, inspect the approaches to the routes. If an attempt is made to establish a sabotage or ambush, an alert is given to the nearest guard post and measures are taken to repel an attack by an illegal armed group. A detected HE or another explosive device is indicated by signs in the prescribed manner.

Before the convoy of troops passes a specific section of the route on it, mobile patrols begin patrolling the territory adjacent to the route with the task of preventing the enemy DRG or IAG from advancing to the route and arranging a fire ambush.

The secret when it detects the approach of an enemy armed group or enemy DRG to the troop movement route, without getting involved in the battle, notifies the guard post and commandant reserve, which, in turn, take measures to repel the attack, by means of a signal (via communications)

In the case of an attack by enemy armed forces on a convoy, the guard unit engages in a battle with them at a favorable line in order to repel the attack, forge the actions of the attackers and allow the convoy to escape from the attack at increased speed.

One of the most reliable ways of combating enemy DRGs and IAFs is a set of measures to create a system of bases, garrisons and defense units throughout the territory of the territorial defense zone with their reliance on settlements. Therefore, it is advisable that the rifle battalions (companies) of territorial troops not be assigned targets, but areas (plots) of responsibility, platoons

Sectors of responsibility, if possible within the boundaries of the administrative places of their residence and formation.

It is advisable for the TV battalion to designate the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility within the boundaries of 2-3 village councils on the border territory and up to 4 village councils within the territorial defense zone. In the regional, district center, the areas of responsibility of battalions should be assigned to the administrative regions of the city and 2-3 village councils adjacent to the city.

A company of territorial troops may be assigned a responsibility area within the boundaries of 1-2 village councils in the city

In accordance with the quarterly development or scope of the facility (s) taken under protection.

A platoon of territorial troops, as a rule, is indicated by the sector of responsibility within one village council or the object of the task.

Thus, the task of combating enemy DDS and IAF is complex and requires the implementation of a number of counter-sabotage measures in the course of all tasks assigned to the territorial troops, the main of which are:

Suppression of seepage and breakthroughs of enemy DRGs, illegal armed groups through covered sections of the state border;

search, blocking and destruction of enemy DRGs and illegal armed forces;

protection and defense of important state and national economic facilities;

protection of the routes of movement of troops and communications in the framework of curfews;

the protection of public order and the control of observance of curfew in conjunction with police units, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

At the same time, in our opinion, it should be noted that all actions carried out by military units of territorial forces in terms of combating enemy DRGs and IAFs should clearly fit into a harmonious hierarchical system of measures and measures carried out in this vein throughout the state. The creation of such a system is an urgent task that requires an early solution.

LITERATURE

1. The partisan movement. According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Military historical sketch. Under the total. ed. V.A. Zolotareva. M .: Publishing house "Kuchkovo field", 2001. - S. 462.

2. Bogdanov V.N. The essence of partisanism and rebellion as a method of war. Army and internal troops in counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla struggle. Minsk, 1997 .-- 45 p.

3. Bogdanov V.N. Soviet experience in the fight against partisans and rebels (IAF). Army and internal troops in the counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla struggle. Minsk, 1997 .-- 78 p.

4. Taras A.E. Minor war. Organization and tactics of military operations of small units. - Mn .: Harvest, 2003 .-- 510 p.

5. Tsar'kov V.A. School for special purposes // Military-historical journal. 1989. - No. 12.

6. Zavelev A.I. Special Purpose Brigade, ed. Moscow, 1990 - 152 s.

7. The fighting of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan / Ed. Yarovenko. Yu.N. - M.: Publishing. VA them. Frunze, 1991.188 s.

8. The Chechen tragedy. Who is to blame / Ed. Nikolaev Yu.V. - M.: RIA Novosti, 1995. -111 p.

9. Potapov A. Fight in the dusk of the forest // Special Forces. -1997. - No. 1,2,3.

10. [War logs of partisan formations and units] NARB, f. 3908, storage 1, t. 1,2,3, f. 4258, storage 1, v. 1, f. 3620, storage 1, v. 1, f. 3616, vault 1, v. 1, f. 3952, storage 1, v. 1.

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